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Abstract 
Understanding the world involves complex cognitive processes 
occurring and interacting within the mind. Traditionally, this has been thought 
of as analogous to computational processes, with strict rules that encapsulate 
obligatory and domain specific modules. Current theories of cognition suggest a 
radically different approach in that sensorimotor simulation forms a necessary 
basis of abstract and concrete knowledge. These theories suggest that the ability 
to represent knowledge relies not only on brain-based processing, but also on 
the embodied experiences of the cognizer in the environment. However, there 
remains little agreement as to the nature of such embodied representations, 
particularly at the level of what constrains their properties and their ability to 
interact with one another. This thesis focuses on how cross-representational 
interplay is made possible. Through an empirical dataset, a case for a 
conceptual interface is made, suggesting co-activated distinct representations 
may interact by means of a third-party mediating mechanism (e.g. a joint 
attentional bias). This is demonstrated across a range of experiments using 
concepts representing several conceptual knowledge domains from more 
abstract to more concrete, including concepts denoting numerical magnitude, 
spatial semantics, emotional valency, and manual affordances. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
Cognitive science, a pursuit to understand how we acquire, represent, and 
retrieve knowledge, faces a critical frontier. Having accepted at least some level 
of sensorimotor representation as necessary in creating cognition (Meteyard, 
Cuadrado, Bahrami & Vigliocco, 2012; Zwaan, 2014; Borghi et al., 2017), the 
question now concerns the mechanisms that allow these representations to 
interact and be constrained by one another.  
This thesis offers a theoretical proposal and empirical data set 
documenting support for interactions between knowledge representations, 
including manipulation affordances, words denoting spatial semantics, valency, 
and numerical magnitude. However, before this agenda can be undertaken, the 
following chapter will begin by introducing the notions of mental representation 
and abstraction, which are critical for the understanding of how representations 
of number, affordances, spatial semantics, and valency may share and interact in 
cognitive domain. 
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Abstraction 
A brief history 
Philosophy has been concerned with the machinations of the mind in one 
way or another since as early as the times of the Ancient Greeks (Kenny, 1997). 
In Raphael’s painting The School of Athens (Figure 1), Plato and Aristotle can 
be seen arguing. Each philosopher grasps, in their left hand, their magnum opus: 
for Plato, Timaeus; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics. Plato’s upward pointing is 
toward what he would term the realm of forms (Gulley, 1960). These exist 
beyond what can be seen and are the perfect representations of things around us. 
For example, a triangle in the real world will never be a perfect triangle, as it may 
never represent the category of a triangle, but always a specific representation of 
Figure 1. The School of Athens, a fresco painted by Raphael. Note the central figures of Plato 
and Aristotle, arguing over representation. 
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one. Aristotle points at the ground, toward what we can physically observe 
around us. To understand Aristotle’s view as a contrast, it is perhaps best to use 
a quote from Nicomachean Ethics (in Rowe & Broadie, 2002):  
 
“It is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of 
things just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally 
foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand 
from a rhetorician scientific proofs”. (Book I, p. 1094b) 
 
To Aristotle, seeking perfect forms did not accurately represent the 
individual or collective experience in which we, as humans, live. Because of this, 
the forms described by his contemporary cannot exist: an understanding can only 
come from physical experience. 
Plato’s ether realm is easily understood today as the realm of 
propositional and amodal concepts, while Aristotle draws focus toward the body 
and the environment. This division continues throughout the painting, with other 
philosophers on the leftward side, such as Pythagoras, sharing a similar interest 
in forms, while on the rightward portion are philosophers concerned with 
observation, like Euclid. Though the terms have been altered and formalised, the 
arguments made in the present day are essentially equivocal to the ones conveyed 
in the painting: how does the mind function? What role, if any, do the body’s 
experiences in the physical and social environments play in cognition? Ultimately, 
can our thoughts ever be truly abstract and divorced from our experiences?  
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In answering these general questions, behaviourists eschewed the mind 
entirely. Following the early ventures of psychoanalysis, Watson (1913) 
suggested that the only data worthy of study was that which can be measured 
objectively and directly. To Watson and his ilk, the mind was little more than a 
black box; an item that received information from the senses and outputted 
behaviour and bodily action (Mackenzie, 1977). However, with the advent of the 
computer, this frontier would change drastically (Cooper, 1993). ENIAC, one of 
the earliest computational devices, was built to give answers to complex 
problems, however the physical workings of the device were not visible 
(McCartney, 1999). This served as a powerful metaphor for cognitive science, 
allowing researchers to unpack the black box of the brain. 
So came the boom of cognitive science, with early theories being strongly 
influenced by the literature of formal computationalism (e.g. Fodor, 1983; 
Pylyshyn, 1985; Johnson-Laird, 1994). By being able to label cognitive 
processing as symbolic manipulation, psychological thought could be ordered 
and categorised according to explicit architectures instead of external stimuli – 
or in other words, cognition could become abstracted away from the environment 
(Newell & Simon, 1972). These early views suggested that the brain should 
operate on amodal symbols, similar in nature to the way binary systems in 
computers are able to represent information. These symbols, through various 
processes of transcoding perceptual inputs, are acquired, stored, and retrieved to 
allow for rich cognitive understanding. 
However, problems developed with this view quickly, as can be best 
illustrated by Searle’s (1980) contention using the Chinese Room. This was a 
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thought experiment that had a non-Chinese speaker located in a room. Inside this 
room were two hatches, a set of rules and nothing else. The person would receive 
Chinese letters (symbols) from one of the hatches, manipulate them according to 
the strict set of rules and then send the resulting output through another hatch. 
Just as the individual performing the manipulations will never know what is 
being communicated in each message, simple symbolic manipulation cannot lead 
to the creation of meaning. An alternative approach considers the mechanisms of 
cognition as having evolved for action (rather, interaction) between the body and 
the environment it exists within. As a result, the organisation of the brain’s 
sensorimotor processes associated with embodied experience in the world should 
be reflected, somehow, in the nature and organisation of acquired, stored (offline), 
and retrieved (online) knowledge representations. Broadly, this relatively simple 
premise forms the basis for embodied cognition (Wilson, 2002).  
The word broadly is used with purpose: unlike formalised accounts of 
symbolic cognition, no clear model of embodied cognition has been accepted by 
the scientific community at large, with critics referring to it as a theoretical toolkit 
rather than a full-fledged theory of cognition (see Mahon & Caramazza, 2008; 
Mahon, 2015; Goldinger, Papesh & Barnhart, 2016). Because of this, it should 
not be surprising that embodied approaches run the gamut of perspectives, being 
in the most extreme cases entirely anti-representational like enactivist 
programme (e.g. Varela, Thompson & Rosch 2017; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; 
Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Pecher & Zwaan, 2005) or so far removed from 
sensorimotor systems that any activation thereof occurs by means of indirect, or 
secondary, priming (e.g. Patterson, Nestor & Rogers, 2007; Collins & Quillian, 
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1969; Levelt, 1992; Binder, Desai, Graves & Conant, 2009). Generally, when the 
term embodiment (also: groundedness) is used, it is making the claim that 
conceptual knowledge is somehow integrated within modal systems (see 
Barsalou, 1999; Myachykov, Scheepers, Fischer & Kessler, 2014; Pulvermüller, 
1999).  
Formal semantics as a study of meaning can be seen as a modern-day 
incarnation of Plato’s forms (Gulley, 1960), categories that refer to certain items 
without being a specific representation (e.g. a triangle can be considered a 
category that includes right angled, equilateral, scalene, equiangular, acute, 
obtuse and isosceles representations). Thus, a semantic category can refer to 
things that are present (the cup of coffee I’m drinking; lizards), absent, imaginary 
(a second cup of coffee not yet made; dragons), or even totally abstract 
(addiction; love). Undoubtedly, meanings of individual concepts and categories 
are real things, not only intuitively but also as we seem to understand each other 
most of the time when referring to things, both concrete and abstract. As a 
consequence, any proposed cognitive architecture has to have the capacity to 
represent what is present, not present, and also that which has never been directly 
experienced. So, for embodiment to hold as an account of cognition, 
sensorimotor systems should be traceable in both online and offline processes 
(Myachykov, et al., 2014). This is made possible through a radical shift in how 
thought is conceptualised: instead of cognition, and by extent the cognising 
individual, as a separate from the environment, consider that the world is 
constructed by sensorimotor processes, within the mind of the individual. In other 
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words, the agent, the agent’s body, and the environment this body is placed within, 
are one (e.g. Jackendoff, 2003; McRae, De Sa & Seidenberg, 1997; Ocelák, 2016). 
In the literature, there has been a shift away from entirely symbolic and 
amodal theories; at the same time, radically embodied theories have failed to gain 
traction as well. While it is generally agreed that sensorimotor information is 
accessed when semantic representations are activated, the mandatory/optional 
role of this sensorimotor information remains debated (Meteyard, Cuadrado, 
Bahrami & Vigliocco, 2012): Does it amount to little more than epiphenomenal 
effects reflecting access to extraneous and confounding information, or is it a 
necessary step in mental processing? This thesis refers to cognition-as-simulation, 
understood as “the re-enactment of perceptual, motor, and introspective states 
acquired during experience with the world, body, and mind” (Barsalou, 2009, 
p.1281). By adopting this view, the specific hypotheses of each tested area can 
be advanced. The domains discussed in what follows include affordances, spatial 
semantics, and valency, all in relation to numerical magnitude. A more detailed 
discussion of each domain will follow; however, it needs to be noted that these 
domains differ in their degree of abstractness. The most concrete (and, therefore, 
least abstract) of these domains is affordances, referring directly to objects that 
are manipulable in the world, and so this domain should have the strongest 
sensorimotor trace (Tucker & Ellis, 2004). The domain of spatial semantics is 
relatively more abstract than affordances, but still directly refers to the 
experienced environment (e.g., “push”, “pull”, “retreat”, and “advance”; Kuipers, 
2000). Finally, emotional valency (thereafter, valency) is the most abstract 
domain amongst the ones studied here. It has little concreteness as emotional 
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states like pride and depression are intangible and internal emotional states rather 
than direct experiences of the world around (Niedenthal, 2007). These three 
domains are discussed with relation to the domain of numerical magnitude, which 
spans levels of abstraction depending upon the type of presentation made 
(Dehaene, 1992). As noted above, a more detailed description of these domains 
appears later in the thesis. 
The adopted theoretical approach is not taken without strong support from 
the literature. Recent research shows emotional valency (Foroni and Semin, 
2009), spatial semantics (Zwaan, 2014; Dudschig, de la Vega & Kaup, 2014), 
affordance (Osiurak & Badets, 2016), and number (Myachykov, Ellis, Cangelosi 
& Fischer, 2016) to be linked with sensorimotor experiences acquired during 
acquisition and subsequent re-use. Several studies have, in support of these 
claims, demonstrated what we will refer to as spatial-conceptual mappings. For 
example, studies confirmed that numerical (Fischer, 2003; Fischer & Fias, 2005), 
spatial (Richardson, Spivey, Barsalou, & McRae, 2003; Chapman & Myachykov, 
2014), emotional (Meier & Robinson, 2004), and temporal (Núñez & 
Cooperrider, 2013) concepts all demonstrate sensorimotor biases.  
Having established a general case for cognitive simulation, an argument 
will now be made for cross-representational interaction. This is theoretically 
made possible by means of a dual-route whereby both top-down and bottom-up 
processing can cause interaction. Specifically, this interaction is argued to occur 
in general cognitive systems (such as memory and attention; see Posner & 
Petersen, 1990) as opposed to specific knowledge domains. 
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Interplay between concepts 
Think back to the forms of Plato (in Gulley, 1960). Today, these would be 
known as concepts, with each concept being a combination of permanent (core) 
and transient (online) features (Myachykov, Scheepers, Fischer & Kessler, 2014; 
see also Wilson, 2002). When two representations are simultaneously activated, 
they may interact even when they do not have much in common. The driving 
force for this interaction is a third-party component utilised by both conceptual 
representations, and subsequently acts as an interface between the two. (e.g. 
attention). A number of studies demonstrate spatial-conceptual mappings across 
different knowledge domains (see Cappelletti, Freeman & Cipolotti, 2009; 
Bonato, Zorzi & Umiltà, 2012; Lachmair, Dudschig, de la Vega, & Kaup, 2014; 
Winter, Marghetis & Matlock, 2015; Santiago & Lakens, 2015), and a 
commonality across all of these studies are fast and simultaneous shifts of spatial 
attention triggered by access to individual concepts. Congruent or ipsilateral 
shifts typically lead to facilitatory cross-domain priming indicating the 
establishment of a conceptual interface. Typically, these studies utilize tasks that 
require processing of concrete spatially arranged stimuli (such as priming and/or 
visual probe detection tasks) alongside or following word processing tasks (e.g. 
Richardson, Spivey, Barsalou & McRae, 2003).  
Some particularly strong examples come from lexical decision tasks, 
whereby participants show faster processing of nouns, verbs and numbers that 
bias attention upward (e.g. sun, rise, 9; see Lachmair, Dudschig, de la Vega & 
Kaup, 2014; Lachmair, Dudschig, Ruiz Fernández & Kaup, 2014). This observed 
effect of priming shows interfacing between two representations by means of 
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attention. Essentially, the first stimuli acts as a spatial cue (Posner, 1980), priming 
a directional response. If the probe stimulus appears in the same location or 
shares the same directional bias, a speed-up in processing is observed. Further to 
this, these studies also suggest the role of attention in underlying spatial biases to 
be relatively general and universal, and that any two representations known to 
project spatial biases can interact via an attentional interface (see Posner & Fan, 
2008; Posner & Rothbart, 2007; Rueda et al., 2004; Myachykov, et al., 2014). 
An important feature of cross-representational interface is its online 
nature; i.e., the notion that spatial biases triggered during accessing a 
representation are not stored offline as this representation’s permanent features. 
Consider the following example: both nine and lift are known to bias attention 
upward while one and drop are known to bias attention downward. However, 
neither sets of these concepts rely on attending upward for understanding. In 
other words, attention has no mandatory role in understanding either of these 
concepts. However, accessing these concepts will result in a measurable shift of 
attention. Because of this, and very importantly for the notion of interaction, it is 
suggested that any interface must only rely on an online relationship between two 
or more concepts that appear in close spatial or temporal proximity. Arguably, 
spatial biases are amongst the most studied of general cognitive mechanisms, 
which is why attentional interaction features so prominently. It is not, of course, 
the only catalyst for interface: another contender is working memory (e.g. 
Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Hickok, Buchsbaum, Humphries & Muftuler, 2003; see 
also Barsalou, 2008). 
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Traditionally, working memory proposes distinct mechanisms for 
visuospatial and verbal content (Baddeley, 2000). However, a case is made in 
more recent work for long-term knowledge representations as crucial 
components of the system (Cowan et al., 2005; Cowan, 2010) suggesting the 
existence of a much more holistic mental process. Additionally, links have been 
forged between visual working memory and visual attention (e.g. Olivers, 2008), 
with arguments relying on the overlap in brain regions and task demands forming 
the cornerstone of arguments (Olivers, Peters, Houtkamp & Roelfsema, 2011; 
van Moorselaar et al., 2017).  
If indeed working memory is an integrated system, it should be capable 
of acting as an interface between the knowledge representations that, when 
accessed, share the same working memory space. For example, in the literature 
of number-space interaction, sequential ordering of number in memorised 
sequences has led to spatial biases (Huber, Klein, Moeller & Willmes, 2016; for 
a review, see Abrahamse, van Dijck & Fias, 2016) suggesting that two complex 
concepts that shared memorial configuration may interact via this interfacing 
mechanism. 
So, it is hypothesised that co-activated concepts known to carry similar 
spatial mappings regularly interface via a shared attentional system. This forms 
the basis of the theoretical proposal for a distinct system of interaction by 
interface. The remainder of the chapter serves to introduce the domains tested 
later in the thesis, by means of affordance, spatial semantics, valency, and number. 
These domains are delineated by the associated relative degree of abstraction 
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(Figure 2), which acts as a tool to display where the present subject matter is in 
the context of the thesis. 
Number 
The core concept explored in this thesis is the concept of numerical 
magnitude, referred to simply as number from this point onward. It is the rug that 
joins together each of the seemingly separate representations of affordance, 
spatial semantics, and valency.  
Mathematics has been traditionally thought of as a relatively abstract 
domain of knowledge (see Adámek, Herrlich & Strecker, 2004). At the same time, 
space-related associations have always been helpful as a tool to aid the 
understanding of numbers and arithmetic. Cartesian coordinates offer a good 
example, where a reference system specifies a given location in space relative to 
an origin point using two fixed coordinates (see Descartes, 2001). To formally 
define this concept would require a relatively complex mathematical apparatus; 
Figure 2. The abstraction pipeline. A reference image used to indicate how concrete, in 
comparison to the other topics of the thesis, a given section is. Note number is not 
indicated, as it is used as a tool across all experiments. 
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to explain to a layman it is relatively straightforward if space is utilised in 
understanding. It is easy for one to remark they left a house and travelled i miles 
in one direction before travelling j miles in another, then show how these points 
are but coordinates on a map where i and j correspond with an X and Y axis.  
But association between numbers and space goes deeper than this. At the 
level of psychological experimentation, the association between space and 
number has been shown across a great many behavioural tasks. For example, 
when a participant is asked to judge the location of a centre point in either a 
broken or unbroken straight line during a line bisection task, they are fairly 
accurate despite displaying a slight bias depending on handedness (for a review, 
Jewell & McCourt, 2000). However, when this line is made of the numbers 2 or 
9, or of words that represent them, a participant’s judgement of centre is skewed 
toward the left or right respectively (Doricchi, Guariglia, Gasparini & Tomaiuolo, 
2005). This suggests that it is the knowledge of number-space associations that 
causes the bias in judgements, as if the left-to-right oriented number line had 
numbers plotted atop of them: 2 would be associated with leftward space and 9 
with rightward. A similar effect is observed in vertical space, to a lesser extent, 
with bisection tasks using larger numbers causing a bias upward, and smaller 
numbers biasing bisection downward in space (Cappelletti, Freeman & Cipolotti, 
2007). There are other factors at work (e.g. see differences in visual vs tactile line 
bisection; Shelton, Bowers & Heilman, 1990) but the effect of number is 
consistent across task design. 
The spatial biases induced by numbers can also be registered by means 
of an attention displacement effect (Longo & Lourenco, 2007). In a visual cueing 
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paradigm, participants were presented with a number before having to respond 
to a target in one of two visual locations on the screen. Presenting small numbers 
(1 and 2) facilitated faster leftward target detection responses, while presenting 
larger numbers (8 and 9) facilitated rightward target detection responses (Göbel, 
Calabria, Farne & Rossetti, 2006; Loftus, Nicholls, Mattingley & Bradshaw, 
2008; see also Fischer & Brugger, 2011). It is important to note that the digit 
itself gave no indication as to the outcome of the task, being entirely 
uninformative. Later work shows that this effect could be underpinned by an 
automatic ocular drift that accompanies the attentional shift and occurs 
independently, preceding an overt saccadic response. Myachykov, Ellis, 
Cangelosi and Fischer (2016) had participants maintain gaze on a central fixation 
point or perform left-to-right-to-left saccades following the auditory presentation 
of a number. In both tasks, spontaneous eye movement in the horizontal 
dimension confirmed ocular drift along the mental number line: leftward 
following small numbers, rightward following large numbers.  
The Spatial-Numerical Association of Response Codes (SNARC) is 
another effect confirming the existence of spatial-numerical mappings in 
horizontal space. It emerges when participants are required to make parity 
judgements about a perceived number (e.g. “press the left key if the number is 
odd, press the right key if the number is even”; see Dehaene, Bossini & Giraux, 
1993; Fias, 1996). This differs to the previous two effects described, as here the 
effect is less automatic in a sense that the content of a number representation is 
being necessarily accessed. The SNARC effect shows that left lateral responses 
are made faster following small numbers, while right lateral responses are 
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associated with larger numbers despite the task not requiring any magnitude 
estimation (Figure 3; Fischer, Castel, Dodd & Pratt, 2003; Viarouge, Hubbard & 
McCandliss, 2014; Ninaus et al., 2017). The SNARC effect has been found both 
in horizontal and vertical space, though it is weaker in the latter dimension (Hesse 
& Bremmer, 2017). 
Importantly, the SNARC effect has been shown to be relatively rapidly 
emerging. In Fias, Lauwereyns and Lammertyn (2001), participants were 
required to view shapes or lines that were superimposed onto numbers. The task 
then required the judgement of orientation using either the left or the right hand 
to respond, which resulted in the emergence of a SNARC effect and no observed 
effects of shape or colour processing. In later work, it was suggested that this can 
be credited to the overlap in neural regions for number, orientation, and space in 
the parietal cortex (Lammertyn, Fias & Lauwereyns, 2002), and the lack of 
overlap for other factors like colour and shape. However, later research has 
shown this to be a much more complex process suggesting a greater role for the 
Figure 3. A visualisation of the SNARC effect, whereby the blue line indicates an advantage for 
smaller numbers and left hand responses, while the red line indicates an advantage for larger 
numbers and right hand responses. 
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parietal cortex (Evans, Edwards, Taylor & Ietswaart, 2016; Colizoli, Murre, 
Scholte & Rouw, 2017; Mercier, Schwartz, Spinelli, Michel & Blanke, 2017).  
The unifying concept behind the effects discussed so far is the notion of 
a mental number line (Dehaene, 2003), later revised towards a mental number 
space that includes two (Chen & Verguts, 2010) or three (Winter, et al., 2016) 
mapping dimensions. This construct stems from work on the distance effect, 
whereby number pairs with greater numerical values of separation are more 
easily distinguished than number pairs with less numerical distance, at least in 
numbers less than ten due to a logarithmic compression of the Euclidean distance 
between the digits (Moyer & Bayer, 1976; Dehaene, Dupoux & Mehler, 1990). 
The mental number line, and by extension mental number space, is exactly as it 
sounds: the conceptualisation of number, or magnitude, in top-down, left-right 
and near-far space. 
By incorporating an extra dimension, mental number space evokes 
cultural effects (among other things) as an explanation of why effects observed 
in the horizontal domain are much stronger than those seen in the vertical, a 
suggestion supported by both embodied (e.g. Barsalou, 1999 Myachykov, 
Scheepers, Fischer & Kessler, 2014) and associative numerical cognition theories 
(Beller & Bender, 2008; Leibovich, Katzin, Harel & Henik, 2017). Although this 
thesis does not specifically address this, the effect of culture has been the subject 
of intense recent research. One study examined a sample of Russian-Hebrew 
bilingual participants to show SNARC effects when reading left-to-right 
(Cyrillic) but also when reading from right-to-left (Hebrew), which suggests 
reading habits contribute to the observed effects (Shaki, Fischer & Petrusic, 
- 39 - 
 
2009). Later research examined Iranian participants, which presents a novel set 
of circumstances: Farsi is read from right-to-left, but the number system used is 
read left-to-right. While a line bisection task still discovered a conventional 
number-based priming shift, no such effect was found in a random number 
generation task. This suggests that the horizontal mapping may be sensitive to 
the situation experienced (Rashidi-Ranjbar, Goudarzvand, Jahangiri, Brugger & 
Loetscher, 2014). 
So far, the SNARC has been shown to emerge relatively automatically, in 
other words regardless of individual intention to access the magnitude 
information (i.e. the task requires no processing of magnitude). Also, it is distinct 
from accessing other types of perceptual information about the stimuli as it 
doesn’t emerge when participants are asked to identify shapes. It is sensitive to 
reading direction as it can be modulated by this, and may be extinguished if the 
system of number and reading habit are in conflict. The question now concerns 
where SNARC originates. Specific proprioceptive coordinate systems can be 
ruled out, as studies have demonstrated SNARC effects to emerge when 
participants point toward targets (Fischer, 2003), cross their hands (Dehaene, 
Bossini & Giraux, 1993), and even when participants make eye-movement 
responses over the traditional hand or leg-based triggering (Schwarz & Keus, 
2004). In addition to this, the SNARC effect has been seen to emerge in response 
to grasp aperture, with participants adopting closed-hand and open-hand grasp 
postures and responding faster to small and large numbers respectively (Andres, 
Davare, Pesenti, Olivier & Seron, 2004). This will be further discussed later in 
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the chapter as it is crucial for the understanding of overlap-based interactions 
between simulated representations. 
Another method of triggering spatially congruent responses is to use 
tactile stimulation (Spence, Pavani & Driver, 2000). For example, affecting the 
left hand of a participant results in faster left-space responses (the equivalent 
being true for right hand stimulation). Interestingly, even when hands were 
crossed this effect still occurred (i.e. stimulation delivered to the left hand while 
it is in right-side space caused faster rightward response). This is starkly similar 
to work discussed earlier (Dehaene, Bossini & Giraux, 1993), and serves to 
suggest a similar mapping between the perception of space and the mental 
representation of number via spatial-conceptual mapping. Indeed, in 
neuroimaging studies examining visuo-spatial cueing, activation of the parietal 
lobe is consistently found (Eimer, van Velzen & Driver, 2002; Behrmann, Geng 
& Shomstein, 2004; Wu, Li, Li, Sun, Guo & Wu, 2014).  
When the literature discussed so far is taken collectively, interactions 
between magnitude and space appear to be relatively consistent. Evidence 
furthermore shows these findings to be relatively effector-independent, and in 
line with the theoretical basis for interplay between concepts discussed earlier: 
due, in part, to shifts in attention linked to spatial, eye, and hand representations. 
Importantly, it has been suggested that non-human species keep track of 
numerosity (see Dehaene, 2011) through neurons that are magnitude-selective 
(Thompson, Mayers, Robertson & Patterson, 1970; Sawamura, Shima & Tanji, 
2002; Nieder, Freedman & Miller, 2002). Through training, this behaviour can 
also be extended to the manipulation of symbols used to represent numbers (e.g. 
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Matsuzawa, 1985; Whalen, Gallistel & Gelman, 1999; Verguts & Fias, 2004). 
Similarly, infants (Xu & Spelke, 2000; Coubart, Izard, Spelke, Marie & Streri, 
2014) and adults (Barth, Kanwisher & Spelke, 2003) track numerosity also, 
suggesting that counting or tracking behaviours in the environment might have 
been a successful evolutionary adaptation. 
In A Theory Of Magnitude (ATOM; Walsh, 2003), the interactions 
observed between number and space, as well as between time and number, and 
time and space, are exactly that: an evolutionary adaptation which serves to 
lessen the load on, and aid, cognition when it comes to concepts that all have a 
magnitude-like meaning. ATOM highlights a classic argument in psychology 
where Piaget and Binet (in Fraisse, 1963) suggest children are unable to 
discriminate between temporal and spatial order, because perhaps the child is 
right. That, through experience within the body and environment a cognising 
infant is born into, the ability to discriminate between time, number and space 
develops. After all, as far as the architecture of the brain is concerned, it would 
be inefficient to have several similar systems distributed slapdash across the 
cortex (Collins & Loftus, 1975; also van den Heuvel, Stam, Kahn & Pol, 2009). 
The main support for ATOM is that it satisfies these criteria, the need to 
efficiently process external (magnitude-related) information for action, providing 
a directly-accountable system for processing that is based in the parietal cortex. 
The main competitor of ATOM is the generalised effigy of attention, often 
evoked in one of many guises as a post-hoc explanation of effects. This may 
sound like a strong statement to make, but the literature is clear: attention-general 
is the processor of time (Casini & Macar, 1997), the system for maintaining 
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number (Burle & Casini, 2001), the gatekeeper between time and number 
processes (Zakay & Block, 1995), and even the store containing for any or all of 
the above (Tracy, Faro, Mohamed, Pinsk & Pinus, 2000). Further, there is no 
widely accepted region of the brain responsible for attention-general, with the 
visual cortex (Ghose & Maunsell, 2002), cingulate cortex (Heinze et al., 1994), 
and parietal cortex (Posner, Walker, Friedrich & Rafal, 1984) being the brain 
regions1 responsible for attentional mechanisms of number, time and quantity 
depending upon the level of processing. The ability of attention-general to be 
used as a catch-all case means any prediction, within reason, can be formulated 
and find support in the literature. By means of ATOM, a more scientific 
attentional system allows only for specific hypotheses to be created, developed 
and tested. 
Interim Summary: Numbers and Space 
 Number and space have been shown across a variety of studies to be 
intrinsically linked due to an underlying magnitude component or representation. 
Across numerous modalities and tasks, spatial representations have been seen to 
affect the processing and judgement of participants in top-down and bottom-up 
contexts. While this has been mediated by the embodied context and situated 
demands of a task, such as culture and cognition, the association between spatial 
and numerical response codes is robust. Further, by means of ATOM (Walsh, 
2003), a framework has been presented that links domains beyond empiricism. 
The parietal cortex is suggested as the seat of sensorimotor manipulations 
involving space, quantity (number) and time, which allows for the present theory 
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of conceptual interplay to be tested using domains that rely upon spatial 
components: affordances, spatial semantics and valency.  
Affordances 
Studies on monkeys have shown two varieties of neurons to exist when 
processing visual and motor information, these are mirror and canonical neurons 
(Sakata, Taira, Murata & Mine, 1995; Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998; Gallese & 
Freedberg, 2007; Gallese & Goldman, 1998). In the macaque, both neurons are 
activated when carrying out specific actions, such as grasping. Canonical neurons, 
however, fire when simply looking at an object, providing support for the notion 
of affordance (Gibson, 1966; Gibson, 1977; Norman, 1999). 
Affordances are the motor programmes associated with potential 
interactions with an object perceived by an agent within an environment, that 
become automatically activated; i.e., even without an intention to act (Gibson, 
1966). The concept of affordances follows the general proposal for vison-for-
action (e.g. Gallese, Craighero, Fadiga & Fogassi, 1999) making visual 
perception more than a passive input processing system, and allowing for direct 
perception – an understanding without having to recruit more complex higher 
order cognition. This means that the processing of object features like colour and 
shape happens at the same time and in close coordination with the processing of 
what an observer can physically do with the object. To Gibson (1977), an 
affordance was an objective action possibility that exists in the environment 
independent of the individual’s ability to perceive it. It can be inferred, because 
of this, that objects have a set number of potential affordances, which are 
universal across agents despite a desire to use or ignore them (McGrenere & Ho, 
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2000). A door, for example, would afford the ability to be opened even if the 
handle or the door itself were camouflaged; a switch would afford being triggered, 
even if it were too high for the agent to reach. 
To Norman (1999), this did not follow. How can the locus of an 
affordance be within an object, when the individual cannot possibly perform 
them all? Instead, the idea of individually perceived affordances is put forward. 
Under this account, it is not just the physical capabilities and limitations of an 
object and agent, but also the agent’s goals, beliefs and experiences that affect 
the possible interactions afforded to the observer. For example, in Figure 4 a rock 
is being observed by three separate agents. In the Gibsonian sense of the term, 
all agents are equally capable of throwing, tool use, toe stubbing, hiding, 
climbing, and finding prey. The notion of perceived affordances captures the 
likelihood of different interactions occurring when the subjects are of different 
body, goal, and capability (see also Gibson, 2014; Fayard & Weeks, 2014). 
Figure 4. Object interactions as they are afforded to three different agents. 
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The notion of affordances can be subcategorized further into micro-
affordances, whereby specific components of action delineate different profiles 
of interaction (Ellis & Tucker, 2000; Myachykov, Ellis, Cangelosi & Fischer, 
2013). Here, the size and orientation of an object an agent intends to interact with 
potentiates different profiles of grasping (e.g. power/precision grips; Tucker & 
Ellis, 2004) or orientation (e.g. pronation and supination of the wrist and hand; 
Symes, Ellis & Tucker, 2007). As affordances are perceived manipulations, the 
situation of an interacting agent alters the ability of affordances to emerge 
(Wagman, Caputo & Stoffregen, 2016). Perhaps the strongest example of 
affordance variability can be seen in tool use, as here not only grasping 
affordances are activated but also functional affordances (Creem-Regehr & Lee, 
2005). As a means of addressing this, manipulation affordances can further be 
distinguished into volumetric and functional affordances (Bub, Masson & Cree, 
2008; Pellicano, Iani, Borghi, Rubichi & Nicoletti, 2010). A functional 
affordance is one associated with use (e.g. using a claw hammer to pry a nail 
from a wall) while volumetric affordances are used for grasping (related to the 
aperture of the hand when picking items up). 
Recent research shows that manipulating volumetric and grasping 
affordances impacts upon the time taken to process subsequent stimuli. Borghi, 
Flumini, Natraj and Wheaton (2012) had participants observe objects that were 
related either by functional use (knife and jam), spatial use (knife and mug), or 
objects that were unrelated (jam and mug). Additionally, a hand was presented 
near the stimuli, grasping an object functionally, grasping an object with a 
manipulation grip, or not displayed at all. The reaction time of a participant to 
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the task was fastest when objects were functionally, over spatially, related, but 
was affected by context. Manipulative conditions made functional trials slower, 
and functional conditions were slower in spatial trials. This is understood as being 
likely due to motor simulation. Myachykov, Ellis and Cangelosi (2013) found 
further support for this, in a task that shown graspable object parts to play a role 
in the process of affording. For example, in viewing a saw (Figure 5) it is possible 
to afford many different grasps. However, as use is frequently associated with the 
handle region, it is more likely to prime: 1) power grips, and; 2) right-hand 
specific response (c.f. Cho & Proctor, 2010). 
Vainio, Ellis and Tucker (2007) make a case for the relative degree of 
stability in micro-affordances, suggesting that there are stable and variable 
featural components of object representations. The stable features of an item exist 
across objects such as using a precision grip to interact with a pen: despite the 
variety of different shapes and sizes, a competent adult will tend to grasp a pen 
Figure 5. A hand saw. Note that this hand saw is more readily able to prime power grip 
responses (because of the handle) than precision grip responses (to picking up via the 
blade). 
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with the fingertips and thumb pressing against one another. Variable affordances 
are instead dependent upon situation and exist only when certain circumstances 
are met (i.e. transporting a pen in the palm of the hand could be done by means 
of a power manipulation). In a meta-analysis of studies examining brain region 
activation during viewing of stable and variable affordances, greater activation 
was found in the dorso-dorsal pathway for variable, and ventro-dorsal pathway 
for stable, affordances (Sakreida et al., 2013; see also Rizzolatti & Matelli, 2003). 
Binkofski and Buxbaum (2012) related this difference to use and grasp, driving 
a connection between the stability of an affordance and functional/spatial item 
use. 
It has been established so far that affordances are agent-perceived motor 
programmes supporting interactions with an object that may be relatively stable 
across use or variable depending upon situation and whether the intended use is 
functional or volumetric. Given such radical differences in affordance profiles 
within the same item, how can this area be studied free from interference and 
confounding affordance profiles? Simon effect-like findings (see Simon, 1990; 
Simon & Berbaum, 1990) when viewing objects provides a plausible explanation. 
The work of early stimulus-response compatibility effect experiments has 
participants classifying objects into categories, and that the objects tended to be 
either large or small, affording power or precision grips respectively (e.g. Tucker 
& Ellis, 2001; Grèzes, Tucker, Armony, Ellis & Passingham, 2003). Although the 
object size had little to do with successful completion of the task, the congruency 
between size and affordance type facilitated task response (Thill, Caligiore, 
Borghi, Ziemke & Baldassarre, 2013). So, by providing a context to the task, it 
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may be possible to reliably trigger activation of certain affordance profiles. 
Recent research shows cognitive processing of context to rely upon processing 
in the ventral stream (see Goodale & Milner, 1992), which allows goal-directed 
behaviour to influence processing occurring in the dorsal stream (vision for 
action; Mahon et al., 2007). 
The focus of the current thesis is on manipulation of stable affordances. 
As already alluded to above by a review of studies documenting size-congruency 
effects in power and precision grip items, when assuming a power grip, there is 
a larger grasp aperture than when assuming a precision grip (Castiello, 2005). 
This difference in volumetric affordances’ size has been related to the fact that 
magnitude-related information may be available in many more domains than is 
typically appreciated, including in affording action to item (Walsh, 2003; Rossetti 
et al., 2004; Göbel, & Rushworth, 2004). In Dehaene, Molko, Cohen and Wilson 
(2004), the argument is made that this is due to an overlap in the brain regions 
responsible for the representation of magnitude information and motor tasks, the 
intraparietal sulcus. The intraparietal sulcus is a part of one of the visual pathways 
involved in the encoding of spatial information, the dorsal system (Culham et al., 
2003; see also Rizzolatti & Matelli, 2003; Milner & Goodale, 2008). 
Generalizing from these and similar findings, ATOM (Walsh, 2003) 
purports the existence of a relatively universal magnitude system that underlies 
access to the magnitude information across knowledge domains. Many studies 
support the notion of an interaction between affordance and number by means of 
such magnitude system, both directly and indirectly. Firstly, the latter: words that 
represent objects of relative size have been shown to affect the activation of grasp 
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affordances (Glover, Rosenbaum, Graham & Dixon, 2004). In Glover, 
Rosenbaum, Graham and Dixon, this effect was shown to diminish as participants 
interacted with stimuli which suggested an online correction, something only 
possible without significant delay if the same system is being utilised. Though 
seemingly convincing, it would not be reasonable to generalise these findings 
from semantic knowledge to numerical cognition. The understanding of 
magnitude has been shown across many studies to be an ability reliant on abstract 
representations of size and quantity (Brannon, 2006; Dehaene, Bossini & Giraux, 
1993; Dehaene, Dehaene-Lambertz, & Cohen, 1998).  
Secondly, evidence that more directly shows the coupling of spatial 
representation with magnitude can be seen through the co-location of magnitude 
and spatial information in the brain. Walsh (2003) suggested the parietal cortex 
to be the location of the magnitude system. Many studies confirm the link 
between this region and numerical processing (Dehaene, Piazza, Pinel, & Cohen, 
2003; Bueti, & Walsh, 2009), while others show this region to play a role in visual 
gesturing (Desmurget, Epstein, Turner, Prablanc, Alexander, & Grafton, 1999; 
Connolly, Andersen & Goodale, 2003) interaction and grasping (Rathelot, Dum 
& Strick, 2017; Konen, Mruczek, Montoya & Kastner, 2013), and object 
manipulation (Binkofski et al., 1999; Buccino et al., 2001). Using reversible 
inactivation, animal research even shows an inability to pre-shape the hand to 
grasp when there is damage to the parietal cortex (Gallese, Murata, Kaseda, Niki 
& Sakata, 1994). In a seminal study, the parietal cortex was linked to all the above, 
incorporating reaching, grasping, object, and tool use (Vingerhoets, 2014). 
Further, the parietal cortex contains the dorsal stream, one of two visual pathways 
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(Goodale & Milner, 1992). This pathway is widely accepted as being responsible 
for guiding actions in space. In Chao and Martin (2000), fMRI and single unit 
recording was used to show a similar response in parietal cortices when exposed 
to manipulable objects, suggesting that the understanding of tools relies on 
specific sites in the dorsal pathway.  
Of all the domains examined in this thesis, manipulation affordances are 
rendered as the most concrete. This is because of the clear link between the 
physical environment (i.e. the object to interact with) and the associated 
representation encoding agent’s concrete experience. Numerous work has shown 
that merely perceiving an object is enough to potentiate the stable affordances 
associated with items (Helbig, Graf & Kiefer, 2006; Ellis & Tucker, 2000; Metta 
& Fitzpatrick, 2003), and so here a paradigm is suggested whereby participants 
are first primed with specific object affordances. This priming should later 
facilitate large/small number responses (cue dependent) in a parity judgement 
task, and affect recall during a verification task. Thus, the specific hypothesis for 
these studies is that grasp size and object representations, stored in memory, will 
lead to the establishment of attentional SNARC effects during auditory number 
processing, as revealed by saccade parameters. 
Interim Summary: Manipulation Affordances 
This section reviewed and summarised research pertinent to the area of 
affordances, with a greater focus on the aspects important to the thesis. In other 
words, it has been highlighted that mechanisms for manipulation and numerical 
processing overlap. One such way that this happens is through the dorsal visual 
pathway, known commonly as the vision for action stream of processing. While 
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affording to items in space is a continuous process, a distinction has been made 
in that affordances are agent-perceived. Because of this, goal-directed action is 
fundamental in processing the affordances available to an individual at any one 
moment – however, it has also noted that the mere perception of an object is 
enough to activate the affordances associated with it. In order to not be 
overwhelmed by the number of affordances available at one possible moment, 
affordance selection relies also on the ventral (vision for understanding) stream 
of processing. 
Spatial Semantics 
It is common parlance to look up to a respected person or look down on a 
person that is pitied. A proud speaker might describe themselves as standing tall, 
while a person in counselling might remark they’re down in the dumps. Tall and 
short people aren’t intrinsically worthy of more or less respect, nor does a 
person’s height grow or shrink depending upon their mood. However, these 
examples serve to highlight the spatial component of language and a very 
controversial area of research (see Talmy, 1983; Lakoff, 2008; Boroditsky, 2001). 
An agent will always be contained within a body, and that body will 
always be present in an environment. To a varying extent, that environment will 
be able to be navigated and interacted with. The language used by this agent will, 
at least in part, reflect both the concrete and the abstract aspects of the situation 
being experienced and described. Because of this, it is not surprising that 
language with a spatial frame of reference is fairly frequently used and 
encountered. The hypotheses of linguistic relativity (Whorf & Chase, 1956; see 
also Casasanto, 2016) and mediation (Vygotsky, 1978; Levinson, 2003; Slobin, 
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2003) find support from the use of space in language, and in turn provide strong 
explanations as to why space is so omnipresent. Both of these perspectives, to 
varying degrees, suggest language to effect and be affected by the cognitive 
processes of the speaker. Where these differ is in the degree to which thought is 
determined by language, with the former taking a relatively hard-line stance that 
language is thought and the latter being more flexible. 
Space is not, within itself, an easy category to delineate within language. 
In fact, understanding spatial frames of reference is anything but straightforward! 
Despite a large literature suggesting the opposite – from the space grammar of 
Langacker (1982), to the conceptual spaces of Gärdenfors (2004), to the mental 
spaces of Fauconnier (1994), it appears spatial semantics has boldly gone… 
everywhere. At the same time, not all semantics is spatial. Thus, it is important 
to have an operational definition of the topic being studied as to avoid sweeping 
statements and amorphous categorisation.  
Probably the easiest way of understanding space is to utilise classes (e.g. 
Landau & Jackendoff, 1993; Regier, 1996; Tyler & Evans, 2003). While this 
provides a quick way to make categorical judgements, it is not universal and a 
lot of information becomes lost (e.g. Brown, 1994). A way of circumventing this 
issue is to turn focus toward communicative function. Here, spatial semantics is 
concerned with being able to, during conversation, determine a location of a 
referent (Pederson et al., 1998). This view would require being able to answer 
questions of where, but also who, what, and when. However, this would prove 
controversial to some (e.g. Troyer, Curley, Miller, Saygin & Bergen, 2014; 
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Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Boroditsky, 2000) that would instead have spatial 
semantics limited to the literal.  
Here, spatial semantics is taken to mean expressions that indicate a 
location, or a change in location, of an entity in space. By adopting such a 
definition, the major controversies of the above are circumvented, and a non-
arbitrary position reached whereby language can clearly be labelled as spatial. 
For example, “lift”, “drop”, “retreat” and “advance” would be spatial language 
lexemes; conversely, “love” and “hate”, though triggering spatial biases (see the 
section on valency below), would not belong to spatial language. In part, the 
definition is motivated by the notion that cultural influence and embodied 
understanding of the world is a key component of language (Gibbs, Lima & 
Francozo, 2004). Another reason for this choice is to allow for a parallel to be 
drawn between concrete and abstract aspects of meaning, which will be 
elucidated further in the sections that follow. 
As with most effects in cognitive science, the initial demonstrations of a 
spatial bias in the perception of imagery extends as far back as the beginnings of 
psychology (Scripture, 1896). This effect was later rediscovered, following the 
demise of behaviourism, and extended to visual priming induced by words 
(LaBerge, 1983). Later work documented the relationship between mental 
representations of space and spatial linguistic terms (Tversky, 1993; Schober, 
1995; Carlson-Radvansky, Covey & Lattanzi, 1999). While these early studies 
reported some stable and consistent findings (e.g. Hayward & Tarr, 1995), the 
methods used were confounded by linguistic common ground (Schober), 
attributes of objects being described (Carlson-Radvansky et al.), and visual 
- 54 - 
 
context (Spivey-Knowlton, Tanenhaus, Eberhard & Sedivy, 1998). This is 
expected, as language is used in an open system, and so not free from the 
confounding effects of the environment (Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998; Larsen-
Freeman, 2002; Larsen-Freeman & Cameron, 2008). A seminal study by 
Pulvermüller (2001) detailed neurological evidence in support of this, showing 
words like kick, lick, and pick to activate areas of the motor cortex involved in 
the acts of kicking, licking and picking. Spurred on by this, later work also found 
words to activate the sensory systems that are associated with motion processing, 
for example the words rise and fall (Meteyard, Zokaei, Bahrami & Vigliocco, 
2008). 
There is a large body of research at the behavioural level to support these 
claims. Arguably one of the most important studies in this area was conducted by 
Richardson, Spivey, Edelman and Naples (2001). Here, ratings for 30 different 
action-verbs were gathered, normed, and stratified into functional categories 
across 2d space: the horizontal and vertical axes (e.g. push, pull; sink float), with 
the verb-ratings of participants being affirmed in two tasks. Later, Richardson, 
Spivey, Barsalou and McRae (2003) used these verbs to make a case for image-
schema interacting with perceptual processes. Across two tasks, the 
comprehension of verbs was shown to affect spatial processing, which furthers 
the claim that linguistic representation and perceptual mechanisms are closely 
intertwined. However, in these tasks sentences were used and so it is not clear 
whether the findings were motivated by the spatial representation of a given verb, 
or by the simulation of a whole sentential content. This is in line with accounts 
of sentence processing that are based on mental models (cf. Bower & Morrow, 
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1990). Kaschak et al. (2005), for example, found a similar effect in the 
comprehension of sentences: when asked to read a sentence and examine an 
image, participants were faster when the motion described in the sentence was in 
the opposite direction to the image viewed. This effect was later extended from 
visual to auditory processing (Kaschak, Zwaan, Aveyard & Yaxley, 2006), and 
shown to be negated by using single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(TMS; Glenberg et al., 2007), which supports common coding accounts of 
cognition (e.g. Prinz, 1990). However, even if support is taken to exist for both 
accounts – that is, processing of both within-word spatial content and within-
sentence – it can still be maintained that spatial representation, at least at some 
level, is recruited by language to aid understanding. Indeed, it would appear the 
effects finding lexical meaning to be captured by spatial representation are both 
robust and reliant (see also: Bergen, Lindsay, Matlock, & Narayanan, 2007; 
Meteyard, Bahrami & Vigliocco, 2007; Meteyard, Zokaei, Bahrami & Vigliocco, 
2008). This can be taken as support for embodied and grounded theories of 
cognition, which would expect spatial representations to interact with cognitive 
processing during subsequent reactivation (e.g. Barsalou, 1999). 
In this thesis single verbs with spatial semantics, instead of nouns or full 
sentences, are used. Using verbs allows for the focus of an experimental task to 
be on the mechanism that links perception and action through language. An 
experimenter is not having to rely upon the correct motor program to activate 
when participants are shown a ball, but instead directly evoke them through 
linguistic labelling, e.g. kicking. Further, by presenting only the verb to 
participants, the possible confounding effects of sentence simulation are avoided. 
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Experiments have been able to show that the mere perception of words alone 
activates image schema that either facilitates memory or interferes with attention 
(Richardson, Spivey, Barsalou & McRae, 2003). Bergen, Lindsay, Matlock, and 
Narayanan (2007) suggest that the effect emerges dependent upon the image 
schema implied by the sentence (e.g. concrete vs abstract movement; see Estes, 
Verges & Barsalou, 2008) where referential framing has been shown to have an 
ability to bias attention in the spatial semantics of words (Zwarts, 2017). 
Additionally, a role for magnitude has been found in the processing of 
language. One study found an effect whereby language with greater frequency 
evoked faster left-hand responses (Hutchinson & Louwerse, 2014). Bundt, Bardi, 
Abrahamse, Brass and Notebaert (2015) provide neurological support through 
showing greater motor evoked potentials for the right index finger following 
visual presentation of the word right and for the left index finger following the 
word left. The common denominator across the reported studies is magnitude-
related spatial responses indicating the existence of a mental number space. 
Additionally, there is ample evidence showing concrete and abstract words and 
sentences from other domains to also be grounded in sensorimotor experience 
(Hauk, Johnsrude & Pulvermüller, 2004), showing location information to 
interact with spatial semantic categories (Luo & Proctor, 2013), and showing 
numerical information to bias spatial understanding (Shaki & Fischer, 2017). It’s 
important to note that most evidence supporting the mental number line relies 
upon manipulating rather than merely perceiving numbers. For example, it has 
been shown in healthy adults that, when asked to bisect a line, that 4+2 is 
estimated as further rightward than 8-2 (Pinhas, Shaki & Fischer, 2014; Pinhas, 
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Shaki & Fischer, 2015). This suggests further research is required to examine 
whether representational pairs (spatial semantics and numerical cognition) 
interact. The associated SNARC effect has already been shown to be modulated 
by reading direction (e.g. Shaki, Fischer & Petrusic, 2009) and so an assumption 
that meaning will affect processing is grounded. Theoretically, this is made 
possible through association. Pulvermüller (2013) asserts that neurons make 
meaning by Hebbian learning mechanisms, and so by means of continued 
activation both spatial and numerical systems interplay. Mental number space 
develops through usage, as does the association between linguistic label and 
space (e.g. Gärling & Evans, 1991; Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 2017). 
In comparison to affordances, spatial semantics is more abstract. This is 
because it relies upon language, and not just on items present in the environment. 
As previous work has provided a case for the ability of spatial semantics to bias 
attention (e.g. Richardson, Spivey, Barsalou & McRae, 2003), here a paradigm 
is suggested whereby participants are first primed with words denoting specific 
spatial semantics. This priming should later facilitate large/small number 
responses (cue dependent) in a parity judgement task, and affect recall during a 
verification task. Thus, the specific hypothesis for these studies is that spatial 
semantics, stored in memory, will lead to the establishment of attentional 
SNARC effects during auditory number processing, as revealed by saccade 
parameters. 
Interim Summary: Space in Semantics 
This section reviewed and summarized research pertinent to the area of 
spatial semantics, with a greater focus on the areas important to the thesis. 
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Numerous studies suggest spatial knowledge to be reliant upon sensorimotor 
simulations associated with linguistic labels and objects (see Vigliocco, Vinson, 
Lewis & Garrett, 2004). Indeed, the understanding of action and spatial language 
has been previously linked to grounded experiences (Richardson, Spivey, 
Barsalou & McRae, 2003; Meteyard, Bahrami, Vigliocco, 2007). Referential 
framing, important to the ability of spatial semantics to lead attention (e.g. 
Landau & Jackendoff, 1993; Pederson et al., 1998; Zlatev, 2007), provides 
accountability for this system that relies on an individual situated in an 
environment (à la Gallese, 2007). Because of the similarities in empirical tasks 
examining visual attentional biases observed in SNARC and spatial semantics, 
as well as theoretical accounts of cognitive embodiment (Barsalou, 1999; 
Pulvermüller, 1999; Myachykov, Scheepers, Fischer & Kessler, 2014), 
motivation can be found for the proposed interactions. Though necessarily more 
abstract than affordances due to the obligatory linguistic coding, an interplay 
between representational components is still hypothesised.  
Valency 
When valency is referred to in this thesis, what is really being discussed 
is emotion. Specifically, a continuum between positive and negative emotional 
connotations as expressed by language. So, the language describing a situation 
that evokes happiness is said to be positively valenced. Likewise, should a 
situation evoke sadness, it can be said to evoke a negative valency (Frijda, 1986). 
As argued by embodied literature (e.g. Barsalou, 1999) the processing and 
understanding of valenced words comes through an interaction between the 
world, the body, and the mind. For example, it has been known that observing 
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either a smile or frown leads to activation in the very same facial muscles used 
to produce either expression (Dimberg & Petterson, 2000; Moody, McIntosh, 
Mann & Weisser, 2007). 
It has been argued that this mirroring (e.g. mirror neurons; Rizzolatti & 
Craighero, 2004) is what allows an agent to comprehend the emotions and actions 
of other people (Gallese, 2006) as well as their own (Niedenthal, 2007). Here, 
the thesis is concerned with language, not just emotion, and so a necessary 
question is whether language that utilises valency necessarily causes motor 
resonance (Zwaan & Taylor, 2006; Taylor & Zwaan, 2008). Motor resonance 
refers to the hypothesis that descriptions of an action (e.g. “frown”) will activate 
the same motor resources used in performing the action itself, similar to the 
effects that are observed through visual perception. Foroni and Semin (2009) 
detailed two tasks that required participants to process verbal stimuli, presented 
either overtly or covertly, finding smile-related muscle activation to emerge so 
long as the potential for motor resonance exists (i.e. is not inhibited by task 
demands). These findings fit with accounts of cognition described previously, 
whereby language maps onto areas of the brain that are associated with 
perception and action (Pulvermüller, 2013).  
Importantly, when the results of Foroni and Semin (2009) are understood 
in light of the TMS research by Buccino, Riggio, Melli, Binkofski, Gallese and 
Rizzolatti (2005), these articles together provide compelling evidence against 
criticisms of simulation for action (Spaulding, 2011): here, it can be taken that 
simulation of action co-occurs alongside language understanding, and not as a 
consequence of it. This is also paramount for the hypothesis of conceptual 
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interplay, which relies upon simulations that occur when two representations are 
simultaneously activated. 
Supporting findings are found in Glenberg and Robertson (2000) who 
assert that language comprehension relies on proximity between event and 
linguistic label. This so-called the indexical hypothesis follows the idea that the 
perceptual symbols described in Barsalou (1999) are parasitised by language in 
order to create meaning (see also Glenberg & Robertson, 1999; Kaschak & 
Glenberg, 2000; Glenberg, 2002). The action-sentence compatibility effect 
(Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002) – an experimental associate of motor resonance – 
emerges from this, a result which shows how a conflicting sentence (e.g. push 
the box) can interfere with subsequent action (e.g. pull the door). In a study 
bearing similarities to the original Simon effect study (Simon & Berbaum, 1990), 
participants were tasked with pressing a button that was either closer to, or further 
from, their body after reading a sentence that implied either an action associated 
with movement away from (e.g., push), or towards (e.g. pull), the body (e.g. 
Borreggine & Kaschak, 2006; Secora & Emmorey, 2015; Vinson, Perniss, Fox & 
Vigliocco 2017). Due to the necessity of sensorimotor simulation, a bottlenecking 
when processing conflicting information is observed (Prinz, 2013). This finding 
is taken to further support an embodied account of accessing meaning (Barsalou, 
2009).  
It has been shown that affective language can also cause motor resonance, 
making stronger the case for grounding cognition in sensorimotor experience and 
creating the avenue of research this thesis is to explore further. Conceptually, 
valency differs from spatial semantics by means of a greater abstraction. For the 
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purposes of this thesis, a parallel was drawn between spatial semantics and 
spatial meaning, which is to say the former relies upon markers of the 
environment: an agent can push or pull an object, and by doing so will move 
through space. Likewise, advancing or retreating implies movement. At the level 
of valency, though I can love climbing and hate football, though this thesis has 
drove me to both pride and despair, there is no physical movement associated 
with any of these emotions. 
The conceptual metaphor theory as purported by Lakoff and Johnson 
(1980), suggests that understanding abstract concepts occurs via a metaphoric 
mapping between the world of concrete experiences (source domains) and the 
world of abstract concepts (target domain). Space is one such source domain, and 
already has much support from the literature as far as understanding time 
(Boroditsky, 2000) and emotional concepts (Richardson, Spivey, Barsalou & 
McRae, 2003). Similarly, Zacks and Tversky (2001) make a compelling 
argument for the understanding of events by means of temporal and spatial 
structure. 
The present thesis is concerned with the understanding of valency and 
how this cognitive architecture can bias spatial processing. Typically, language 
is used to describe emotional states by means of space. At least in Western 
cultures, this is implemented in left-right and bottom-up polarities, which is to 
suggest the horizontal axis advances as it moves left to right and the vertical 
grows from the bottom upward. Most studies demonstrate that negative valency 
is associated with downward and leftward space, while upward and rightward 
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space is associated with positive valency (Crawford, Margolies, Drake & Murphy, 
2006).  
While it is obvious that, in some cultures, the direction of the horizontal 
or vertical axis may reverse, it is unclear as to actually why this occurs. The 
Tropic, Embodied, and Situated Theory of Cognition (Myachykov, Scheepers, 
Fischer & Kessler, 2013) provides an explanation as to why this may be the case, 
as it taxonomizes grounding representations in experience. Here, embodied and 
situated representations are equivocal below tropic constraints of the 
environment. 
Regardless of culture, many languages use spatially orientated terms in 
order to delineate positive and negative valency. It is important not to mistake an 
experience of valency as spatial representation, however, and understand them as 
being two distinct systems that are interfaced via a regular mapping mechanism: 
Gibbs (2005) suggests that there are conceptual similarities between the source 
and target domains which allows for the description (i.e. concrete) to be used to 
understand representation (i.e. abstract; see also Gentner, Holyoak & Kokinov, 
2001; Gentner, Bowdle, Wolff & Boronat, 2001; Gentner & Hoyos, 2017). Thus, 
it is possible to describe valency by means of space, but valency will still have a 
non-spatial representation at its core (e.g. Lebois, Wilson-Mendenhall & 
Barsalou, 2015). If valency is to be represented in a similar manner to spatial 
semantics, then there should be markers present in language and behaviour. But, 
there is a tendency to study behaviour through language alone, which may very 
well be problematic as not all cognition is language. 
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Through spatial representation, valency utilises a powerful shortcut for 
the representation of information via a reference to a matching experience (Gattis, 
2003). Memory and reasoning has been aided by the inclusion of spatial 
information (Hintzman, O'Dell & Arndt, 1981; Fellner et al., 2016; Perrault, 
Lecolinet, Bourse, Zhao & Guiard, 2015), but to date no research has investigated 
how this interferes cross-modally. As numerical cognition has been shown to 
incorporate a spatial aspect, it is not illogical to hypothesise about potential 
interplay between concepts, especially as the understanding of space is made 
possible through magnitude (Walsh, 2003). 
A final note needs to be made: valency is the most abstract of all the 
domains covered in this thesis. The use of emotional language is almost entirely 
abstract as it is language based, and reflects feelings not directly traceable in the 
environment, indirectly traceable in the body, and not entirely understood in the 
mind (Altarriba & Bauer, 2004; Kousta, Vigliocco, Vinson, Andrews & Del 
Campo, 2011; Vigliocco et al., 2013). Here, a paradigm is suggested whereby 
participants are first primed with words differing in terms of valency. This 
priming should later facilitate large/small number responses (cue dependent) in 
a parity judgement task, and affect recall during a verification task. 
 Thus, the specific hypothesis for these studies is that the valency 
associated with a specific word, stored in memory, will lead to the establishment 
of attentional SNARC effects during auditory number processing, as revealed by 
saccade parameters. 
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Interim Summary: Emotions in Space 
This section presents research important to the area of valency, with a 
greater focus on the areas important to the thesis. Highlighted have been 
mechanisms by which affect, or valency, utilises the spatial domain in order to 
be more readily processed cognitively. Additionally, due to utilisation of space, a 
case has been made for magnitude in the form of a potential conceptual interface 
between number and valency. 
Chapter Summary 
Here a theoretical case has been made for the domains of affordances, 
spatial semantics, and valency interacting with the representation of magnitude 
by means of a third-party interface. It is suggested that the activation and 
representation of conceptual domains utilises mechanisms of sensorimotor 
simulation, in line with embodied theories of cognition. The interplay discussed 
is made possible by co-activated (i.e. either in close spatial or temporal 
proximity), distinct knowledge representations being processed in a third-party, 
general mechanism (such as attention or working memory). 
By combining the emerging research, it is possible to generate tentative 
hypotheses that can be exploited through further academic study. Though 
discussed in more detail later in the thesis, these can be seen broadly to concern 
the nature of how the third-party interface processes information when dealing 
with congruent and incongruent representations. Exploratory by design, these 
hypotheses suggest that when representations are congruent by means of domain 
(i.e. between the parameters discussed throughout this chapter) there will be 
facilitation in response time and greater accuracy in recall.  
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In the chapters that follow, six experiments are to provide an empirical 
case for conceptual interface. These six experiments follow a similar 
methodology, which is described at a broad level in the General Methods 
(Chapter 2). Two of the studies then explore microaffordances and numerical 
magnitude interactions in Chapter 3, before another two explore interactions 
between spatial semantics and numerical magnitude in Chapter 4. Valency and 
numerical magnitude is explored in Chapter 5 before, finally, Chapter 6 provides 
the general discussion and conclusions of the thesis. Chapters 7 and 8 comprise 
the reference list and appendix respectively.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
General Method 
The following chapter aims to describe methodological elements of the 
project that are common across all studies. By describing these features now, 
more focus can be given to the findings and implications later. As such, this 
section of the thesis serves as a reference for future chapters, providing an 
overview of the hardware deployed, general features of participants, basic 
procedure, and data pruning methods. The experiment-specific chapters cover the 
precise details of participants, materials, and procedure. 
Hardware Used 
An Eyelink 1000 system recorded participant’s eye movements. The 
setup consisted of different components, categorized into three domains for 
simplicity: the Eye Tracking Device, Host PC and Display PC. There is overlap 
in terms of how the devices act (e.g. the eye tracking device records the eye, the 
Host PC detects and categorises movements, the display PC coordinates the 
efforts), however, the groupings are for the sake of simplicity and understanding 
instead of functionally distinct categorisation. 
Eye Tracking Device 
The Eyelink 1000 is an ultra-high resolution device, deployed within the 
laboratory as desktop mounted with the illuminator on the left (SR Research, 
2017). Eye detection was performed with centroid fitting, and tracking achieved 
using the Pupil with Corneal Reflection principle (Duchowski, 2007). Eyes were 
tracked with a monocular sampling rate of 1000Hz, capable of measuring one 
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data point every millisecond. Such a frequency is important in maintaining a high 
standard of spatial resolution (measured at .01°), and accuracy (typically 
between .25° to .5°). At this tracking frequency, the blink recovery time was 1ms 
and the end-to-end sample delay on average less than 1.8msec. 
The camera-to-eye distance of the tracker was approximately 60cm and, 
with the 35mm lens installed, this provided a gaze tracking range of 32° 
horizontally and 25° vertically – acceptable for the size of the monitor used to 
present stimuli and the distance from the monitor to the eye. Movement of the 
head was restricted using an SR Research head support with both chin and 
forehead rests attached. By doing so, any movement was contained within 
allowable parameters (25mm x 25mm x 10mm; horizontal x vertical x depth). 
The eyetracker produced an infrared wavelength of 940nm, gaining the 
categorization as a Class 1 LED Device. This is not harmful to participants when 
used as per standard operating procedures. 
Host PC 
The Eyelink 1000 was connected to a Dell Precision 390 via a parallel 
port cable, enabling the two devices to communicate multiple bits of data 
simultaneously. As the detection and categorization of eye-motion into saccade 
and fixation events is performed online, the requirements of the host PC are 
necessarily stringent. The Dell Precision 390 comprised an Intel Core 2 6400 
CPU with two cores clocked at 2.13GHz, 1GB RAM and an NVIDIA Quadro 
NVS 285 with 128mb of memory. When eye-tracking, the Host PC ran a ROM-
DOS Real-Time operating system to avoid buffering delays during data 
processing. 
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The experimenter could interact with the Host PC using a standard 
QWERTY keyboard and mouse in order to calibrate, validate, and monitor 
participant’s performance. Participants were required to respond during the task 
using a Microsoft Sidewinder gamepad connected to the Host PC via a USB port. 
USB traffic polling introduces a variable input lag of up to 8ms due to the CPU 
of the Host PC polling devices at 125Hz (see Plant, Hammond & Whitehouse, 
2003). However, low-level drivers produced by SR Research address this 
problem and the variable delay is benchmarked instead at less than 1ms. 
Following a successful session, data were transferred to the Display PC using a 
100 BASE-T Ethernet cable  
Display PC 
The display PC served the procedures of calibrating the eye tracker, 
coordinating data collection, presenting stimuli during the experiment and 
collating data following completion. Here, the Eyelink Programming API was 
deployed as part of the experimental paradigm. Thus, the Display PC utilised SR 
Research’s Experiment Builder (SR Research, 2017) to configure and control the 
Eye Tracking Device through the Host PC. As it was the responsibility of the 
Host PC to acquire and collect data, millisecond reaction timing was made 
possible despite the use of a non-real-time operating system on the Display PC 
(see Garaizar, Vadillo, López-de-Ipiña & Matute, 2014). The Display PC was a 
custom-built device, comprising an Intel i7-6700k, with 8 CPUs clocked at 4GHz, 
16GB of RAM, and an NVIDIA GTX 980 with 4GB of memory. A 64bit image 
of Windows 7 was installed on the device, and sound played via Realtek Drivers 
through Kye Systems Corp’ Genius Stereo Speakers. 
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Importantly for reaction timing, stimulus presentation occurred on a 19” 
ViewSonic Graphic Series G90fB CRT monitor connected to the Display PC via 
VGA cable. The monitor had a 1280 x 1024 resolution and 85Hz refresh rate. At 
this rate, the monitor refreshed every 11.764ms. 
Software Used 
The experiments were designed using Experiment Builder v1.10, 
software built by the company SR Research to allow for high levels of precision 
in the recording of data (SR Research, 2017). To aid design, Python v2.7 was 
utilised to increase the flexibility of Experiment Builder. 
Collected data were parsed through Data Viewer v2.6 (SR Research, 
2017). The output was then manipulated and analysed using Microsoft Excel 
2016, IBM SPSS 24, and RStudio v1.0.136 (RS Team, 2017; via a backend of R 
v3.3.3, R Core Team, 2017). In using R, several additional statistical packages 
were required; these were psych (v1.7.3.21), ggplot2 (v2.2.1), plyr (v1.8.4), dplyr 
(v0.5.0), and extrafont (v0.17). 
Participants 
Participants were recruited via opportunity sampling of the Northumbria 
University SONA System, a participation management system. In return for 
contributing, participants were awarded course credits that could be used in 
recruiting for under- or post-graduate dissertation projects. It was required that 
all participants be over the age of 18, native speakers of English, have normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision, not have any language impairments, and not wear 
any eye makeup during testing. Due to the potential effects of body specificity 
(Casasanto, 2011) all participants were additionally required to be right handed, 
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which was assessed with the help of the short form Edinburgh Handedness 
Inventory (EHI; Ransil & Schachter, 1994; 
http://www.brainmapping.org/shared/Edinburgh.php). Participants had to have 
an EHI score over 80 in order for their data to be included into the experimental 
sample. 
Procedure 
Experiments 1-6 followed a similar procedure, which gained approval for 
testing from Northumbria University’s Board of Ethics. Before testing, 
participants were first fully briefed about the study, including use of the eye-
tracking apparatus, by means of standardised instructions, and provided written 
informed consent (for an example, Appendix A). Any participants wearing 
excessive eye makeup (e.g. eyeliner, mascara, eyeshadow) were asked to remove 
it for testing.  
Participants were seated at a desk in the eye-tracking laboratory with their 
chin and forehead firmly rested onto a support that was 60cm from the CRT 
monitor. The setup was adjusted to make participants comfortable, before 
equipment adjustment and calibration of the eyetracker took place. Calibration 
comprised a nine-point task that matched eye movement to screen location. This 
task had participants first fixate on a dot in the centre of the screen before 
directing gaze toward a series of fixation dots appearing at random across nine 
locations. A further nine-point validation task confirmed the error of recorded 
visual angle to be less than 1°.  
Experimental trial contents are to be discussed at greater detail in each 
chapter, but the general structure of a trial remained generally the same across all 
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experiments. Participants were presented first with a fixation dot (20px) for 
500ms, before being presented with a priming image for 1000ms. Another 
fixation dot was then presented for 500ms. Following fixation offset, participants 
were presented with two square-shaped targets, 150x150px in size, either in 
horizontal or vertical space (upward: 512,192; downward: 512,576; leftward: 
320,384; rightward: 704,384), and heard a female voice saying one of four 
numbers (one, two, eight, nine; for experimental materials, Appendix B). The use 
of a female voice recording was important, as previous research has found 
SNARC to be gender (Bull & Benson, 2006; Bull, Cleland, & Mitchell, 2013) 
and pitch (Campbell & Scheepers, 2015) sensitive. By controlling for vocal pitch, 
the extra dimensions of spatial representation that may become activated are 
prevented from interfering with the study. 
Participants were tasked with responding to these numbers by means of a 
parity rule that was presented at the start of a block of trials, for example “look 
left if the number you heard was odd; look right if the number you heard was 
even” (cf. Fischer, et al., 2004). The parity rule was manipulated such that all 
directions were accounted for equally (left and right, up and down). After making 
the target directed saccade, participants were asked a question that verified the 
prime as being maintained in memory. This question presented either the same 
image or word participants were shown, or a different image or word, and to 
respond participants pressed one of two trigger buttons on a gamepad that 
corresponded to yes or no. A buffer period of 1000ms existed between the offset 
of one trial and the beginning of the next. See Figure 6 for an example trial 
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sequence. After completion of the experimental session, participants were 
debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
Data Filtering and Analysis 
Filtering 
The experimental output was first time-locked to the chronometric 
periods of interest (POI) that were deemed important for analysis. These POIs 
were: 1) probe onset to probe offset, 2) probe onset to verification question offset, 
3) verification question onset to participant button response. POI 1 was used in 
the analysis of probe reaction time and measures related to saccadic eye-
movement. POI 2 allowed for the analysis of total gaze durations. The reason for 
the longer duration is that participants may continue to fixate for a period 
following probe offset, which would be data lost if analysis was conducted under 
POI 1. Finally, POI 3 allowed for the analysis of measures related to the 
verification task. Measures of probe and verification accuracy did not require a 
time locked period, as these were generated automatically by means of custom 
python scripting. 
Figure 6. An example trial sequence in which the verification question is a word and 
incongruent with the prime. 
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Time-locked data were subject to filtering to remove any extreme values: 
for measures of probe and verification reaction times, this was between 150ms 
and 2000ms; total gaze durations, 10ms and 2000ms; first fixation durations, 
10ms and 2000ms; saccade onset, 100ms and 2000ms; saccade duration, 20ms 
and 600ms. These parameters were based on the typical values found in the 
literature and they were used to trim the data with regard to anticipatory and 
severely delayed responses. Resulting data underwent a log10 transformation to 
account for the right skewness inherent in reaction time-based data and to assume 
a distribution much more representative of Gaussian-normal. Finally, any 
participants with too few remaining values were excluded from the analysis. This 
removed one participant from each task. 
Analysis 
Data were analysed by means of 2x2x2 within-subjects ANOVAs with 
further investigations of any interaction effects. The advantage of this type of 
analysis is that it protects against overclaiming and underclaiming the number of 
significant differences between groups. Furthermore, measures of effect size 
were provided via the partial eta squared statistic. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Volumetric Affordances And Numerical Magnitude 
 
Figure 7. The Abstraction Pipeline. A pictorial example of how far removed the current 
chapter’s subject matter is from concrete representation. 
The following chapter comprises two experiments that required participants to 
maintain in memory the identities of objects of varying grasp volume, listen to 
numbers of varying number, and then direct eye movement toward one of two 
targets located on a screen in horizontal (experiment 1) and vertical (experiment 
2) space. As discussed in the Introduction, there is growing empirical evidence 
for the assumption that object representations stored in memory and those formed 
online during perceptual apprehension rely on sensorimotor simulation (van 
Moorselaar et al., 2014) and that perceptual and semantic properties of these 
representations share an interactive processing space (Oliviers, Meijer, Theeuwes, 
2006; De Groot, Huettig, & Olivers, 2016). Other studies show a similar case for 
the processing of numerical magnitude, such as SNARC (Fischer & Fias, 2005) 
and distance (Lendinez, Pelegrina & Lechuga, 2011) effects. Even more studies 
relate representations of number to sensorimotor simulations, such as volumetric 
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grasp affordances (Badets, Andres, Di Luca & Pesenti, 2007) and time (Sell & 
Kaschak, 2011). These studies provide support for the ATOM theory of number 
(Walsh, 2003) suggesting interplay between number-related knowledge domains, 
which include perception and memory (Myachykov, Chapman, & Fischer, 2017). 
Here, it is hypothesized that the grasp size of object representations stored in 
memory will lead to the establishment of attentional SNARC effects during 
auditory number processing, as revealed by saccade parameters. Specifically, 
objects that involve assuming power grasps will prime responses in rightward 
and upward domains whilst precision grasps will prime responses in leftward and 
downward domains. Error rates are expected to mirror this, with greater accuracy 
being observed in wholly congruent trials.  
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Experiment 1  
Horizontal Space 
Methodology 
Design 
The task comprised a within-participants, 2x2x2 design with the 
following independent variables: Affordance (power/precision), Number 
(small/large) and Probe (left/right). Two parity rules (even-left; even-right) were 
used to balance for any effects of number line congruency and auditory number 
presentation. Trials were replicated to produce 96 instances per participant. 
Several dependent variables were recorded, including: reaction times in the 
parity-ruled saccade task and verification question, accuracy rates in the saccade 
and verification tasks, and both saccadic and fixation measures of eye movement. 
All participants responded to all trials, which were grouped by parity rule and 
counterbalanced across presentation. Numbers were presented randomly within 
blocks of testing. 
Participants 
The experimental sample consisted of 26 participants (13 males), with an 
average age of 22 (range: 18-50, SD = 7.593). All participants were native 
speakers of English, had normal or corrected-to-normal eyesight, and they were 
all right handed as per the inclusion criteria outlined above. All participants were 
recruited from the undergraduate population of Northumbria University, and they 
received course credits in remuneration for their participation. 
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Materials 
In addition to the auditory number files used across all studies reported in 
this Thesis, objects’ pictures were taken from Salmon, McMullen and Filliter’s 
(2010) stimuli database, with the respective affordance norms provided by 
Lagacé, Downing-Doucet and Guérard (2013). These norms allowed for the 
creation of objective power and precision object trials, consisting of the most 
representative objects from each category. Fixation dots and target squares were 
created in Experiment Builder. 
Procedure 
All data were collected in a room with minimal lighting. Before testing, 
participants were briefed about the nature of the experiment (see Appendix A for 
the standardised brief) and asked to complete informed consent documentation 
(Appendix A) before answering a demographics questionnaire (Appendix C) and 
the Short Form Edinburgh Handedness Index (Appendix D; Ransil & Schachter, 
1994). After consenting, the participant was then seated on a chair with the 
backrest tilted to a 110° 60cm from the screen with their head placed on an SR-
Figure 8. An example trial sequence in which the verification question is an object 
congruent with the prime. Note that presentation is not to scale but is used to aid 
clarification. 
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Research chin-rest, before being calibrated, tested, and debriefed. Figure 8 
portrays a typical experimental trial. Each experimental trial started with a 
fixation cross presentation for 500ms followed by a centrally presented object for 
1000ms, followed by another fixation cross (500ms). After that, an auditory 
number was played alongside two lateral visual targets, located as identified in 
horizontal space within the General Methods (chapter 2). In accordance with the 
parity rule, participants made a saccade toward one of the targets. The landing of 
a saccade triggered the offset of the saccade task and the onset of a verification 
task, which required participants to view an object and decide whether it is the 
same or different to the object seen at the start of the trial. This secondary task 
ensured that participants maintained the object’s identity in memory when the 
auditory number was played hence allowing for the analysis of the potential 
interactions between the two co-activated representations (Myachykov, Chapman, 
& Fischer, 2017). Participants pressed a key on the game pad to respond to this 
task, either the left (corresponding to yes) or right (corresponding to no) trigger. 
Depress of the button signalled the end of a trial and a 1000ms buffer period 
before the start of the next. Participants were given accuracy feedback 
immediately after saccade and verification tasking. Individual experimental 
session lasted approximately 60 minutes. 
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Results 
The strategy discussed in the general methods section was utilised in 
filtering and analysing the data provided by participants. This involved, post 
filtering and transformation, a series of 2x2x2 ANOVAs to understand fixation, 
saccadic, and manual response parameters of the data. 
Responses to the parity and verification task were measured using 
reaction time and error rates for all participants. Eyetracking data was analysed 
only for the saccade task, which can be further divided into fixation and saccadic 
metrics. A standard criterion of α was used and set to .05. Data from one 
participant was excluded due to not completing the experimental paradigm, and 
all tests were conducted on the remaining 25 participants. For the raw data, see 
Appendix E. 
Saccade Task 
Error Rate Analysis 
On average, correct responses in the saccade task were high (85.95%). 
More accurate responses were given in trials showing precision grip (86.82%) 
stimuli than those showing power grip (85.07%). The audial presentation of large 
(87.02%) numbers resulted in greater accuracy than the presentation of small 
numbers (84.88%). Finally, rightward (86.21%) trials were responded to more 
correctly than leftward (85.69%) trials. For conditional means, see the 
breakdown in Table 1.  
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Table 1. Mean rate of accuracy (%) in response to the saccade task. 
Probe  Left  Right  Total 
Affordance  Power Precision Power Precision  
Number Large 84.54 85.71 87.20 90.66 87.02 
Small 86.51 86.01 82.07 84.93 84.88 
Total  85.52 85.86 84.63 87.78 85.95 
 
In a closer analysis, no significant main effect of probe (Wilks’ λ = .997, 
f (1,24) = .067, p = .797, ηp2 = .003), number (Wilks’ λ = .964, f (1,24) = .888, p 
= .356, ηp2 = .036), or affordance (Wilks’ λ = .900, f (1,24) = 2.657, p = .116, ηp2 
= .100) was found. Additionally, no significant interaction was observed between 
probe and number (Wilks’ λ = .873, f (1,24) = 3.495, p = .074, ηp2 = .127), probe 
and affordance (Wilks’ λ = .926, f (1,24) = 1.908, p = .180, ηp2 = .074), or number 
and affordance (Wilks’ λ = .994, f (1,24) = .140, p = .712, ηp2 = .006), nor was 
any interaction observed between all three factors (Wilks’ λ = .999, f (1,24) = .034, 
p = .856, ηp2 = .001). 
Response Time Analysis 
Mean RT in the saccade task was 729.36ms. Responses were fastest when 
hearing large (721.22ms) over small (737.76ms) numbers. Leftward (735.29ms) 
conditions were slower than rightward (723.41ms) conditions. Finally, power 
grip (728.29ms) objects evoked a faster response than precision grip (730.41ms) 
items. The means for individual conditions can be seen in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Mean (and standard deviations) for response times in milliseconds to the 
saccade task. 
Probe  Left  Right  Total 
Affordance  Power Precision Power Precision  
Number Large 738.20 
(303.39) 
724.18 
(278.11) 
699.52 
(288.03) 
723.30 
(302.20) 
721.22 
(292.93) 
Small 720.41 
(304.21) 
759.03 
(346.32) 
756.99 
(340.78) 
715.64 
(282.42) 
737.76 
(311.45) 
Total  729.19 
(303.61) 
741.31 
(297.70) 
727.38 
(315.67) 
719.57 
(292.46) 
729.36 
(302.23) 
 
A closer analysis revealed no significant main effect of probe (Wilks’ λ 
= .946, f (1,24) = 1.363, p = .254, ηp2 = .054), number (Wilks’ λ = .992, f (1,24) 
= .202, p = .657, ηp2 = .008), or affordance (Wilks’ λ = .976, f (1,24) = .597, p 
= .447, ηp2 = .024). Additionally, no significant two-way interactions were found 
between probe and number (Wilks’ λ = .991, f (1,24) = .214, p = .647, ηp2 = .009), 
probe and affordance (Wilks’ λ = .997, f (1,24) = .079, p = .781, ηp2 = .003), and 
number and affordance (Wilks’ λ = 1, f (1,24) = .012, p = .915, ηp2 < .001). 
However, a significant three-way interaction was found between all three factors 
(Wilks’ λ = .808, f (1,24) = 5.705, p = .025, ηp2 = .192), prompting further 
investigation. See Figure 9 and 10 for a representation of the interaction. The 
interaction revealed no further significant differences when trials were grouped 
by power grip (leftward: large x small magnitude, p = .198; rightward: large x 
small magnitude, p = .164) or precision grip (leftward: large x small magnitude, 
p = .382; rightward: large x small magnitude, p = .330) conditions.  
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Figure 9. Depicted is one aspect of the three-way interaction for Probe Response Time. 
Responses to power grip trials are shown across probe location and magnitude, and 
reaction time is displayed in milliseconds. 
Figure 10. Depicted is one aspect of the three-way interaction for Probe Response Time. 
Responses to precision grip trials are shown across probe location and magnitude, and 
reaction time is displayed in milliseconds. 
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Eye Movement Analysis 
Fixation data. 
On average, participants’ first fixations durations were 359.69ms. Large 
numbers (359.86ms) primed longer first fixation durations than small numbers 
(359.51ms), with the same being true for precision grip (365.63ms) over power 
grip (353.70ms), objects. Finally, leftward saccades (346.54ms) preceded shorter 
first fixation durations than rightward saccades (372.97ms). In Table 3, first 
fixation durations are shown on a condition-by-condition basis. 
Table 3. Means (and standard deviations) for participant's first fixation durations 
presented in milliseconds during the saccade task. 
Probe  Left  Right  Total 
Affordance  Power Precision Power Precision  
Number Large 342.95 
(188.71) 
355.53 
(202.35) 
353.09 
(188.22) 
386.92 
(219.07) 
359.86 
(200.54) 
Small 348.48 
(191.70) 
338.77 
(209.09) 
371.17 
(225.94) 
380.14 
(277.70) 
359.51 
(228.36) 
Total  345.78 
(190.06) 
347.32 
(205.62) 
361.95 
(207.51) 
383.59 
(249.34) 
359.69 
(214.72) 
 
Inferential analysis revealed no significant main effects of probe (Wilks’ 
λ = .997, f (1,24) = .058, p = .812, ηp2 = .003), number (Wilks’ λ = .905, f (1,24) 
= 2.421, p = .133, ηp2 = .095), nor affordance (Wilks’ λ = .959, f (1,24) = .983, p 
= .332, ηp2 = .041). Additionally, no two-way interactions were observed 
between probe and number (Wilks’ λ = 1.000, f (1,24) = .011, p = .918, ηp2 
< .001), probe and affordance (Wilks’ λ = .940, f (1,24) = 1.473, p = .237, ηp2 
= .060), nor number and affordance (Wilks’ λ = .901, f (1,24) = 2.530, p = .125, 
ηp2 = .099). Finally, no three-way interaction was observed (Wilks’ λ = .978, f 
(1,24) = .517, p = .479, ηp2 = .022). 
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The amount of time on average spent by participants dwelling on a target 
during the saccade task was 448.74ms. Dwell time was longer for large 
(454.66ms) over small (442.71ms) numbers, for precision (454.64ms) over 
power (442.80ms) grip objects, and for rightward (450.15ms) over leftward 
(447.36ms) targets. Table 4 details total gaze durations on a condition-by-
condition basis. 
Table 4. Means (and standard deviations) for participant's total gaze duration presented 
in milliseconds during the saccade task. 
Probe  Left  Right  Total 
Affordance  Power Precision Power Precision  
Number Large 438.46 
(234.67) 
467.54 
(241.85) 
449.90 
(243.68) 
462.18 
(233.75) 
454.66 
(238.38) 
Small 447.08 
(253.11) 
435.64 
(243.72) 
435.21 
(232.97) 
452.20 
(277.08) 
442.71 
(252.20) 
Total  442.88 
(244.06) 
451.95 
(243.02) 
442.72 
(238.35) 
457.28 
(255.72) 
448.74 
(245.32) 
 
Similarly, no significant main effects were found for probe (Wilks’ λ 
= .995, f (1,24) = .114, p = .738, ηp2 = .005), number (Wilks’ λ = .909, f (1,24) 
= .2.307, p = .142, ηp2 = .091), or affordance (Wilks’ λ = .873, f (1,24) = .3.355, 
p = .080, ηp2 = .127). No significant two-way interactions were discovered 
between probe and number (Wilks’ λ = .990, f (1,24) = .226, p = .639, ηp2 = .010), 
probe and affordance (Wilks’ λ = .998, f (1,24) = .035, p = .852, ηp2 = .002), or 
number and affordance (Wilks’ λ = .996, f (1,24) = .084, p = .774, ηp2 = .004). 
Additionally, no three-way interaction could be observed (Wilks’ λ = .914, f 
(1,24) = 2.159, p = .155, ηp2 = .086). 
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Saccade data. 
Over the course of every saccade task, the average onset of a saccade was 
695.37ms with the reference to the onset of an auditory number as the start of 
this RT period. Saccades performed in response to large numbers (689.34ms) 
were faster than saccades performed in response to small numbers (701.59ms). 
When participants were exposed to a power grip (694.33ms) item, saccades were 
onset faster than when exposed to precision grip (696.38ms) items. Leftward 
saccades (701.20) were slower to onset than rightward saccades (689.49ms). 
Table 5 provides a closer breakdown of saccade onsets by condition. 
Table 5. Mean (and standard deviation) values for the onset of saccades, presented in 
milliseconds, as performed by participants during the saccade task. 
Probe  Left  Right  Total 
Affordance  Power Precision Power Precision  
Number Large 707.43 
(315.31) 
688.81 
(275.82) 
670.40 
(301.68) 
691.05 
(313.32) 
689.34 
(301.69) 
Small 682.69 
(306.20) 
726.55 
(324.73) 
718.67 
(340.80) 
679.52 
(297.79) 
701.59 
(317.68) 
Total  694.95 
(310.66) 
707.40 
(301.17) 
693.69 
(321.70) 
685.43 
(305.58) 
695.37 
(309.63) 
 
Analysis of these findings revealed no significant main effects (probe: 
Wilks’ λ = .940, f (1,24) = 1.542, p = .226, ηp2 = .060; number: Wilks’ λ = .1.000, 
f (1,24) = .002, p = .963, ηp2 < .001; affordance: Wilks’ λ = .970, f (1,24) = .738, 
p = .399, ηp2 = .030). Further, a two-way interaction was not observed between 
probe and number (Wilks’ λ = .994, f (1,24) = .156, p = .697, ηp2 = .006), probe 
and affordance (Wilks’ λ = .980, f (1,24) = .491, p = .490, ηp2 = .020), or number 
and affordance (Wilks’ λ = .1.000, f (1,24) = .003, p = .954, ηp2 < .001). However, 
a significant three-way interaction was revealed (Wilks’ λ = .965, f (1,24) = 7.384, 
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p = .012, ηp2 = .235). This interaction is represented in Figure 11 and Figure 12. 
Upon closer inspection, the reaction revealed no further effects when grouped by 
either power (leftward: large x small, p = .087; rightward: large x small, p = .224) 
or precision grip (leftward: large x small, p = .343; rightward: large x small, p = 
177) levels. 
  
Figure 11. Depicted is one aspect of the three-way interaction for Saccade Onset. 
Responses to power grip trials are shown across probe location and magnitude, and 
saccade onset is presented in milliseconds. 
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The average saccade duration was 45.03ms. Saccades lasted longer 
following small numbers (46.04ms) and faster when hearing large numbers 
(44.05ms). After power grip object (45.75ms) exposure, the duration of saccades 
was greater than after precision grip object (44.32ms) exposure. Finally, when 
performing a saccade to the left (45.17ms), the duration was greater than those 
performed to the right (44.89ms). Table 6 shows a breakdown of the conditional 
means in greater detail. 
  
Figure 12. Depicted is one aspect of the three-way interaction for Saccade Onset. 
Responses to precision grip trials are shown across probe location and magnitude, and 
saccade onset is presented in milliseconds. 
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Table 6. Means (and standard deviations) for the duration of saccades that were 
performed by participants during the saccade task, presented in milliseconds. 
Probe  Left  Right  Total 
Affordance  Power Precision Power Precision  
Number Large 48.02 
(40.25) 
41.87 
(15.72) 
42.39 
(21.23) 
43.98 
(22.69) 
44.05 
(26.57) 
Small 44.81 
(29.18) 
46.11 
(31.04) 
47.95 
(38.72) 
45.44 
(29.80) 
46.04 
(32.28) 
Total  46.38 
(35.05) 
43.95 
(24.53) 
45.09 
(31.08) 
44.69 
(26.36) 
45.03 
(29.53) 
 
Inferential analysis of saccade durations shows no significant main 
effects for probe (Wilks’ λ = .993, f (1,24) = .169, p = .684, ηp2 = .007), number 
(Wilks’ λ = .908, f (1,24) = 2.432, p = .132, ηp2 = .092) or affordance (Wilks’ λ 
= .986, f (1,24) = .347, p = .561, ηp2 = .014). Additionally, no two-way 
interactions were observed between probe and number (Wilks’ λ = .955, f (1,24) 
= 1.135, p = .297, ηp2 = .045), probe and affordance (Wilks’ λ = .974, f (1,24) 
= .644, p = .430, ηp2 = .026) or number and affordance (Wilks’ λ = .960, f (1,24) 
= 1.009, p = .325, ηp2 = .040). From the data, however, a significant three-way 
interaction can be observed (Wilks’ λ = .830, f (1,24) = 4.923, p = .036, ηp2 
= .170). This interaction was motivated by a difference in precision grip trials 
with a leftward probe, with longer saccade durations when the magnitude 
experienced was small (46.11ms) over large (41.87ms; p = .037), with the other 
precision grip comparison (rightward: large x small, p = .308) and power grip 
comparisons (leftward: large x small, p = .333; rightward: large x small, p = .118) 
providing non-significant results. See Figure 13 and Figure 14 for a depiction of 
the interaction. 
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Figure 14. Depicted is one aspect of the three-way interaction for Saccade Duration. 
Responses to power grip trials are shown across probe location and magnitude, and 
saccade duration is presented in milliseconds. 
Figure 13. Depicted is one aspect of the three-way interaction for Saccade Duration. 
Responses to precision grip trials are shown across probe location and magnitude, and 
saccade duration is presented in milliseconds. 
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Verification Task 
Error Rate Analysis 
The average accuracy of participant response to the verification question 
was high (93.51%). When maintaining large numbers (93.59%) in memory, 
participants responded more accurately than when maintaining small numbers 
(93.43%), the same being true for when participants are required to recall power 
grip (94.12%) objects over precision grip (92.90%) items. Finally, after 
performing a leftward saccade (93.68%) participants subsequently answered 
more accurately than when a rightward saccade (93.34%) had been performed. 
See Table 7 for a more detailed breakdown of conditional means. 
There were no significant main effects observed for error rates at the level 
of probe (Wilks’ λ = .979, f (1,24) = .505, p = .484, ηp2 = .021), number (Wilks’ 
λ = .951, f (1,24) = 1.231, p = .278, ηp2 = .049), and affordance (Wilks’ λ = .917, 
f (1,24) = 2.184, p = .152, ηp2 = .083). Further, no significant interactions were 
found at either the two-way level, between probe and number (Wilks’ λ = .999, f 
(1,24) = .020, p = .889, ηp2 = .001), probe and affordance (Wilks’ λ = .999, f 
(1,24) = .018, p = .895, ηp2 = .001), and number and affordance (Wilks’ λ = .992, 
f (1,24) = .183, p = .672, ηp2 = .008), nor at the three-way level (Wilks’ λ = .918, 
f (1,24) = 2.145, p = .156, ηp2 = .082). 
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Table 7. Mean levels of accuracy (%) in response to the task verification question. 
Probe  Left  Right  Total 
Affordance  Power Precision Power Precision  
Number Large 93.21 94.08 94.46 92.58 93.59 
Small 95.44 91.99 93.33 92.96 93.43 
Total  94.34 93.03 93.90 92.77 93.51 
 
Response Time Analysis 
For participant reaction times to the verification task, on average the 
question was answered in 689.68ms. In trials where large numbers (683.42ms) 
were experienced, responses to the task were faster than in trials where small 
numbers were experienced (696.15ms). Questions asking about power grip items 
(689.81ms) were answered slower than questions asking about precision grip 
objects (689.55ms). Finally, in trials were leftward (682.87ms) saccades were 
performed, responses were faster than in trials that required rightward responses 
(696.46ms). Table 8 shows, by condition, participant response times 
Table 8. Mean (and standard deviation) response times by participants to the accuracy 
verification task, presented in milliseconds. 
Probe  Left  Right  Total 
Affordance  Power Precision Power Precision  
Number Large 655.66 
(296.65) 
679.63 
(343.93) 
711.73 
(308.10) 
685.00 
(332.69) 
683.42 
(321.32) 
Small 683.83 
(352.53) 
712.23 
(362.64) 
707.20 
(343.32) 
682.05 
(307.42) 
696.15 
(341.92) 
Total  670.08 
(326.41) 
695.58 
(353.21) 
709.55 
(325.20) 
683.57 
(320.34) 
689.68 
(331.59) 
 
At an inferential level, no significant main effects of probe (Wilks’ λ 
= .963, f (1,24) = 929, p = .345, ηp2 = .037), number (Wilks’ λ = .963, f (1,24) 
= .934, p = .343, ηp2 = .037) or affordance (Wilks’ λ = .1.000, f (1,24) = .002, p 
= .965, ηp2 < .001) were revealed. However, a significant interaction (Figure 15) 
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between probe and affordance was found (Wilks’ λ = .821, f (1,24) = 5.218, p 
= .031, ηp2 = .179). This interaction was shown to be driven by slower responses 
when maintaining a power object in memory and having performed a rightward 
(709.55ms) over leftward (670.08ms) saccade (p = .003). No difference in 
verification response time was observed when participants maintained in 
memory precision objects (p = .346). 
No further significant interactions were found for probe and number 
(Wilks’ λ = .920, f (1,24) = 2.083, p = .162, ηp2 = .080) number and affordance 
(Wilks’ λ = .971, f (1,24) = .707, p = .409, ηp2 = .029), or at the three-way level 
of analysis (Wilks’ λ = .978, f (1,24) = .541, p = .469, ηp2 = .022). 
 
Figure 15. Depicted is the two-way interaction for verification response times. 
Responses to different affordance types are shown across probe locations, with response 
time presented in milliseconds 
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Discussion 
The present study investigated the interplay between magnitude-related 
features of objects with varying volumetric affordances maintained in working 
memory and concurrently apprehended numbers of varying numerical magnitude 
with regard to the potentially shared spatial-numerical mappings in horizontal 
space. Analysis found four interactions, one involving probe and affordance 
during processing of the verification task, and three, three-way interactions found 
during the saccade task for response time, saccade onset and saccade duration.  
At the level of the two-way interaction, it was found that power grasp-
rightward probe conditions resulted in slower responses than power grasp-
leftward probe conditions. At the level of three-way interaction, for saccade 
duration it was found that precision grasp-leftward probe-large magnitude 
conditions resulted in a longer duration than precision grasp-leftward probe-
small magnitude conditions. The remaining three-way interactions revealed little 
upon further decomposition.  
No main effects of affordance, number, or probe were registered, while 
existing research shows these factors to bias lateral responses. At a physiological 
level, participants, especially those that are right handed, have been shown to 
saccade (Hutton & Palet, 1986) and manually respond (Goodin, et al., 1996; 
Hommel, 1995) faster toward rightward, over leftward, targets.  
A similar case is true for numbers. Research supports the notion of a 
mental number line (Rugani, Vallortigara, Priftis & Regolin, 2015, Chen & 
Verguts, 2010; Schwarz & Keus, 2004). Typically, faster responses are given in 
rightward space when presented with large numbers and faster responses in 
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leftward space when presented with smaller numbers (Fischer, Castel, Dodd & 
Pratt, 2003, Wood, Willmes, Nuerk & Fischer, 2008, Viarouge, Hubbard & 
McCandliss, 2014). Equally, for affordances, many studies have shown 
participants to respond faster after being primed with a manipulable object when 
the location of response is congruent with their dominant hand (Constantini, 
Ambrosini, Tieri, Sinigaglia & Committeri, 2010, Borghi, Flumini, Natraj & 
Wheaton, 2012, Lameira, Pereira, Conde & Gawryszewski, 2015). If there is no 
conceptual interplay between representations, it would be expected that at least 
one of these documented effects would be replicated, however, the current task 
fails to reproduce any. The findings of null effects suggest more complex 
processing may be taking place. 
The direction of the interaction between affordance and probe during the 
verification task, and of the three-way interaction for duration, was unexpected. 
In line with ATOM (Walsh, 2003) and other previous literature (Namdar & Ganel, 
2017, Ranzini et al., 2011) facilitation was expected, but instead interference was 
found. This is in line with a common coding account of cognition (Prinz, 1990), 
that because of the activation of both power affordance and large magnitude (for 
saccade duration) or power objects and rightward probes (for verification 
response time), there is a bottleneck effect in response time. Similar effects are 
observed in research by Badets, Andres, Luca and Pesenti (2007), whereby 
participants, after seeing a large or small number, estimate grasp size required to 
interact with a rod. After large number exposure, participants underestimated 
their grasp, and overestimated after small number exposure.  As such, data 
provide further support for the notion of conceptual interplay between co-
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activated representations. For this to be a truly compelling argument the 
interaction observed for verification response time would also incorporate 
number. One possibility is that numerical information is not maintained in 
memory beyond the main task so this information is unavailable to interfere with 
the maintained affordance at the point of saccade execution. 
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Experiment 2  
Vertical Space 
Methodology 
Design 
A similar design to the one utilised in Experiment 1 was adopted for 
Experiment 2, with saccade task changing to vertical space. Hence, the 
independent factors were: Affordance (power/precision), Number (small/large) 
and Probe (up/down). The same two parity rules (even-left; even-right) were used 
to balance effects of number line congruency and the audible presentation of 
number. In total, there were 96 trials per participant. The same dependent 
variables were recorded (simple reaction time, error rates, saccade onset and 
duration, fixation duration and total gaze durations). Every trial required a 
response from participants. All trial conditions were counterbalanced across 
presentation, with numbers presented at random within testing blocks. 
Participants 
The same participants who completed Experiment 1 took part in 
Experiment 2.  
Materials 
The same materials were used as in Experiment 1, with the exception of 
the vertically arranged visual probe. 
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Procedure 
The experimental procedure was the same as in Experiment 1 except that 
this time participants had to saccade to one of the two visual probes presented 
vertically as per the coordinates specified in General Method (chapter 2; see 
Figure 16).  
Results 
The strategy discussed in the general methods section was utilised in 
filtering and analysing the data provided by participants. This involved, post 
filtering and transformation, a series of 2x2x2 ANOVAs performed on fixations, 
saccades, and manual responses. 
Responses to the saccade and verification task were measured using 
reaction time and error rates for all participants. Eye tracking data was analysed 
only for the saccade task, which can be further divided into fixation and saccadic 
metrics. Data from one participant was excluded due to not completing the 
experimental paradigm, and all tests were conducted on the remaining 25 
participants. For the raw data, see Appendix E. 
Figure 16.. An example trial sequence in which the verification question is an object 
congruent with the prime. Note that probe occupied vertical space, not horizontal, and 
stimuli presentation is not to scale, instead used to aid clarification. 
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Saccade Task 
Error Rate Analysis 
Participants made correct responses in 84.79% of the trials. Rates of 
accuracy were greater for small numbers (85.06%) over large numbers (84.52%). 
Accuracy was observed to be greater after exposure to precision grip objects 
(85.37%) over power grip (84.21%), and when the saccade task required upward 
(87.53%) responses over downward (82.04%). Table 9 shows these findings at a 
condition-by-condition level. 
Table 9. Mean rates of accuracy (%) for participants when responding to the saccade 
task. 
Probe  Down  Up  Total 
Affordance  Power Precision Power Precision  
Number Large 83.28 80.00 84.88 90.00 84.52 
Small 80.28 84.67 88.36 86.90 85.06 
Total  81.79 82.30 86.62 88.45 84.79 
 
An inferential analysis of error rate shows a significant main effect of 
probe (Wilks’ λ = .839, f (1,24) = .4.604, p = .042, ηp2 = .161). This main effect 
shows upward (87.53%) responses to be significantly more accurate than 
downward (82.04%) responses. No further main effects of number (Wilks’ λ 
= .999, f (1,24) = .033, p = .856, ηp2 = .001) or affordance (Wilks’ λ = .943, f 
(1,24) = .1.448, p = .241, ηp2 = .057) were found to be significant.  
No combination of interaction terms were deemed to be significant at 
either the two-way (probe by number: Wilks’ λ = .998, f (1,24) = .046, p = .832, 
ηp2 = .002; probe by affordance: Wilks’ λ = .987, f (1,24) = .308, p = .584, ηp2 
= .013; number by affordance: Wilks’ λ = .989, f (1,24) = .263, p = .613, ηp2 
= .011) or three-way (Wilks’ λ = .913, f (1,24) = 2.298, p = .143, ηp2 = .087) level. 
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Response Time Analysis 
The average time taken by a participant to respond was 724.61ms. Faster 
responses were gathered for small number (723.15ms) trials over large number 
(726.05) trials, for power grip (718.42ms) items over precision grip (730.70ms), 
and for upward (697.55ms) over downward (753.50ms) probes. In Table 10, a 
conditional breakdown of means and standard deviations can be observed. 
Table 10. Mean (and standard deviation) values for participants response time to the 
saccade task, presented in milliseconds. 
Probe  Down  Up  Total 
Affordance  Power Precision Power Precision  
Number Large 757.11 
(311.17) 
777.07 
(322.47) 
688.14 
(294.80) 
686.64 
(287.03) 
726.05 
(305.91) 
Small 737.44 
(298.19) 
742.00 
(283.28) 
693.22 
(272.15) 
722.22 
(309.85) 
723.15 
(291.31) 
Total  747.67 
(304.83) 
759.30 
(303.42) 
690.71 
(283.29) 
704.21 
(298.75) 
724.61 
(298.67) 
 
A significant main effect of probe was revealed (Wilks’ λ = .560, f (1,24) 
= 18.829, p < .001, ηp2 = .440), with downward responses (753.50ms) being 
slower than upward responses (697.55ms). There were no further statistically 
significant main effects of either number (Wilks’ λ = .999, f (1,24) = .027, p 
= .871, ηp2 = .001) or affordance (Wilks’ λ = .950, f (1,24) = 1.254, p = .274, ηp2 
= .050).  
At the two-way level, an interaction was found between probe and 
number (Wilks’ λ = .838, f (1,24) = 4.639, p = .042, ηp2 = .162). This interaction 
was further analysed and found to reflect a difference in response time when the 
number was large, with upward (687.37ms) responses being significantly faster 
than downward (766.85ms) responses (p < .001). When the number heard was 
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small, there was no difference between probes upward or downward (p = .076; 
see Figure 17). 
There were no further interactions at either the two-way level, for probe 
by affordance (Wilks’ λ = .994, f (1,24) = .140, p = .712, ηp2 = .006), and number 
by affordance (Wilks’ λ = .999, f (1,24) = .025, p = .875, ηp2 = .001), or at the 
three-way level (Wilks’ λ = .997, f (1,24) = .077, p = .783, ηp2 = .003). 
Eye Movement Analysis 
Fixation data. 
On average, the duration of the first fixation within a target area was 
342.56ms. Fixations were seen to be shorter when hearing large numbers 
(337.98) over small numbers (347.14ms). When maintaining power grip 
(339.76ms) items in memory, the first fixation duration was shorter than trials 
where precision grip objects were maintained (345.27ms). Finally, trials with 
Figure 17. Depicted is the two-way interaction for probe response times. Responses to 
different magnitudes are shown across probe locations, where response time is presented 
in milliseconds 
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response upward (355.02ms) provoked longer durations of the first fixation than 
trials requiring downward responses (329.30ms). Table 11 provides a closer 
examination of mean and standard deviation first fixation durations made by 
participants. 
Table 11. Mean (and standard deviation) durations of the first fixation participants made 
in response to the saccade task, presented in milliseconds. 
Probe  Down  Up  Total 
Affordance  Power Precision Power Precision  
Number Large 320.43 
(157.06) 
331.95 
(212.59) 
350.28 
(226.61) 
347.97 
(205.17) 
337.98 
(202.28) 
Small 328.12 
(216.65) 
336.59 
(205.94) 
358.99 
(208.00) 
362.83 
(217.74) 
347.14 
(212.31) 
Total  324.19 
(188.44) 
334.32 
(209.00) 
354.62 
(217.35) 
355.40 
(211.46) 
342.56 
(207.35) 
 
Inferential analyses revealed no significant main effects of probe (Wilks’ 
λ = .957, f (1,24) = 1.079, p = .309, ηp2 = .043), number (Wilks’ λ = .991, f (1,24) 
= .214, p = .648, ηp2 = .009) or affordance (Wilks’ λ = .974, f (1,24) = .637, p 
= .433, ηp2 = .026). Nor were any significant two-way interactions found between 
probe and number (Wilks’ λ = .936, f (1,24) = 1.639, p = .213, ηp2 = .064), probe 
and affordance (Wilks’ λ = .999, f (1,24) = .022, p = .884, ηp2 = .001), or number 
and affordance (Wilks’ λ = .955, f (1,24) = 1.122, p = .300, ηp2 = .045). Finally, 
no significant three-way interaction was uncovered either (Wilks’ λ = .956, f 
(1,24) = 1.101, p = .304, ηp2 = .044). 
Across the study, the total gaze duration of participants in the target area 
was, on average, 425.47ms. Longer periods of dwelling were observed in trials 
where participants heard small numbers (430.90ms) than in trials where 
participants heard large numbers (420.05ms). Trials that displayed precision grip 
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(432.86ms) items to participants produced longer total gaze durations than trials 
showing participants power grip (417.76) items. Finally, greater dwell periods 
were observed after upward saccade response (430.55ms) than in trials requiring 
downward saccades (420.12ms). For a condition-by-condition rendition of the 
probe total gaze durations, see Table 12. 
Table 12. Mean (and standard deviation) total gaze durations for participant responses 
to the saccade task, presented in milliseconds. 
Probe  Left  Right  Total 
Affordance  Power Precision Power Precision  
Number Large 420.47 
(243.57) 
428.88 
(273.36) 
412.04 
(272.61) 
419.20 
(241.62) 
420.05 
(257.56) 
Small 396.55 
(216.53) 
433.41 
(250.76) 
441.03 
(295.02) 
449.56 
(317.94) 
430.90 
(274.55) 
Total  408.81 
(230.83) 
431.20 
(261.77) 
426.44 
(284.02) 
434.41 
(282.57) 
425.47 
(266.16) 
 
No significant main effects of total gaze duration were uncovered for 
probe (Wilks’ λ = .999, f (1,24) = .035, p = .852, ηp2 = .001), number (Wilks’ λ 
= .944, f (1,24) = 1.421, p = .245, ηp2 = .056), or affordance (Wilks’ λ = .986, f 
(1,24) = 351, p = .559, ηp2 = .014). No interactions at either the two-way level 
for probe by number (Wilks’ λ = .925, f (1,24) = 1.952, p = .175, ηp2 = .075), 
probe by affordance (Wilks’ λ = .999, f (1,24) = 032, p = .859, ηp2 = .001) or 
number by affordance (Wilks’ λ = .974, f (1,24) = .629, p = ..435, ηp2 = .026), or 
three-way level (Wilks’ λ = .951, f (1,24) = 1.233, p = .278, ηp2 = .049) were 
found. 
Saccade data. 
On average, participants programmed and launched saccades in 
685.95ms following the auditory number onset. Saccades were launched slower 
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in trials where participants heard a large number (687.64ms) over a small number 
(684.24ms). Likewise, participants were slower after exposure to precision grip 
(694.67ms) items over power grip (677.13ms) objects. Finally, upward saccades 
(657.38ms) were initiated faster than downward saccades (716.21ms). For a 
condition-level showing of saccade onset timings, see Table 13. 
Table 13. Mean (and standard deviation) onset times for saccades performed in response 
to the saccade task, presented in milliseconds. 
Probe  Down  Up  Total 
Affordance  Power Precision Power Precision  
Number Large 717.91 
(310.76) 
742.03 
(338.69) 
646.47 
(287.00) 
648.05 
(288.12) 
687.64 
(308.70) 
Small 695.32 
(294.85) 
708.99 
(288.63) 
650.25 
(264.06) 
684.45 
(319.63) 
684.24 
(292.92) 
Total  707.04 
(303.08) 
725.44 
(314.63) 
648.37 
(275.41) 
666.14 
(304.42) 
685.95 
(300.90) 
 
A significant main effect of probe was revealed (Wilks’ λ = .499, f (1,24) 
= 24.067, p < .001, ηp2 = .501). A saccade was launched faster when the probe 
was directed upwards (657.38ms) than when it was directed downward 
(716.21ms). No further significant main effects were found for number (Wilks’ λ 
= .988, f (1,24) = .280, p = .602, ηp2 = .012) or affordance (Wilks’ λ = .976, f 
(1,24) = .582, p = .453, ηp2 = .024). In addition to this, no significant interactions 
were found at the two-way level, for probe and number (Wilks’ λ = .908, f (1,24) 
= .2.445, p = .131, ηp2 = .092), probe and affordance (Wilks’ λ = .988, f (1,24) 
= .279, p = .602, ηp2 = .012), and for number by affordance (Wilks’ λ = .998, f 
(1,24) = .045, p = .833, ηp2 = .002), nor were any interactions found at the three-
way level (Wilks’ λ = .999, f (1,24) = .014, p = .908, ηp2 = .001). 
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The average duration of a saccade performed by a participant was 
50.23ms. Greater was the saccade duration after hearing large numbers (51.40ms) 
than when hearing small numbers (49.03ms). The maintenance of power grip 
(50.17ms) items in memory produced shorter saccade durations than the 
maintenance of precision grip (50.30ms) objects. Finally, a saccade performed 
downward (51.27ms) had a greater duration than a saccade performed upward 
(49.25ms). In Table 14, the duration of saccades can be seen at the condition level. 
Table 14. Mean (and standard deviation) saccade durations of participants during the 
saccade task, presented in milliseconds. 
Probe  Down  Up  Total 
Affordance  Power Precision Power Precision  
 Number Large 52.82 
(44.89) 
52.14 
(47.42) 
52.84 
(51.87) 
48.07 
(39.33) 
51.40 
(46.09) 
Small 50.43 
(48.51) 
49.64 
(38.84) 
44.46 
(21.86) 
51.55 
(56.07) 
49.03 
(43.38) 
Total  51.67 
(46.63) 
50.87 
(43.23) 
48.70 
(40.16) 
49.78 
(48.51) 
50.23 
(44.78) 
 
For saccade durations, no significant main effects were found for probe 
(Wilks’ λ = .891, f (1,24) = 2.808, p = .107, ηp2 = .109), number (Wilks’ λ = .918, 
f (1,24) = 2.064, p = .164, ηp2 = .082), or affordance (Wilks’ λ = .995, f (1,24) 
= .108, p = .745, ηp2 = .005). No interactions were found at either the two-way 
level, for probe by number (Wilks’ λ = .995, f (1,24) = .109, p = .744, ηp2 = .005), 
probe by affordance (Wilks’ λ = .995, f (1,24) = .121, p = .731, ηp2 = .005), or 
number by affordance (Wilks’ λ = .897, f (1,24) = .2.638, p = .118, ηp2 = .103), 
nor at the three-way level (Wilks’ λ = .998, f (1,24) = .045, p = .833, ηp2 = .002). 
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Verification Task 
Error Rate Analysis 
The rate of correct responses to the verification task was, on average, high 
(94.61%). Average accuracy was higher in trials were participants had heard large 
numbers (94.66%) than in trials were participants heard small numbers (94.56%). 
When participants maintained a precision grip (95.25%) object in memory they 
were, on average, more accurate than when maintaining a power grip (93.97%) 
item. Finally, greater levels of accuracy were observed after participants had 
performed upward (95.11%) over downward (94.11%) saccades. Table 15 details 
the condition-level rates of accuracy for the verification task. 
Table 15. Average rates of accuracy (%) in response to the verification question. 
Probe  Down  Up  Total 
Affordance  Power Precision Power Precision  
Number Large 94.70 94.41 94.14 95.41 94.66 
Small 92.98 94.35 94.06 96.85 94.56 
Total  93.84 94.38 94.10 96.13 94.61 
 
For verification accuracy, no significant main effects were found for 
probe (Wilks’ λ = .942, f (1,24) = 1.467, p = .238, ηp2 = .058), number (Wilks’ λ 
= .989, f (1,24) = .273, p = .606, ηp2 = .011), and affordance (Wilks’ λ = .980, f 
(1,24) = .490, p = .491, ηp2 = .020). No significant two-way interactions were 
found for probe by number (Wilks’ λ = .947, f (1,24) = 1.352, p = .256, ηp2 = .053), 
probe by affordance (Wilks’ λ = .923, f (1,24) = 2.000, p = .170, ηp2 = .077), or 
at the three-way level (Wilks’ λ = .998, f (1,24) = .051, p = .824, ηp2 = .002). 
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Response Time Analysis 
The average time taken to respond to an accuracy verification question 
was 667.47ms. When participants had heard a large number (666.58ms), the time 
taken to respond to the verification question was shorter than when having heard 
a small number (668.37ms). When participants were maintaining a power grip 
(669.97ms) item in memory, the response time was greater than when 
maintaining a precision grip (665.01ms) object. Finally, time taken for the 
verification task was greater after having performed a downward saccade 
(673.31ms) than after a participant had performed an upward saccade (662.00ms). 
In Table 16, the average response time can be seen at a conditional level. 
Table 16. Mean (and standard deviation) reaction times in response to the verification 
task, presented in milliseconds. 
Probe  Down  Up  Total 
Affordance  Power Precision Power Precision  
Number Large 666.64 
(329.01) 
690.56 
(377.20) 
668.75 
(322.86) 
642.89 
(308.66) 
666.58 
(334.32) 
Small 660.64 
(318.70) 
675.61 
(314.52) 
683.19 
(345.90) 
654.15 
(327.29) 
668.37 
(326.71) 
Total  663.70 
(323.67) 
682.93 
(346.34) 
675.94 
(334.25) 
648.48 
(317.78) 
667.47 
(330.47) 
 
An inferential analysis revealed no significant main effects for either 
probe (Wilks’ λ = .921, f (1,24) = 1.969, p = .174, ηp2 = .079), number (Wilks’ λ 
= .993, f (1,24) = .166, p = .687, ηp2 = .007), or affordance (Wilks’ λ = .1.000, f 
(1,24) < .001, p = .998, ηp2 < .001). No significant two-way (probe by number: 
Wilks’ λ = .970, f (1,24) = .717, p = .406, ηp2 = .030; probe by affordance: Wilks’ 
λ = .880, f (1,24) = 3.132, p = .090, ηp2 = .120; number by affordance: Wilks’ λ 
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= .977, f (1,24) = .549, p = .466, ηp2 = .023) nor three-way (Wilks’ λ = .999, f 
(1,24) = .023, p = .880, ηp2 = .001) interactions were discovered. 
Discussion 
The present study investigated the interplay between magnitude-related 
features of the objects with varying volumetric affordances maintained in 
working memory and the concurrently apprehended numbers of varying 
numerical magnitude with regard to the potentially shared spatial-numerical 
mappings in vertical space. Main effects of probe were found for probe task 
response time, accuracy and saccade onset. For probe time, participants were 
faster when performing an upward response over downward – a finding mirrored 
by the main effect of saccade onset. Participants were also more accurate in 
making upward, over downward, probe responses. This appears to be in line with 
polarity accounts of processing (e.g. Lynott & Coventry, 2014, Lakens, 2012, 
Santiago, Ouellet, Román, Valenzuela, 2012). That is, concepts are categorised 
faster when at a positive polar endpoint, such as upward over downward. 
A two-way interaction was found between probe and number for probe 
response time. This interaction shows a faster processing of large numbers in 
upward trials over downward trials. This replicates the findings of many previous 
studies (Viarouge, Hubbard & Dehaene, 2014, Ito & Hatta, 2004, Gevers, 
Lammertyn, Notebaert, Verguts & Fias, 2006). It is interesting that no similar 
effect was found in the downward domain with small numbers, as would be 
expected and predicted by SNARC and mental number space accounts (Kadosh 
& Dowker, 2015). More interestingly, this pattern is the opposite of what was 
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observed in horizontal space, in which interference was seen suggesting partially 
different spatial-numerical mapping mechanisms along these two dimensions. 
No main effects or interactions involving affordances were discovered. 
There are several reasons why this may be the case. Of course, it would be 
simplistic to rely upon – but stupid to ignore – notions of sample size and task 
complexity. After all, the claim that 25 participants is too few is not one that the 
literature agrees with, as both visual research handbooks (e.g. Margolis & 
Pauwels, 2011) and research in similar domains (Chapman & Myachykov, 2015; 
Makris, Hadar & Yarrow, 2013; Bulf, Cassia & de Hevia, 2014) suggests or uses 
similar amounts of participants. Another possible explanation regards the co-
occurrence of vertical and radial visual profiles. Typically, vertical eye movement 
reflects a shift from near-to-far (bottom-to-top) distances. The automatic 
activation of affordance profiles have been shown to occur depending upon 
proximity (Constantini, Ambrosini, Scorolli & Borghi, 2011). So, it is possible 
that a vertical shift of eye movement – especially in a controlled, experimental 
context – unpacks affordance content. This would require further research to 
understand. 
A much more plausible explanation is the one inferring the situated 
aspects of manipulation affordance (see Myachykov, Scheepers, Fischer & 
Kesller, 2014). It is rare that the principle context of an affordance is vertical. 
Indeed, most effects of affordance are found, when the vertical and horizontal 
axis is disentangled, in horizontal space (Osiurak, Rossetti & Badets, 2017). So, 
the case for an interplay between representations may be weakened due 
affordances not necessarily becoming activated in vertical space.  
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Chapter Summary 
This chapter investigated the interplay between magnitude-related 
features of objects with varying volumetric affordances maintained in working 
memory and the concurrently apprehended numbers of varying numerical 
magnitude with regard to the potentially shared spatial-numerical mappings in 
horizontal and vertical space. Across two experiments, a case for interaction 
between numbers and affordances has been diagnosed. Results from the 
horizontal experiment provide the strongest support for the notion of a conceptual 
interface between representations, while the study of vertical space provides little 
affirmation but, importantly, replicates previous findings and poses interesting 
questions. 
In the horizontal tasks, interference between probe location, number, and 
affordance was observed. One potential reason for this stems from the 
concreteness of representations. On the continuum between concreteness and 
abstraction, affordances are at the extreme concreteness pole, requiring very little 
removal from sensorimotor simulation to be processed and understood. 
Numerical magnitude can be processed either as concrete or abstract, depending 
upon circumstance. Typically, numbers below ten are found to rely stronger on 
concreteness (Dehaene & Cohen, 1995, Pecher & Boot, 2011). Due to the 
richness of concrete simulations, instead of observing a facilitation of processing, 
the two concepts attentional bottleneck. This effect would explain the slowing of 
processing observed, in line with common coding theories (Prinz, 1990, Barsalou, 
2008). This is a novel finding; as such, it warrants further investigation. One 
question for future research this poses is whether or not another representational 
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interface would be able to utilise the same two components to find, instead, a 
facilitating effect. 
In the vertical domain, the data revealed little support for any interplay 
between the co-activated representations. An important aspect to be aware of is 
that the effects that were observed in the vertical domain (probe location effects 
and an interaction in line with SNARC) suggest that the contents of an affordance 
were not, here, being processed automatically. Both suggested explanations 
require future research to elucidate the actual effects of affordance processing 
and conceptual interplay in vertical space, as while they are both compelling 
explanations, neither are, right now, convincing explanations. To understand this 
in greater detail, the following chapter deals with a factor that is closer toward 
abstraction, spatial semantics.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Spatial Semantics And Numerical Magnitude 
 
Figure 18. The Abstraction Pipeline. A representation of how far removed the current 
chapter's subject matter is from concrete representation in comparison to other studies. 
Spatial words are used regularly in language to provide a frame of 
reference for cognizing the world around us. Space is a fundamental aspect of 
our environment, and its use in language involves helping to understand location, 
path, size, shape, and orientation (Zwarts, 2017). Crucially, spatial semantics 
serve to lead the attention of another through referential framing (Landau & 
Jackendoff, 1993; Pederson, et al., 1998; Zlatev, 2007). If sensorimotor 
simulation is accepted as forming at least some basis for our understanding of 
abstract and concrete knowledge (Meteyard & Vigliocco, 2008), then spatial 
language should form a necessary component of knowledge. Previous research 
has already shown that understanding spatial (Richardson, Spivey, Barsalou & 
McRae, 2003) and action-related (Meteyard, Bahrami & Vigliocco, 2007) 
language involves the simulation of sensorimotor experience. Due to its 
obligatory linguistic coding, the domain of spatial semantics is less concrete than 
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affordances where no obligatory reference to language is necessary (c.f. Glover, 
Rosenbaum, Graham & Dixon, 2004; Gibson & Sztybel, 2014), and so the 
conceptual interplay between cognitive components may manifest differently. 
Here, two studies examine the ability of spatial language to displace visual 
attention in the different dimensions of space. Specifically, it is expected that 
language with either a rightward or upward spatial bias will prime a response for 
large numerical magnitudes while leftward and downward biasing language will 
prime responses for small numerical magnitudes. Error rates are hypothesised to 
mirror this, with greater accuracy observed in wholly congruent trials. In a similar 
manner to the previous chapter, the first study examines the horizontal domain 
while the second concerns the vertical. 
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Experiment 3 
Horizontal Space 
Methodology 
Design 
As before, the task comprised a within-participants, 2x2x2 design. Here, 
the spatial semantics of a word bias (leftward/rightward), number (small/large) 
and probe (left/right) comprised the independent variables. Two parity rules 
(even-left; even-right) were used to balance for any effects of number line 
congruency and audible number presentation. In total, 192 trials were presented 
to each participant. Recorded were several dependent variables. Non-eye-
tracking metrics included simple reaction time and accuracy rates to the saccade 
and verification tasks. Eye tracking metrics were only recorded for the saccade 
task, and included saccade measures of onset and duration, as well as fixation 
measures of total gaze duration and the duration of the first fixation. All 
participants were required to give a response to every trial, which were grouped 
by parity rule and counterbalanced across presentation. Numbers were presented 
at random within blocks of testing. 
Participants 
There were 27 participants (14 male) recruited from the undergraduate 
population of Northumbria University, whose participation came in exchange for 
course credits. The average age of a subject was 22 (range = 18-50, SD = 7.486); 
all participants were of UK birth, native speakers of English, with normal or 
corrected-to-normal eyesight. All participants self-identified as right handed, 
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which was confirmed by the Short Form Edinburgh Handedness Inventory 
(Ransil & Schachter, 1994; average = .979).  
Materials 
The same recording of the numbers ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘8’ and ‘9’ used previously 
were, again, deployed here. Words were chosen from a normed database that 
catered for the spatial semantics of a verb (Meteyard & Vigliocco, 2009). The 
norms of the database allowed for the creation of leftward and rightward-biasing 
conditions, which consisted of the most representative verbs from each category. 
Words were initially presented in lower case for the saccade task, but in the 
verification task presented in uppercase. This ensured processing of the content 
of the word itself, and not just the maintenance of stimuli in visual working 
memory. Both fixation dots and target squares were created in Experiment 
Builder.  
Procedure 
The following procedure gained approval from the Northumbria 
University Board of Ethics. All data were collected in a room with minimal 
lighting. Before testing, participants were briefed about the nature of the 
experiment (see Appendix A for the standardised brief) and asked to complete 
informed consent documentation (Appendix A) before answering a 
demographics questionnaire (Appendix C) and the Short Form Edinburgh 
Handedness Index (Appendix D; Ransil & Schachter, 1994). After consenting, 
the participant was then seated on a chair with the backrest tilted to a 110° 60cm 
from the screen with their head placed on an SR-Research chinrest, before being 
calibrated, tested, and debriefed. 
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Testing consisted of a fixation cross presentation for 500ms followed by 
the visual presentation of a word for 1000ms. After the word another fixation 
cross (500ms) was presented and the probe task followed. This consisted of a 
number, audibly presented, and the visual presentation of two targets. In 
accordance with the parity rule, participants made a saccade toward one of the 
targets, located as identified in horizontal space within the General Methods 
(chapter 2). The landing of a saccade triggered the offset of the saccade task and 
the onset of a verification task, which required participants to view a word and 
decide whether it is the same or different to the object seen at the start of the trial. 
Participants pressed a button to respond to this task, either the left (corresponding 
to yes) or right (corresponding to no) trigger. Depress of the button signalled the 
end of a trial and a 1000ms buffer period before the start of the next. Participants 
were given accuracy feedback immediately after saccade and verification tasking. 
Total testing took approximately 60 minutes. See Figure 19 for an example trial 
sequence 
Figure 19. An example trial sequence in which the verification question is a word congruent 
with the prime. Note that presentation is not to scale but is used to aid clarification. 
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Results 
The strategy discussed in the general methods section was utilised in 
filtering and analysing the data provided by participants. This involved, post 
filtering and transformation, a series of 2x2x2 ANOVAs to understand fixation, 
saccadic, and manual response parameters of the data. 
Responses to the parity and verification task were measured using 
reaction time and error rates for all participants. Eyetracking data was analysed 
only for the saccade task, which can be further divided into fixation and saccadic 
metrics. A standard criterion of α was used and set to .05. Data from one 
participant was excluded due to not completing the experimental paradigm, and 
all tests were conducted on the remaining 25 participants. For the raw data, see 
Appendix E. 
Saccade task 
Error Rate Analysis 
In general, task accuracy was high (88.74%). Accuracy was greater in 
response to rightward words (88.94%) over leftward (88.53%) words, large 
numbers (90.33%) over small numbers (87.15%), and for leftward probes 
(89.31%) over rightward probes (88.17%). For a breakdown by condition for 
rates of accuracy, see Table 17. 
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Table 17. Mean rate of accuracy (%) in response to the saccade task. 
Probe  Left  Right  Total 
Word Bias  Left Right Left Right  
 Number Large 89.05 89.57 92.99 89.72 90.33 
Small 88.81 89.80 83.33 86.70 87.15 
Total  88.94 89.68 88.13 88.20 88.74 
 
A closer analysis revealed no significant main effects for probe (Wilks’ λ 
= .978, f (1,25) = .573, p = .456, ηp2 = .022), number (Wilks’ λ = .926, f (1,25) = 
1.994, p = .170, ηp2 = .074), or word bias (Wilks’ λ = .998, f (1,25) = .052, p 
= .456, ηp2 = .022). A significant interaction was discovered between probe and 
number (Wilks’ λ = .830, f (1,25) = 5.138, p = .032, ηp2 = .170), which can be 
seen in Figure 20. This interaction was motivated by a difference at the level of 
small number (p = .048), with rightward (85.02%) responses being less accurate 
than leftward (89.31%). At the level of large number, no significant difference 
was found (p = .281). 
Figure 20. Depicted is the two-way interaction for probe accuracy. Responses to 
different magnitudes are shown across probe locations, with accuracy displayed as a 
percentage of correct responses. 
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No further interactions were observed, either at the two-way level 
between probe and word bias (Wilks’ λ = .1.000, f (1,25) = .002, p = .968, ηp2 
< .001) or number and word bias (Wilks’ λ = .889, f (1,25) = 3.108, p = .090, ηp2 
= .111), nor at the three-way level (Wilks’ λ = .933, f (1,25) = 1.805, p = .191, 
ηp2 = .067). 
Response Time Analysis 
The average time taken to respond to the saccade task was 750.80ms. 
Participants were faster when the priming word biased attention toward the left 
(743.19ms) than to the right (758.24ms). Large numbers (749.10ms) made for 
faster responses than small numbers (752.51ms), and when the probe necessitated 
leftward (749.52ms) over rightward (752.09) saccades. See Table 18 for a 
breakdown of response times by condition. 
Table 18. Mean (and standard deviations) for participant response times to a saccade 
task, presented in milliseconds. 
Probe  Left  Right  Total 
Word Bias  Left Right Left Right  
 Number Large 769.21 
(327.28) 
757.75 
(298.65) 
729.26 
(295.46) 
741.25 
(293.69) 
749.10 
(301.50) 
Small 723.06 
(292.98) 
748.82 
(327.65) 
753.08 
(305.37) 
785.91 
(338.05) 
752.51 
(317.15) 
Total  745.65 
(310.95) 
753.26 
(313.45) 
740.73 
(295.30) 
763.34 
(317.04) 
750.80 
(309.35) 
 
No main effects were found for probe (Wilks’ λ = 998., f (1,25) = .042, p = .840, 
ηp2 = .002), for number (Wilks’ λ = .995, f (1,25) = .124, p = .727, ηp2 = .005), 
or for word bias (Wilks’ λ = .876, f (1,25) = 3.550, p = .071, ηp2 = .124). At the 
two-way level, an interaction was found between probe and number (Wilks’ λ 
= .721, f (1,25) = .9.698, p = .005, ηp2 = .279). This interaction can be seen 
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visually in Figure 21 but reveals only a trend toward significance at large (p 
= .055) and small (p = .074) levels of comparison. 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 21. Depicted is the two-way interaction for probe response time. Responses to 
different magnitudes are shown across probe locations, where response time is 
displayed in milliseconds. 
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Eye Movement Analysis 
Fixation data. 
On average, participants maintained the first fixation for 349.65ms. 
Fixations lasted for a longer duration after rightward biasing words (351.83ms) 
over leftward (347.44ms), for small (351.30ms) numbers over large (348.01ms), 
and for rightward (363.75ms) probes over leftward (336.22ms). Table 19 displays 
conditional means and standard deviations for first fixation durations. 
Analysis by means of ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of probe 
(Wilks’ λ = .840, f (1,25) = 4.748, p = .039, ηp2 = .160), with longer first fixations 
after rightward (363.75ms) probes over leftward (336.22ms). No further main 
effects were found for number (Wilks’ λ = .998, f (1,25) = .048, p = .829, ηp2 
= .002) or word bias (Wilks’ λ = .904, f (1,25) = 2.662, p = .115, ηp2 = .096). 
Table 19. Means (and standard deviations) for participant's first fixation durations during 
the saccade task, presented in milliseconds. 
Probe  Left  Right  Total 
Word 
Bias 
 Left Right Left Right  
 Number Large 334.14 
(182.49) 
337.23 
(182.43) 
358.54 
(176.41) 
362.19 
(177.02) 
348.01 
(178.91) 
Small 329.86 
(182.49) 
343.56 
(183.78) 
369.22 
(202.06) 
365.47 
(177.04) 
351.30 
(186.89) 
Total  331.94 
(182.41) 
340.44 
(183.05) 
363.71 
(189.24) 
363.80 
(176.95) 
349.65 
(183.41) 
 
No interactions were found at either the two-way, between probe and number 
(Wilks’ λ = .984, f (1,25) = .396, p = .535, ηp2 = .016), probe and word bias 
(Wilks’ λ = .995, f (1,25) = .120, p = .732, ηp2 = .005) or number and word bias 
(Wilks’ λ = .949, f (1,25) = 1.345, p = .257, ηp2 = .051), or three-way level (Wilks’ 
λ = .991, f (1,25) = .231, p = .635, ηp2 = .009). 
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For total gaze durations, the average series of fixations lasted for 
435.60ms. Leftward (434.91ms) biasing words resulted in shorter total gaze 
durations than rightward (436.28ms). The number heard resulted in longer total 
gaze durations when small (431.47ms) over large (439.73), as did probes to the 
left (455.23) over right (414.78). Table 20 shows, by condition, means and 
standard deviations for participant total gaze durations. 
Table 20. Means (and standard deviations) for participant's fixation total gaze durations 
during the saccade task, presented in milliseconds. 
Probe  Left  Right  Total 
Word 
Bias 
 Left Right Left Right  
 Number Large 464.33 
(266.52) 
464.95 
(257.66) 
415.63 
(200.78) 
412.97 
(193.26) 
493.73 
(233.36) 
Small 435.97 
(242.86) 
456.29 
(265.87) 
422.94 
(221.66) 
407.75 
(205.08) 
431.47 
(236.46) 
Total  449.80 
(254.94) 
460.57 
(261.75) 
419.19 
(211.12) 
410.40 
(199.08) 
435.60 
(234.92) 
 
Following analysis, no main effects emerged at the level of probe (Wilks’ 
λ = .933, f (1,25) = 1.787, p = .193, ηp2 = .067), number (Wilks’ λ = .934, f (1,25) 
= 1.775, p = .195, ηp2 = .066), or word bias (Wilks’ λ = .998, f (1,25) = .046, p 
= .831, ηp2 = .002). Nor were any two-way interactions observed between probe 
and number (Wilks’ λ = .942, f (1,25) = 1.542, p = .226, ηp2 = .058), probe and 
word bias (Wilks’ λ = .900, f (1,25) = 2.763, p = .109, ηp2 = .100), or number and 
word bias (Wilks’ λ = .980, f (1,25) = .507, p = .483, ηp2 = .020). An interaction 
was not observed at the three-way level (Wilks’ λ = .987, f (1,25) = .317, p = .579, 
ηp2 = .013). 
- 122 - 
 
Saccade data. 
The average time taken until the onset of a saccade was 709.02ms. 
Participants initiated eye movement faster when the word was leftward 
(702.79ms) than rightward (715.13ms). Large numbers (709.21ms) made for 
slower responses than small numbers (708.83ms). Probes rightward (706.63ms) 
were faster than probes to the left (711.39ms). See Table 21 for a breakdown of 
means and standard deviations by condition. 
Table 21. Mean (and standard deviation) values for the onset of saccades as performed 
by participants during the saccade task, presented in milliseconds. 
Probe  Left  Right  Total 
Word 
Bias 
 Left Right Left Right  
 Number Large 729.99 
(325.92) 
717.15 
(300.83) 
690.09 
(284.41) 
700.96 
(291.81) 
709.21 
(300.91) 
Small 682.50 
(294.58) 
716.60 
(332.83) 
710.54 
(307.51) 
726.07 
(321.49) 
708.83 
(314.78) 
Total  705.69 
(311.03) 
716.87 
(317.22) 
699.92 
(295.76) 
713.33 
(306.89) 
709.02 
(307.85) 
 
An analysis of saccade onset revealed no significant main effects of probe 
(Wilks’ λ = .991, f (1,25) = .232, p = .634, ηp2 = .009), number (Wilks’ λ = .970, 
f (1,25) = .779, p = .386, ηp2 = .030), or word bias (Wilks’ λ = .902, f (1,25) = 
2.724, p = .111, ηp2 = .098). At the level of two-way interaction, a significant 
result, which can be seen in Figure 22, was observed for probe and number (Wilks’ 
λ = .805, f (1,25) = 6.061, p = .021, ηp2 = .195). This interaction was motivated 
by a difference at large levels of magnitude (p = .036), in which rightward 
(695.47ms) responses were made faster than leftward (723.40ms). No difference 
was observed at the level of small magnitudes (p = .331). 
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 No further interactions were found at either the two-way, for probe and 
word bias (Wilks’ λ = .973, f (1,25) = .682, p = .417, ηp2 = .027) or number and 
word bias (Wilks’ λ = .869, f (1,25) = 3.778, p = .063, ηp2 = .131), or three-way 
level (Wilks’ λ = .957, f (1,25) = 1.114, p = .301, ηp2 = .043). 
The average duration of a saccade was 42.67ms. For words that bias 
attention to the left (42.40ms), average saccade durations were shorter than when 
words biased attention to the right (42.94ms). Small numbers (42.56ms) resulted 
in saccades with shorter durations than large numbers (42.78ms). Finally, 
leftward probes (42.44ms) were faster than rightward probes (42.90ms). See 
Table 22 for a breakdown by condition of means and standard deviations for the 
duration of saccades made by participants. 
  
Figure 22. Depicted is the two-way interaction for saccade onset. Responses to 
different magnitudes are shown across probe locations, where saccade onset is 
displayed in milliseconds 
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Table 22. Means (and standard deviations) for the duration of saccades that were 
performed by participants during the saccade task, presented in milliseconds. 
Probe  Left  Right  Total 
Word Bias  Left Right Left Right  
 Number Large 41.15 
(24.58) 
42.83 
(32.01) 
43.98 
(26.64) 
43.09 
(29.62) 
42.78 
(28.39) 
Small 41.78 
(31.40) 
43.93 
(34.04) 
42.64 
(33.27) 
41.84 
(29.89) 
42.56 
(32.19) 
Total  41.48 
(28.29) 
43.39 
(33.04) 
43.34 
(29.99) 
42.48 
(29.75) 
42.67 
(30.34) 
 
An analysis of saccade duration revealed no significant main effects for 
probe (Wilks’ λ = .962, f (1,25) = 1.000, p = .327, ηp2 = .038), number (Wilks’ λ 
= .960, f (1,25) = .1.041, p = .317, ηp2 = .040), or word bias (Wilks’ λ = .973, f 
(1,25) = .689, p = .414, ηp2 = .027). A two-way interaction was found between 
probe and word bias (Wilks’ λ = .841, f (1,25) = 4.724, p = .039, ηp2 = .159; see 
Figure 23). Further analysis found both leftward (p = .091) and rightward (p. = 
917) word biases to provide nonsignificant results.  No further interactions 
appeared at the two-way level between probe and number (Wilks’ λ = .939, f 
(1,25) = .1.617, p = .215, ηp2 = .061) or number and word bias (Wilks’ λ = .927, 
f (1,25) = 1.981, p = .172, ηp2 = .073). No interaction was seen at the three-way 
level (Wilks’ λ = .319, f (1,25) = .319, p = .577, ηp2 = .013). 
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Verification Task 
Error Rate Analysis 
The accuracy of response to the verification question, on average, was 
high (94.81%). Participants were more accurate when the question regarded 
rightward (95.37%) biasing words over leftward (94.24%). Participants were 
more accurate for the verification task after exposure to small (95.71%) over 
large (93.91%) numbers. Finally, greater rates of accuracy were seen after 
leftward (95.03%) probes than rightward (94.59%). For a breakdown of error rate 
means by condition, see Table 23. 
  
Figure 23. Depicted is the two-way interaction for saccade duration. Responses to 
different word biases are shown across probe locations, where saccade duration is 
displayed in milliseconds. 
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Table 23. Mean levels of accuracy (%) in response to the task verification question. 
Probe  Left  Right  Total 
Word Bias  Left Right Left Right  
 Number Large 92.70 95.08 92.78 95.05 93.91 
Small 96.21 96.11 95.29 95.23 95.71 
Total  94.46 95.59 94.03 95.14 94.81 
 
An analysis into rates of accuracy found significant main effects of 
number (Wilks’ λ = .634, f (1,25) = 14.460, p = .001, ηp2 = .366) and word bias 
(Wilks’ λ = .696, f (1,25) = 10.923, p = .003, ηp2 = .304). No significant main 
effect of probe was found (Wilks’ λ = .964, f (1,25) = 946, p = .340, ηp2 = .036). 
For number, after hearing small (95.71%) numbers participants were more 
accurate than large numbers (93.91%) confirming some findings demonstrating 
the so-called “small number advantage” (Cai & Li, 2015; Di Bono & Zorzi, 2013; 
Towse, Loetscher, & Brugger, 2014; Trick & Pylyshyn, 1994). For word bias, 
significantly greater rates of accuracy were seen for rightward (95.37%) words 
over leftward (94.24%). 
Further analysis at the two-way level of interaction revealed an 
interaction between number and word bias (Wilks’ λ = .789, f (1,25) = 6.704, p 
= .016, ηp2 = .211), which can be seen visually in Figure 24. When words biased 
attention leftward, a greater accuracy rate was observed for small (95.82%) 
numbers over large (92.96%; p < .001). When the word biased attention to the 
right, no difference was observed between large and small numbers (p = .464). 
No further two-way, for probe and number (Wilks’ λ = .973, f (1,25) = .698, p 
= .411, ηp2 = .027) or probe and word bias (Wilks’ λ = 1.000, f (1,25) = .006, p 
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= .939, ηp2 < .001), or three-way (Wilks’ λ = .995, f (1,25) = .137, p = .714, ηp2 
= .005) interactions were observed. 
Response Time Analysis 
The average time taken to respond to the verification task was 683.84ms. 
Participants were faster when the word remembered was leftward (683.10ms) 
biasing over rightward (684.57ms). After large (683.35ms) number exposure, 
participants were faster than after small (684.34ms) number exposure. Finally, 
after having made a right (682.36ms) probe, participants were faster than after 
having made a left (685.36ms) probe. See Table 24 for a view of means and 
standard deviations by condition. 
  
Figure 24. Depicted is the two-way interaction for verification accuracy. Responses to 
different magnitudes are shown across word biases, with accuracy displayed as a 
percentage of correct responses. 
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Table 24. Mean (and standard deviation) response times by participants to the accuracy 
verification task, presented in milliseconds. 
Probe  Left  Right  Total 
Word Bias  Left Right Left Right  
 Number Large 686.95 
(326.75) 
689.29 
(317.64) 
694.69 
(359.29) 
662.59 
(307.73) 
683.35 
(328.46) 
Small 677.58 
(342.78) 
687.64 
(350.03) 
672.55 
(344.16) 
699.07 
(348.99) 
684.34 
(346.44) 
Total  682.16 
(334.90) 
688.46 
(334.24) 
684.04 
(352.09) 
680.58 
(329.06) 
683.84 
(337.48) 
 
 Analysis by means of ANOVA revealed no significant main effects for 
probe (Wilks’ λ = .972, f (1,25) = .708, p = .408, ηp2 = .028), number (Wilks’ λ 
= .987, f (1,25) = .332, p = .570, ηp2 = .013), or word bias (Wilks’ λ = .997, f 
(1,25) = .081, p = .779, ηp2 = .003). No interactions were observed at the two-
way level for probe and number (Wilks’ λ = .946, f (1,25) = 1.430, p = .243, ηp2 
= .054), probe and word bias (Wilks’ λ = .995, f (1,25) = .129, p = .723, ηp2 
= .005), or number and word bias (Wilks’ λ = .914, f (1,25) = 2.361, p = .137, ηp2 
= .086). Finally, no significant three-way interaction was found (Wilks’ λ = .912, 
f (1,25) = 2.421, p = .132, ηp2 = .088). 
Discussion 
The present study investigated the interplay between words with varying 
spatial semantics maintained in working memory, and concurrently apprehended 
numbers of varying numerical magnitude, with regard to potentially shared 
spatial-conceptual mappings in horizontal space. The findings from this study 
found, in total, three main effects and five two-way interactions. The two-way 
interactions for probe response time and saccade duration found trends toward 
significance. The remaining interactions were for probe accuracy (magnitude x 
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probe location), saccade onset (magnitude x probe location), and verification 
accuracy (word bias x probe location). 
The main effect of probe found in the parity judgement task shows that 
rightward probes caused longer first fixation durations than leftward probes. This 
is not a surprising finding, being in line with previous research (e.g. Salthouse & 
Ellis, 1980).  
The present study also partially replicated the SNARC effect by showing 
that, primed with large magnitudes, participants are faster to launch a saccade 
rightward and, when primed with small magnitudes, participants more accurately 
perform leftward parity judgements. This makes for an interesting contrast: it 
would be expected that small number and leftward response, and large number 
and rightward response, would have an advantage over their counterparts. Here, 
it is shown that larger magnitudes instigate a faster response, potentially at the 
expense of greater accuracy while smaller magnitudes cause more accurate 
responses at the expense of speed, when the response required is in the typically 
expected direction. In the context of research published at present, this is a novel 
finding. Mental number space is a well-documented phenomenon that shows a 
mapping of number to space (Ranzini, Lisi & Zorzi, 2016). When asked to 
categorise numbers in space, participants have been shown to be more accurate 
when the spatial location is congruent with the number’s position on the mental 
number line (Hoffmann, Hornung, Martin & Schiltz, 2013). Equally, the spatial 
semantics in words has been consistently shown to influence attention in 
participants (Richardson, Spivey, Barsalou & McRae, 2003; Chaterjee, 
Southwood & Basilico, 1999; Bedny, Caramazza, Pascual-Leone & Saxe, 2011). 
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The remaining results were found in the verification task accuracy. Main 
effects were found for number and word bias. Participants were more accurate 
for small over large numbers, and for rightward biasing words over leftward 
biasing words. An interaction was found between word bias and magnitude 
showing participants to be more accurate when the question regarded a leftward 
biasing word after hearing a small magnitude number. It could be argued that this 
supports the polarity account of processing (Lakens, 2012). In this instance, the 
positive pole for small number is leftward, ergo increased accuracy is observed 
when the probe location and number coincide.  This finding is similar in nature 
to the one found for probe accuracy. The argument made could be much stronger, 
were an interaction also to be found for verification response time like that found 
for saccade onset, however this is not the case. A potential reason for this is that 
probe response is a passive component of the verification question. There is no 
active requirement to look left or right at this stage of testing, and so the 
directionality aspect is maintained in memory only by temporal proximity. It 
would be interesting for future research to incorporate this aspect to see how the 
results would be affected.  
Altogether, findings from horizontal space suggest the effects being 
observed are more complex than initially hypothesised. The SNARC effect has 
been partially supported, as well as the mapping from conceptual metaphor to 
numerical number space. No clear-cut effects of representational interplay were 
observed here, though a case can be made for its existence by means of inhibition. 
Were no interaction between conceptual representations occurring, it would be 
expected that previous research would replicate fully.   
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Experiment 4 
Vertical Space 
Methodology 
Design 
As in experiment 3, the task comprised a within-participants, 2x2x2 
design. Here, the spatial semantics of a word (leftward/rightward), intrinsic 
number (small/large) and probe (upward/downward) comprised the independent 
variables. Two parity rules (even-left; even-right) were used to balance for any 
effects of number line congruency and audible number presentation. In total, 192 
trials were presented to participants. Recorded were several dependent variables. 
Non-eye-tracking metrics included simple reaction time and accuracy rates to the 
parity and verification tasks. Eyetracking metrics were only recorded for the 
saccade task, and included saccade measures of onset and duration, as well as 
fixation measures of total gaze duration and the duration of the first fixation. All 
participants were required to give a response to every trial, which were grouped 
by parity rule and counterbalanced across presentation. Numbers were presented 
at random within blocks of testing. 
Participants 
The same participants used in Experiment 3 took part in Experiment 4  
Materials 
The same recording of the numbers ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘8’ and ‘9’ used previously 
were, again, deployed here. Words were chosen from a normed database that 
catered for the spatial semantics of a verb (Meteyard & Vigliocco, 2009). The 
norms of the database allowed for the creation of upward and downward-biasing 
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conditions, which consisted of the most representative verbs from each category. 
Words were initially presented in lower case for the saccade task, but in the 
verification task presented in uppercase. This insured processing of the content 
of the word itself, and not just the maintenance of stimuli in visual working 
memory. Both fixation dots and target squares were created in Experiment 
Builder.  
Procedure 
The same procedure used in Experiment 3 was used again for Experiment 
4. However, here the probe array was arranged vertically, in line with the 
coordinates provided in the General Methods (chapter 2; see Figure 25)   
Figure 25. An example trial sequence in which the verification question is a word congruent 
with the prime. Note that presentation is not to scale, but is used to aid clarification. 
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Results 
The strategy discussed in the general methods section was utilised in 
filtering and analysing the data provided by participants. This involved, post 
filtering and transformation, a series of 2x2x2 ANOVAs to understand fixation, 
saccadic, and manual response parameters of the data. 
Responses to the parity and verification task were measured using 
reaction time and error rates for all participants. Eyetracking data was analysed 
only for the saccade task, which can be further divided into fixation and saccadic 
metrics. A standard criterion of α was used and set to .05. Data from one 
participant was excluded due to non-completion of the experimental paradigm, 
and all tests were conducted on the remaining 25 participants. For the raw data, 
see Appendix E. 
Saccade task 
Error Rate Analysis 
The average rate of accuracy by participants was 86.12%. Participants 
were more accurate when maintaining downward (86.66%) words in memory 
than upward (85.57%). More correct answers were received after experiencing 
large (86.84%) numbers than small (85.39%). Finally, greater rates of accuracy 
were seen when upward (87.79%) probes were made over downward (84.43%). 
Table 25 shows a breakdown of accuracy rates by condition. 
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Table 25. Mean rates of accuracy (%) for participants when responding to the saccade 
task. 
Probe  Down  Up  Total 
Word Bias  Down Up Down Up  
 Number Large 86.95 84.15 87.81 88.44 86.84 
Small 83.47 83.16 88.39 86.51 85.39 
Total  85.20 83.66 88.10 87.48 86.12 
 
No significant main effects were found for probe (Wilks’ λ = .876, f (1,25) 
= 3.532, p = .072, ηp2 = .124), number (Wilks’ λ = .973, f (1,25) = .690, p = .414, 
ηp2 = .027), or word bias (Wilks’ λ = .920, f (1,25) = 2.170 p = .153, ηp2 = .080). 
No two-way interactions were revealed between probe and number (Wilks’ λ 
= .981, f (1,25) = .491, p = .490, ηp2 = .019), probe and word bias (Wilks’ λ = .992, 
f (1,25) = .214, p = .647, ηp2 = .008), or number and word bias (Wilks’ λ = 1.000, 
f (1,25) = .001, p = .973, ηp2 < .001). Further, no three-way interaction existed 
(Wilks’ λ = .921, f (1,25) = 2.158, p = .154, ηp2 = .079). 
Response Time Analysis 
The average time taken to respond to a trial, regardless of condition, was 
741.70ms. Participants were faster than this after experiencing an upward 
(738.20ms) biasing word, and slower after a downward (745.10ms) biasing word. 
Participants were faster after small (741.16ms) number exposure over large 
number exposure (742.12ms). When the probe was made upwards (722.25ms), 
participants were faster at responding than when the saccade task required a 
downward (761.94ms) response. Table 26 shows a breakdown of conditions by 
mean and standard deviation. 
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Table 26. Mean (and standard deviation) values for participants response time to the 
saccade task, presented in milliseconds. 
Probe  Down  Up  Total 
Word Bias  Down Up Down Up  
 Number Large 769.58 
(315.26) 
746.58 
(287.69) 
731.17 
(321.31) 
721.76 
(297.42) 
742.12 
(306.22) 
Small 765.02 
(305.09) 
766.58 
(295.51) 
716.07 
(292.86) 
719.82 
(299.93) 
741.26 
(299.08) 
Total  767.34 
(310.14) 
756.39 
(291.57) 
723.66 
(307.42) 
720.80 
(298.51) 
741.70 
(302.68) 
 
Analysis revealed a significant main effect of probe (Wilks’ λ = .628, f 
(1,25) = 14.800, p = .001, ηp2 = .372), and no further main effects for either 
number (Wilks’ λ = .982, f (1,25) = .467, p = .501, ηp2 = .018) or word bias 
(Wilks’ λ = .999, f (1,25) = .017, p = .896, ηp2 = .001). The main effect of probe 
shows upward (722.25ms) responses to be faster than downward (761.94ms). 
No interactions were found at either two way, for probe and number 
(Wilks’ λ = .964, f (1,25) = .924, p = .346, ηp2 = .036), probe and word bias 
(Wilks’ λ = .989, f (1,25) = .287, p = .597, ηp2 = .011), and magnitube and word 
bias (Wilks’ λ = .963, f (1,25) = .961, p = .336, ηp2 = .037), or three-way level 
(Wilks’ λ = .963, f (1,25) = .954, p = .338, ηp2 = .037).  
Eye Movement Analysis 
Fixation data. 
On average, the duration of a participant’s first fixation in response to the 
saccade task was 346.67ms. The spatial semantics of a word made little 
difference to fixation duration, with upward (346.53ms) words resulting in a 
slightly shorter duration of the first fixation than downward (346.81ms). The 
processing of small (345.57ms) numbers resulted in a shorter first fixation than 
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large (347.74ms) numbers. See Table 27 for a breakdown of first fixation 
durations by condition. 
Table 27. Mean (and standard deviation) durations of the first fixation participants made 
in response to the saccade task, presented in milliseconds. 
Probe  Down  Up  Total 
Word Bias  Down Up Down Up  
 Number Large 330.73 
(166.41) 
327.55 
(145.87) 
358.30 
(170.67) 
372.68 
(190.32) 
347.74 
(170.33) 
Small 338.38 
(173.96) 
330.73 
(153.59) 
358.64 
(179.58) 
352.56 
(177.62) 
345.57 
(172.10) 
Total  334.47 
(170.09) 
329.11 
(149.62) 
358.47 
(175.10) 
362.74 
(184.33) 
346.67 
(171.18) 
 
An analysis revealed no main effects for probe (Wilks’ λ = .896, f (1,25) 
= 2.913, p = .100, ηp2 = .104), number (Wilks’ λ = .997, f (1,25) = .080, p = .780, 
ηp2 = .003), and word bias (Wilks’ λ = .983, f (1,25) = .428, p = .519, ηp2 = .017). 
A two-way interaction was found between number and word bias (Wilks’ λ = .782, 
f (1,25) = 6.982, p = .014, ηp2 = .218; Figure 26). Further testing shows no 
statistically significant differences between first fixation durations to large and 
small numbers after hearing a downward biasing word (p = .266) or upward 
biasing word (p = .266). No further two-way interactions were found either for 
probe and number (Wilks’ λ = .904, f (1,25) = 2.647, p = .116, ηp2 = .096) or 
probe and word bias (Wilks’ λ = 1.000, f (1,25) = .012, p = .913, ηp2 < .001).  
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Additionally, no three-way interaction was observed (Wilks’ λ = .980, f (1,25) 
= .515, p = .480, ηp2 = .020).  
For total gaze durations, participants on average remained for 415.00ms. 
This was shorter for upward (414.51ms) biasing words, and slower for downward 
(415.48ms). Small numbers resulted in shorter total gaze durations (410.08ms) 
than long numbers (419.79ms). When responding to the saccade task downwards 
(401.05ms), participants would remain for a shorter duration than responding 
upwards (428.36ms). Table 28 shows the mean and standard deviations for total 
gaze duration by condition. 
  
Figure 26. Depicted is the two-way interaction for first fixation duration. Responses to 
different magnitudes are shown across word biases, where fixation duration is 
presented in milliseconds. 
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Table 28. Mean (and standard deviation) total gaze durations for participant responses 
to the saccade task, presented in milliseconds. 
Probe  Down  Up  Total 
Word Bias  Down Up Down Up  
 Number Large 404.87 
(197.58) 
404.41 
(189.42) 
432.58 
(215.24) 
436.58 
(226.67) 
419.79 
(208.32) 
Small 397.00 
(199.89) 
397.56 
(191.67) 
426.34 
(223.78) 
417.72 
(214.44) 
410.08 
(208.49) 
Total  401.03 
(198.64) 
401.07 
(190.45) 
429.46 
(219.47) 
427.25 
(220.79) 
415.00 
(208.43) 
 
Following analysis, no significant main effects were found for probe 
(Wilks’ λ = .884, f (1,25) = 3.296, p = .081, ηp2 = .116), number (Wilks’ λ = .982, 
f (1,25) = 465, p = .502, ηp2 = .018) or word bias (Wilks’ λ = .996, f (1,25) = .109, 
p = .744, ηp2 = .004). No two-way interactions could be found for probe and 
number (Wilks’ λ = .999, f (1,25) = 0.14, p = .907, ηp2 = .001), probe and word 
bias (Wilks’ λ = 1.000, f (1,25) = .004, p = .947, ηp2 < .001) or number and word 
bias (Wilks’ λ = .901, f (1,25) = 2.739, p = .110, ηp2 = .099). Finally, no three-
way interaction was found either (Wilks’ λ = .986, f (1,25) = .363, p = .552, ηp2 
= .014).  
Saccade data. 
An average saccade was onset in 704.36ms. Faster was the onset when 
upward (700.62ms) over downward (708.00ms) words were maintained in 
memory. For numbers, onset was quicker after small (702.59ms) numbers over 
large (706.09ms), and probes upward (684.68ms) were faster than downward 
(724.85ms). Table 29 shows the average onset times for saccades in the saccade 
task by condition. 
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Table 29. Mean (and standard deviation) onset times for saccades performed in response 
to the saccade task, presented in milliseconds. 
Probe  Down  Up  Total 
Word Bias  Down Up Down Up  
 Number Large 733.57 
(319.45) 
709.64 
(285.05) 
699.28 
(330.89) 
682.13 
(293.30) 
706.09 
(308.38) 
Small 724.52 
(300.27) 
731.59 
(300.42) 
675.86 
(293.41) 
681.18 
(300.05) 
702.59 
(299.29) 
Total  729.14 
(310.08) 
720.42 
(292.75) 
687.62 
(312.85) 
681.66 
(296.52) 
704.36 
(303.90) 
 
Following an inferential analysis, a significant main effect of probe was 
found (Wilks’ λ = .593, f (1,25) = 17.183, p < .001, ηp2 = .407), indicating a 
significantly faster onset of saccades upward (684.68ms) than downward 
(724.85ms). No further main effects were found for number (Wilks’ λ = .966, f 
(1,25) = .883, p = .356, ηp2 = .034), or word bias (Wilks’ λ = 1.000, f (1,25) 
= .003, p = .956, ηp2 < .001). No two-way interactions were found for probe and 
number (Wilks’ λ = .965, f (1,25) = .920, p = .347, ηp2 = .035), probe and word 
bias (Wilks’ λ = .997, f (1,25) = .082, p = .776, ηp2 = .003), or number and word 
bias (Wilks’ λ = .932, f (1,25) = 1.815, p = .190, ηp2 = .068). At the level of three-
way interactions, no significant result was found (Wilks’ λ = .979, f (1,25) = .540, 
p = .469, ηp2 = .021). 
An average saccade in response to the saccade task lasted for 44.46ms. 
This was consistent across downward (44.38ms) and upward (44.55ms) word 
biases, with the former being marginally faster than the latter. Large (43.71ms) 
numbers resulted in saccades with shorter durations than small (45.23ms) 
numbers, while probes downward (47.77ms) had longer durations than those 
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made upward (41.30ms). Table 30 represents the means and standard deviations 
broken down by condition.  
Table 30. Mean (and standard deviation) saccade durations of participants during the 
saccade task, presented in milliseconds. 
Probe  Down  Up  Total 
Word Bias  Down Up Down Up  
 Number Large 46.89 
(34.49) 
45.47 
(31.26) 
41.09 
(12.26) 
41.49 
(15.89) 
43.71 
(25.36) 
Small 49.76 
(40.21) 
49.06 
(38.03) 
40.19 
(11.34) 
42.49 
(26.72) 
45.23 
(31.17) 
Total  48.29 
(37.40) 
47.23 
(34.77) 
40.64 
(11.81) 
41.99 
(21.96) 
44.46 
(28.39) 
 
After analysing this by means of ANOVA, no significant main effects 
were found for probe (Wilks’ λ = .873, f (1,25) = 3.651, p = .068, ηp2 = .127), 
number (Wilks’ λ = .914, f (1,25) = 2.343, p = .138, ηp2 = .086), or word bias 
(Wilks’ λ = .1.000, f (1,25) = .004, p = .950, ηp2 < .001). A significant two-way 
interaction was revealed between probe and number (Wilks’ λ = .828, f (1,25) = 
5.189, p = .032, ηp2 = .172) which can be seen in Figure 27. Further analysis 
shows no significant results. No significant differences were found following 
large number exposure between downward and upward targets (p = .166) or 
following small number exposure (p = .070). No further interactions were found 
at either two-way, between probe and word bias (Wilks’ λ = .967, f (1,25) = .851, 
p = .365, ηp2 = .033) or number and word bias (Wilks’ λ = .981, f (1,25) = .489, 
p = .491, ηp2 = .019), or at the three-way level (Wilks’ λ = .989, f (1,25) = .266, 
p = .610, ηp2 = .011). 
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Verification Task 
Error Rate Analysis 
Average accuracy for the verification task was high (95.38%). More 
accurate responses were made after exposure to downward (95.91%) biasing 
words than upward (94.76%). Large (96.15%) number trials had greater accuracy 
than trials where participants had experienced small (94.53%) numbers. 
Participants were slightly more accurate after having made probes upward 
(95.38%) over downward (95.29%). See Table 31 for a breakdown of accuracy 
rates by condition. 
Table 31. Average rates of accuracy (%) in response to the verification question. 
Probe  Down  Up  Total 
Word Bias  Down Up Down Up  
 Number Large 96.72 96.37 96.91 94.55 96.15 
Small 95.64 92.47 94.36 95.68 94.53 
Total  96.19 94.41 95.63 95.12 95.34 
Figure 27. Depicted is the two-way interaction for saccade durations. Responses to 
different magnitudes are shown across probe locations, where saccade duration is 
presented in milliseconds. 
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Inferential analysis revealed significant main effects of number (Wilks’ λ 
= .830, f (1,25) = 5.132, p = .032, ηp2 = .170) and word bias (Wilks’ λ = .851, f 
(1,25) = 4.372, p = .047, ηp2 = .149), but no significant main effect of probe 
(Wilks’ λ = .992, f (1,25) = .208, p = .652, ηp2 = .008). For number, a significantly 
greater level of accuracy was seen after exposure to large numbers (96.15%) than 
small numbers (94.53%). Findings from word bias show significantly higher 
accuracy in response to downward biasing words (95.91%) over words with an 
upward bias (94.76%). Though no two-way interactions were observed (probe 
and number: Wilks’ λ = .920, f (1,25) = 2.186, p = .152, ηp2 = .080; probe and 
word bias: Wilks’ λ = .969, f (1,25) = .806, p = .378, ηp2 = .031; number and 
word bias: Wilks’ λ = .950, f (1,25) = 1.309, p = .263, ηp2 = .050), a significant 
three-way interaction was found (Wilks’ λ = .813, f (1,25) = 5.747, p = .024, ηp2 
= .187). This three-way interaction can be seen in Figure 28 and Figure 29. When 
this is analysed further, the interaction can be seen to be motivated by two 
contrasts. The first is for downward biasing words, whereby upward biasing 
probes and small (95.53%) magnitudes resulted in less accurate responses than 
large (96.16%) magnitudes (p = .044). The second is for upward biasing words, 
whereby downward biasing probes and small (92.26%) magnitudes resulted in 
less accurate responses than large (95.45%) magnitudes (p = .031). The 
remaining two contrasts were non-significant (downward word bias, downward 
probe bias: large x small number, p = .321; upward word bias, upward probe bias: 
large x small number, p = .085). 
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Figure 29. Depicted is one aspect of the three-way interaction for verification accuracy. 
Responses to downward word biasing trials are shown across probe location and magnitude, 
with accuracy displayed as a percentage of correct responses. 
Figure 28. Depicted is one aspect of the three-way interaction for verification accuracy. 
Responses to upward biasing trials are shown across probe location and magnitude, with 
accuracy displayed as a percentage of correct responses. 
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Response Time Analysis 
On average, a participant took 667.67ms to respond to the verification 
question. This was faster when participants maintained downward (660.88ms) 
biasing words in memory over upward (673.98ms) and large (661.69ms) 
numbers over small (673.21ms). There was relatively little variation for response 
time to the verification task after participants had performed downward 
(667.11ms) over upward (667.61ms) probes, with the former being slightly faster 
than the latter. See Table 32 for response time to the verification task by condition. 
Table 32. Mean (and standard deviation) reaction times in response to the verification 
task, presented in milliseconds. 
Probe  Down  Up  Total 
Word Bias  Down Up Down Up  
 Number Large 644.12 
(313.47) 
675.30 
(323.90) 
671.17 
(347.81) 
656.31 
(334.14) 
661.69 
(330.16) 
Small 665.34 
(332.26) 
684.90 
(347.12) 
662.90 
(338.86) 
680.19 
(352.15) 
673.21 
(342.55) 
Total  654.48 
(332.78) 
680.00 
(335.32) 
667.07 
(343.24) 
668.17 
(343.23) 
667.37 
(336.33) 
 
A further analysis shows no significant main effects (probe: Wilks’ λ = 
1.000, f (1,25) = .010, p = .921, ηp2 < .001; number: Wilks’ λ = .976, f (1,25) 
= .624, p = .437, ηp2 = .024; word bias Wilks’ λ = .863, f (1,25) = 3.965, p = .057, 
ηp2 = .137), two-way interactions (probe and number: Wilks’ λ = .999, f (1,25) 
= .019, p = .890, ηp2 = .001; probe and word bias: Wilks’ λ = .928, f (1,25) = 
1.935, p = .176, ηp2 = .072; number and word bias: Wilks’ λ = .999, f (1,25) 
= .016, p = .901, ηp2 = .001), or three-way interaction (Wilks’ λ = .960, f (1,25) 
= 1.029, p = .320, ηp2 = .040). 
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Discussion 
The present study investigated the interplay between magnitude-related 
features of words with varying spatial semantics maintained in working memory 
and concurrently apprehended numbers of varying numerical magnitude with 
regard to potentially shared spatial-numerical mappings in vertical space. This 
study found several main effects and interactions. In the saccade task, main 
effects were found for probe response time and saccade onset; interactions were 
found for first fixation duration and saccade duration. However, both interactions 
provided nothing of further interest. The main effects found participants to be 
both faster at launching a saccade and, by extension, responding to the trial when 
the task required responses in upward over downward domains. In the 
verification task, main effects were found for number and word bias, as well as a 
three-way interaction in error rates. Here, the main effects indicated that 
participants were more accurate at responding to the task when the magnitude 
was large, and when the word bias was downward. The three-way interaction 
implies caution with the interpretation of these main effects and provided an 
interesting finding. When the word bias was downward and the probe appeared 
in the upper space, participants were more accurate if the magnitude heard was 
large; when the word bias was upward and the probe was in lower space, 
participants were more accurate if the magnitude heard was small.  
Findings from the saccade task are consistent with previous research, 
which also finds a vertical asymmetry in saccade latencies (Abegg, Pianezzi & 
Barton, 2015). Generally, an upward saccade is performed faster than a 
downward saccade (Oohira, Goto & Ozawa, 1982). It is suggested that this is due 
- 146 - 
 
the upper and lower visual fields accessing different networks in attention and 
motor preparation, which then manifests as a behavioural (saccade) asymmetry 
(Tzelepi, Laskaris, Amditis & Kapoula, 2010). This is supported by ecological 
theories of cognition (e.g. Barker, 1968; Gärling & Evans, 1991; Rietveld & 
Kiverstein, 2014; Shaw & Bransford, 2017), which would suggest eye movement 
in upward space to be parasitised by abstract thinking. In humans, the necessity 
to understand and process features of the environment in upward space has 
diminished with evolution, and so actively processing abstract information has 
expropriated upward saccadic exploration (Previc, Declerck & de Brabander, 
2005). As upward space is not as heavily involved in the processing of grounded 
or embodied stimuli, less common coding confabulation should occur and faster 
responses are to be expected. By being able to replicate this finding, a stronger 
case can be made for the question of why other findings do not replicate (e.g. 
SNARC, conceptual metaphor effects; c.f. Fischer, Castel, Dodd & Pratt, 2003; 
Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). 
In vertical space, the case for spatial semantics is much clearer than 
number. Previous work has found that, though mental number space incorporates 
the Y-axis, effects are much stronger across the X-axis (Gevers & Lammertyn, 
2005). However, as there are numerous examples of vertical SNARC effects (e.g. 
Schwarz & Keus, 2004; Jarick, Dixon, Maxwell, Nicholls & Smilek, 2009), it 
would still be expected that the present study should support the literature if no 
interplay between representations were occurring. Generally, vertical space finds 
support in the literature, something the present study is not able to uphold. A 
number of studies have found interactions between the image schema of words 
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like push and pull and the spatial location of a response (e.g. Schubert, 2005; 
Paladino, Mazzurega & Bonfiglioli, 2017). This is motivated by the notion that 
our understanding is grounded in our knowledge of the world around us. For 
example, standing tall when proud and looking up to others are metaphors 
entwined in upward space. This is thought to transcend meta-cognitive 
association (i.e. it is not that words and concepts are merely associated over time) 
and instead be a fast and automatic process (Richardson, Spivey, Barsalou & 
McRae, 2003). An alternative account of this relationship suggests that there is a 
difference in the processing of positive and negative polar endpoints, so that 
positive (e.g. upward, moral) is processed faster than negative (e.g. downward, 
immoral; Lakens, 2012), and while this is a potential alternative explanation for 
the data it still does not account for why no effects of number were observed. It 
does, however, provide at least some explanation as to why more accurate results 
were observed after upward biasing words over downward. 
Here, then, similar findings to the first two studies are observed, and, once 
again, a much more complex nature of conceptual interplay is presented than 
initially hypothesised. Instead, at the bottom-up level of processing, when 
representations are interacting, competition occurs and there is an interference in 
response times. At the top-down level, in stark contrast, there is a facilitation 
effect. This will be discussed in more detail in the Chapter Summary. 
 
  
- 148 - 
 
Chapter Summary 
The present chapter investigated the interplay between words with 
varying spatial semantics maintained in working memory and concurrently 
apprehended numbers of varying numerical magnitude with regard to potentially 
shared spatial-conceptual mappings in horizontal and vertical space. Once again, 
the strongest support to an interactive simulation hypothesis entertained 
throughout this Thesis has been provided in the horizontal domain, which, 
arguably, has a stronger situated mapping mechanism than the vertical space 
(Myachykov, Scheepers, Fischer & Kessler, 2014). Both studies have, to an 
extent, replicated findings from the literature: in vertical space, a saccade 
asymmetry was observed (Abegg, Pianezzi & Barton, 2015). In the horizontal 
domain more accurate responses were gathered after rightward over leftward 
words (Lynott & Coventry, 2014) and following small over large numbers in 
leftward space, while faster onset saccades and longer first fixations were 
observed in rightward space after large number (e.g. Fischer, 2003). 
Further evidence was found for the differences in top down and bottom 
up cognitive processing. Although originally predicted as a facilitatory 
mechanism, conceptual interplay appeared to interfere with information stored in 
memory when bottom-up processing was measured. In this chapter, were no 
conceptual interplay occurring, it would be expected that strong support would 
be found for SNARC or effects of spatial semantics. This was not the case. Given 
other effects were replicated, and given the claimed power and wealth of the 
respective literatures, the absence of what would be considered normal is in itself 
interesting. At the bottom-up level of processing, conceptual interplay confounds 
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memory in line with common coding accounts (e.g. Prinz, 1990; see also Tye-
Murray, Spehar, Myerson, Hale & Sommers, 2013). However, at the level of top-
down processing (e.g. the verification question) interplay between 
representations was shown to aid processing, which is more in line with 
spreading activation accounts of cognition (Collins & Loftus, 1975; Barr, Walker, 
Gross & Hayne, 2014; Foster et al., 2017). 
An interesting contrast is made across verification accuracy. In horizontal 
space, leftward words and small magnitudes resulted in more accurate responses. 
In vertical space, downward words, upward probes and large magnitudes were 
more accurate than small magnitudes, while upward words, downward probes 
and large magnitudes were also more accurate than small magnitudes. For 
horizontal space, the effect observed is what would be expected, albeit missing 
an effect of probe location. For the interaction in vertical space, a different picture 
entirely is revealed. The driving force was large magnitude, however only when 
combined with one other facilitatory factor: either upward probes or upward 
words, but not both. This would suggest a mixed case of support for both 
common coding (Prinz, 1990) and spreading activation (Collins & Loftus, 1975), 
as facilitation can be seen, but only when there are not too many factors at work 
simultaneously. 
Finally, it would be remiss not to pass comment on the inherent flaws of 
the ANOVA approach to analysis, which provides a very specific answer to a very 
unspecific question. By averaging across trials and participants, a lot of statistical 
power is sacrificed, and this is reflected in the findings. Many of the lost findings 
were interactions that would have supported the number and spatial semantics 
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literature, and in some cases provide a strong support for conceptual interplay. 
However, it is wrong to massage results in a fashion that supports personal 
interest, and through understanding these findings two main issues are brought 
to bear: 1) the analysis strategy must be sufficient to encapsulate all results. 
Perhaps by adopting a mixed linear modelling approach, some of the findings 
would be made clearer. This is not to say the overall picture would change, but 
that the findings would be more understandable due to less power being 
sacrificed. 2) It is by the incorporation of two related representations that both 
the findings have become muddled. The interplay between representations has 
gone to show that the whole is different to the sum of its parts, not necessarily 
greater. 
The final study chapter to follow increases the level of abstraction further. 
While there is a clear link to the concrete when dealing with affordances and 
spatial semantics, the next two studies attempt to understand interplay between 
number and the relatively abstract representations of valency. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Valency and Numerical Magnitude 
 
Figure 30. The Abstraction Pipeline. A pictoral example of how far removed the current 
chapter's subject matter is from concrete representation. 
This chapter reports the results of two experiments, similar in nature to 
the tasks outlined in the preceding chapters. Here, participants maintain in 
memory a word that carries a certain valency before making a judgement about 
the parity of an number presented audibly by performing a saccade to one of two 
onscreen targets, either horizontally (experiment 5) or vertically (experiment 6) 
distributed. Following this, participants are asked to judge whether a word 
presented on screen is either the same or different to the one being maintained in 
memory. Word valency, as it pertains to the psychologist, is typically 
conceptualised as the attractiveness, or emotions, associated with a term 
(Kuperman, Estes, Brysbaert & Warriner, 2014). A word that would be 
considered positively attractive is usually associated with goodness, such as joy, 
pride, and happiness, while a word with negative attractiveness is associated with 
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badness, like melancholy, depression, and sadness (de la Vega, De Filippis, 
Lachmair, Dudschig & Kaup, 2012). Word valency has a spatial component (de 
la Vega, Dudschig, De Filippis, Lachmair & Kaup, 2013). This spatial component 
utilises sensorimotor simulation (Bastiaansen, Thioux & Keysers, 2009). 
Because of the nature of spreading activation, the perceptual features of space 
and semantic properties of word valency have a common locus of activation, and 
by extension a potential for interaction (e.g. Pulvermüller, Hauk, Nikulin & 
Ilmoniemi, 2005; Mahon, & Caramazza, 2008; Davey, Cornelissen, Thompson, 
Sonkusare, Hallam, Smallwood & Jefferies, 2015). As number also shares an 
activation in space, the current thesis would hypothesise an interaction – interplay 
– between representations. 
Unlike spatial semantics, the content of the previous chapter, word 
valency is even more abstract and removed from the environment. This is due, in 
part, to the inability to easily enact valency in the world: with spatial semantics, 
it is easy to lift and drop an item. It is not so easy, as is the case with word valency, 
to force feelings of love, hate, to feel aggressive or intimate. These are abstract 
emotions that are associated with an individual’s experiences. Valency is 
experienced almost entirely without top-down control, and so the nature of the 
interplay between concepts will be different to what is previously observed for 
spatial semantics and affordances, whereby due to the concreteness of concepts 
representation is much richer. Here, two studies examine the ability of language 
that utilises differing valency to displace visual attention in different dimensions 
of space. It is hypothesised that words with positive valency will prime attention 
toward upward and rightward domains while words with negative valency will 
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prime attention in leftward and downward domains. Error rates are expected to 
mirror this, with greater accuracy being observed in wholly congruent trials. As 
before, the first of these experiments is to test horizontal space, while the second 
is to test vertical. 
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Experiment 5 
Horizontal Space 
Methodology 
Design 
As with previous experimental tasks, the present work utilises a within-
subjects 2x2x2 design. In addition to the manipulation of number (small/large) 
and probe (leftward/rightward), there was an additional manipulation of valency 
(positive/negative). Two parity rules (even-left; even-right) balanced for any 
effect of number line congruency and audible number presentation. In total, 128 
trials were shown to participants. Dependent variables included non-eyetracking 
metrics (reaction time and accuracy rates to the parity and verification tasks) and 
eyetracking metrics (saccade onset and duration, first fixation duration and total 
gaze duration for the parity task). All participants were required to respond to 
every trial, which were grouped and counterbalanced by parity rule across 
presentation. Numbers were presented at random within blocks of testing. 
Participants 
In total, 25 participants (12 male) were recruited from the undergraduate 
population of Northumbria University, whose participation came in exchange for 
course credits. The average age of a participant was 23 (range = 18 – 50); all 
participants were of UK birth, native speakers of English, with normal or 
corrected-to-normal eyesight. All participants identified as right-handed, which 
the Short Form Edinburgh Handedness Inventory confirmed (Ransil & Schachter, 
1994; average = .977). 
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Materials 
The same recording of the numbers ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘8’ and ‘9’ used previously 
were, again, deployed here. Words were chosen from a normed database that 
catered for the spatial semantics of a verb (Meteyard & Vigliocco, 2009). The 
norms of the database allowed for the creation of leftward and rightward-biasing 
conditions, which consisted of the most representative verbs from each category. 
In addition to norms for valency, the database also provided norms for arousal 
and frequency, which were used to control the groups so that the only differences 
occurred due to valency. Words were initially presented in lower case for the 
saccade task, but in the verification task presented in uppercase. This ensured 
processing of the content of the word itself, and not just the maintenance of 
stimuli in visual working memory. Both fixation dots and target squares were 
created in Experiment Builder.  
Procedure 
All data were collected in a room with minimal lighting. Before testing, 
participants were briefed about the nature of the experiment (see Appendix A for 
the standardised brief) and asked to complete informed consent documentation 
(Appendix A) before answering a demographics questionnaire (Appendix C) and 
the Short Form Edinburgh Handedness Index (Appendix D; Ransil & Schachter, 
1994). After consenting, the participant was then seated on a chair with the 
backrest tilted to a 110° 60cm from the screen with their head placed on an SR-
Research chinrest, before being calibrated, tested and debriefed. See Figure 31 
for a standard experimental trial. 
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All experimental trials consisted of a fixation cross presentation for 
500ms followed by the visual presentation of a word for 1000ms. After the word 
was another fixation cross (500ms) and the probe task followed. This task had an 
auditory number presented alongside two lateral visual targets, which 
participants would saccade toward in accordance with the parity rule. The landing 
of a saccade triggered the offset of the saccade task and the onset of a verification 
task, which required participants to view a word and decide whether it is the same 
or different to the word seen at the start of the trial. Participants pressed a button 
to respond to this task, either the left (corresponding to yes) or right 
(corresponding to no) trigger. Depress of the button signalled the end of a trial 
and a 1000ms buffer period before the start of the next. Participants were given 
accuracy feedback immediately after saccade and verification tasking. Total 
testing took approximately 60 minutes.  
 
Figure 31. An example trial sequence in which the verification question is a word congruent 
with the prime. Note that presentation is not to scale but is used to aid clarification. 
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Results 
The strategy discussed in the general methods section was utilised in 
filtering and analysing the data provided by participants. This involved, post 
filtering and transformation, a series of 2x2x2 ANOVAs to understand fixation, 
saccadic, and manual response parameters of the data. 
Responses to the parity and verification task were measured using 
reaction time and error rates for all participants. Eyetracking data was analysed 
only for the saccade task, which can be further divided into fixation and saccadic 
metrics. A standard criterion of α was used and set to .05. Data from one 
participant was excluded due to not completing the experimental paradigm, and 
all tests were conducted on the remaining 25 participants. For the raw data, see 
Appendix E. 
Saccade Task 
Error Rate Analysis 
Participants displayed relatively high levels of accuracy across the task 
(85.41%). Similar levels of accuracy were observed for trials containing positive 
(85.44%) or negative (85.38%) words, and for trials containing large (85.63%) 
or small (85.19%) magnitudes. For the probe response, more accurate trials were 
seen when answering rightward (86.13%) over leftward (84.69%). For a 
condition-by-condition basis, see Table 33 
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Table 33. Mean accuracy (%) for responses given to the saccade probe task. 
Probe  Left  Right  Total 
Valency  Negative Positive Negative Positive  
Number Large 82.00 84.50 87.25 88.75 85.63 
Small 87.00 85.25 85.25 83.25 85.19 
Total  84.50 84.88 86.25 86.00 85.41 
 
Analysis of the results revealed no significant main effect of probe 
location (Wilks’ λ = .987, f (1,24) = .324, p = .575, ηp2 = .013), magnitude (Wilks’ 
λ = .998, f (1,24) = .041, p = .840, ηp2 = .002), or valency (Wilks’ λ = 1.000, f 
(1,24) = .004, p = .951, ηp2 < .001). Considering multiple factors, a two-way 
interaction was found between probe location and magnitude (see Figure 32; 
Wilks’ λ = 795, f (1,24) = 6.176, p = .020, ηp2 = .205). However, inferential 
analysis revealed neither large (p = .153) nor small (p = .450) comparisons to be 
significant. 
No further interactions at the two-way, for probe location and valency 
(Wilks’ λ = .998, f (1,24) = .060, p = .809, ηp2 = .002) or magnitude and valency 
Figure 32. Depicted is the two-way interaction for probe accuracy. Here, 
magnitude is shown across probe location. 
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(Wilks’ λ = .929, f (1,24) = 1.836, p = .188, ηp2 = .071), or three-way level (Wilks’ 
λ = .999, f (1,24) = .023, p = .881, ηp2 = .001) were found. 
Response Time Analysis 
The average trial was responded to in 715.72ms. This was faster when the 
valency of a word was negative (703.95ms) over positive (727.67), when the 
magnitude experienced was small (712.60ms) over large (718.87ms), and the 
direction of response was rightward (715.57ms) over leftward (715.88ms). These 
can be seen by condition in Table 34. 
Table 34. Mean and standard deviations values for the duration participants taken to 
respond to the saccade task conditions in milliseconds, presented in milliseconds. 
Probe  Left  Right  Total 
Valency  Negative Positive Negative Positive  
Number Large 707.31 
(302.84) 
721.55 
(324.64) 
700.35 
(302.82) 
746.04 
(348.31) 
718.87 
(320.43) 
Small 692.21 
(319.90) 
742.46 
(341.22) 
716.22 
(326.90) 
699.15 
(285.32) 
712.60 
(319.58) 
Total  699.52 
(311.60) 
732.16 
(333.05) 
708.24 
(314.87) 
723.16 
(319.73) 
715.72 
(319.96) 
 
Inferential analysis revealed a significant main effect of word valency 
(Wilks’ λ = .820, f (1,24) = 5.283, p = .031, ηp2 = .180), with words of negative 
(703.95ms) valency being responded to faster than words of positive (727.67ms). 
No significant main effect was found when investigating parity response (Wilks’ 
λ = 1.000, f (1,24) = .001, p = .982, ηp2 < .001) or magnitude (Wilks’ λ = .966, f 
(1,24) = .835 p = .370, ηp2 = .034). At the level of interaction, no significant 
results were revealed at the two-way level between probe location and magnitude 
(Wilks’ λ = .960, f (1,24) = .987, p = .330, ηp2 = .040), probe location and valency 
(Wilks’ λ = .986, f (1,24) = .336, p = .567, ηp2 = .014), or magnitude and valency 
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(Wilks’ λ = 1.000, f (1,24) < .001 p = .996, ηp2 < .001) or at the three-way level 
(Wilks’ λ = .897, f (1,24) = 2.749 p = .110, ηp2 = .103). 
Eye Movement Analysis 
Fixation data. 
The average duration of a participant’s first fixation was 385.66ms. This 
was made longer after exposure to negative (383.95ms) over positive (387.39ms) 
words. Large (392.02ms) magnitude exposure caused longer durations of fixation 
than small (379.31ms) magnitudes. Finally, a leftward (356.32ms) biasing 
response made for shorter first fixations than right (414.75ms). Table 35 shows 
descriptive statistics on a conditional basis. 
Table 35. Mean (and standard deviation) values for the first fixations participants made 
in response to the saccade task, presented in milliseconds. 
Probe  Left  Right  Total 
Valency  Negative Positive Negative Positive  
Number Large 353.71 
(196.12) 
366.60 
(205.29) 
419.12 
(211.99) 
425.45 
(214.70) 
392.02 
(209.46) 
Small 359.40 
(183.43) 
345.38 
(168.43) 
401.92 
(205.59) 
412.33 
(199.85) 
379.31 
(191.60) 
Total  356.67 
(189.48) 
355.97 
(187.88) 
410.53 
(208.83) 
419.12 
(207.59) 
385.66 
(200.77) 
 
A closer analysis revealed a significant main effect of probe location 
(Wilks’ λ = .693, f (1,23) = 10.175, p = .004, ηp2 = .307), whereby trials that 
required a rightward (414.75ms) saccade resulted in longer durations of the first 
fixation than trials requiring leftward (356.32ms) saccades. There were no main 
effects of magnitude (Wilks’ λ = .997, f (1,23) = .072, p = .790, ηp2 = .003) or 
valency (Wilks’ λ = .989, f (1,23) = .225 p = .618, ηp2 = .011), nor were there any 
significant interactions at the two-way, for parity and magnitude (Wilks’ λ = .920, 
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f (1,23) = 2.005, p = .170, ηp2 = .080), parity and valency (Wilks’ λ = 1.000, f 
(1,23) < .001 p = .989, ηp2 < .001), or magnitude and valency (Wilks’ λ = .966, f 
(1,23) = .817, p = .376, ηp2 = .034). At the three-way level of analysis, no 
significant interaction was revealed (Wilks’ λ = .969, f (1,23) = .739, p = .399, 
ηp2 = .031). 
The total gaze duration of an average participant during the saccade task 
was 458.56ms. This was made longer by exposure to positive words (461.40ms) 
over negative (455.76ms). When exposed to large (468.66ms) over small 
(448.49ms) magnitudes, longer total gaze durations were found. Finally, longer 
durations were recorded in rightward (466.17ms) over leftward (450.89ms) 
biasing trials. On a condition-by-condition level, these findings can be seen in 
Table 36 
Table 36. Mean (and standard deviation) values for the total gaze duration of participants 
in response to the saccade task, presented in milliseconds. 
Probe  Left  Right  Total 
Valency  Negative Positive Negative Positive  
Number Large 450.12 
(238.85) 
469.78 
(251.01) 
477.81 
(223.74) 
475.72 
(223.88) 
468.66 
(234.43) 
Small 446.53 
(226.77) 
437.30 
(220.31) 
448.28 
(216.74) 
462.56 
(219.50) 
448.49 
(220.82) 
Total  448.25 
(232.46)  
453.51 
(236.50) 
463.07 
(220.59) 
469.37 
(221.69) 
458.56 
(227.89) 
 
Through an inferential analysis, no significant main effects were found of 
probe location (Wilks’ λ = .961, f (1,23) = .927, p = .346, ηp2 = .039), magnitude 
(Wilks’ λ = .968, f (1,23) = .751, p = .395, ηp2 = .032), or valency (Wilks’ λ = .974, 
f (1,23) = .615, p = .441, ηp2 = .026). No two-way interactions were found 
between probe location and magnitude (Wilks’ λ = .908, f (1,23) = 2.340, p = .140, 
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ηp2 = .092), probe location and valency (Wilks’ λ = .996, f (1,23) = .101, p = .754, 
ηp2 = .004), or magnitude and valency (Wilks’ λ = .967, f (1,23) = .782, p = .386, 
ηp2 = .033). However, at the three-way level of analysis, a significant interaction 
was found (Wilks’ λ = .827, f (1,23) = 4.808, p = .039, ηp2 = .173). Figures 33 
and 34 show visually this interaction. Further examination shows this interaction 
to rely upon one comparison. When shown a negative bias word and a rightward 
biasing probe, the total gaze duration of participants was longer when the number 
heard was large (477.81ms) over small (448.28ms; p = .027). The remaining 
comparisons were nonsignificant (negative word, leftward probe: large x small 
magnitude, p = .250; positive word, leftward probe: large x small magnitude: p 
= .257; positive word, rightward probe: large x small magnitude: p = .496). 
  
Figure 33. Depicted is one aspect of the three-way interaction for dwell time. Responses 
to negative word bias trials are shown across probe location and magnitude, where the 
total gaze duration of participants is displayed in milliseconds 
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Saccade data. 
The average time taken for a participant to onset a saccade was 682.83ms. 
This was made faster by negative (672.55ms) words and slower by positive 
(693.26ms). After hearing a large (684.68ms) magnitude, participants saccades 
were onset faster than after hearing a small (680.99ms) magnitude. Finally, trials 
requiring a leftward (683.02ms) response had saccades onset slower than those 
requiring rightward (682.65ms) saccades Table 37 shows these findings on a 
condition-by-condition basis. 
Table 37. Mean (and standard deviation) values for the onset times of target-directed 
saccades during the saccade task, presented in milliseconds. 
Probe  Left  Right  Total 
Valency  Negative Positive Negative Positive  
Number Large 674.63 
(310.18) 
684.32 
(326.47) 
663.88 
(302.77) 
715.47 
(361.14) 
684.68 
(326.29) 
Small 667.77 
(341.56) 
705.35 
(340.66) 
684.15 
(335.04) 
666.30 
(296.64) 
680.99 
(329.42) 
Total  671.09 
(326.53) 
694.93 
(333.61) 
673.98 
(319.18) 
691.59 
(332.04) 
682.83 
(327.80) 
Figure 34. Depicted is one aspect of the three-way interaction for dwell time. Responses 
to positive word bias trials are shown across probe location and magnitude. 
 
- 164 - 
 
An analysis of these results shows no significant main effect for probe 
location (Wilks’ λ = 1.000, f (1,24) < .001, p = .998, ηp2 < .001) or magnitude 
(Wilks’ λ = .849, f (1,24) = .483, p = .494, ηp2 = .020). For valency, a significant 
main effect was lost by means of rounding to three decimal places (Wilks’ λ 
= .849, f (1,24) = 4.264, p = .050, ηp2 = .151). No significant two-way 
interactions were found for probe location and magnitude (Wilks’ λ = .949, f 
(1,24) = 1.298, p = .266, ηp2 = .051), probe location and valency (Wilks’ λ = .999, 
f (1,24) = .035, p = .852, ηp2 = .001), or magnitude and valency (Wilks’ λ = .999, 
f (1,24) = .027, p = .871, ηp2 = .001). At the three-way level of analysis, no 
interaction was revealed (Wilks’ λ = .913, f (1,24) = 2.279, p = .144, ηp2 = .087).  
The duration of a target-directed saccade on an average trial was 41.73ms. 
Following exposure to words with a negative (41.18ms) valency, saccades were 
shorter in duration than following exposure to words with positive (42.28ms) 
valency. The same was found to be true for small (40.69ms) over large (42.77ms) 
magnitudes, and when trials required rightward (40.90ms) over leftward 
(42.57ms) responses. This can be seen at the conditional level in Table 38. 
Table 38. Mean (and standard deviation) values for the duration of a participant's target 
directed saccade during the saccade task, presented in milliseconds. 
Probe  Left  Right  Total 
Valency  Negative Positive Negative Positive  
Number Large 43.15 
(22.16) 
44.99 
(32.85) 
41.98 
(22.01) 
41.54 
(22.01) 
42.77 
(25.19) 
Small 40.63 
(18.74) 
41.58 
(19.75) 
39.58 
(19.76) 
40.99 
(22.56) 
40.69 
(21.05) 
Total  41.85 
(20.48) 
43.29 
(27.17) 
40.54 
(20.93) 
41.28 
(23.78) 
41.73 
(23.24) 
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Inferential analysis of saccade durations show no main effects (probe 
location: Wilks’ λ = .965, f (1,24) = 860, p = .363, ηp2 = .035; magnitude Wilks’ 
λ = .852, f (1,24) = 4.167, p = .052, ηp2 = .148; valency: (Wilks’ λ = .945, f (1,24) 
= 1.398, p = .249, ηp2 = .055), no two-way interactions (probe location and 
magnitude: Wilks’ λ = .983, f (1,24) = .424, p = .521, ηp2 = .017; probe location 
and valency: Wilks’ λ = .993, f (1,24) = .157, p = .695, ηp2 = .007; magnitude 
and valency: Wilks’ λ = .999, f (1,24) = .024, p = .879, ηp2 = .001), and no three-
way interaction (Wilks’ λ = .976, f (1,24) = .589, p = .450, ηp2 = .024). 
Verification Task 
Error Rate Analysis 
Average accuracy to the verification task was high (95.44%). When the 
word asked about was negative (95.81%), more accurate responses were given 
than when positive (95.06%). After experiencing a magnitude that was small 
(95.69%) more accurate answers were given compared to large (95.19%). Finally, 
more accurate responses were given when the location of the probe was leftward 
(96.00%), as compared to rightward (94.88%). A conditional breakdown of 
means can be seen in Table 39. 
Table 39. Mean rates of accuracy (%) in response to the verification question asked to 
participants. 
Probe  Left  Right  Total 
Valency  Negative Positive Negative Positive  
Number Large 96.00 95.50 94.25 95.00 95.19 
Small 96.50 96.00 96.50 93.75 95.69 
Total  96.25 95.75 95.38 94.38 95.44 
 
An analysis of error rates revealed no main effects for parity response 
(Wilks’ λ = .897, f (1,24) = 2.752, p = .110, ηp2 = .103), magnitude (Wilks’ λ 
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= .978, f (1,24) = .532, p = .473, ηp2 = .022), or valency (Wilks’ λ = .948, f (1,24) 
= 1.326, p = .261, ηp2 = .052). No two-way interactions were found between 
probe location and magnitude (Wilks’ λ = 1.000, f (1,24) < .001, p > .999, ηp2 
< .001), probe location and valency (Wilks’ λ = .995, f (1,24) = .119, p = .733, 
ηp2 = .005), or magnitude and valency (Wilks’ λ = .940, f (1,24) = 1.540, p = .227, 
ηp2 = .060). Finally, and further, no three-way interaction was discovered (Wilks’ 
λ = .938, f (1,24) = 1.592, p = .219, ηp2 = .062). 
Response Time Analysis 
An average trial was responded within 652.28ms. This was made to be 
longer following exposure to positive (654.05ms) over negative (650.55) word 
valency. Participants were faster after experiencing trials with large (648.27ms) 
magnitudes over small (656.22ms). Finally, after having performed a leftward 
(658.71ms) saccade, participants were slower than to respond to the verification 
question than after having performed rightward (645.81ms) saccades. Table 40 
shows this at the conditional level. 
Table 40. Mean (and standard deviation) values for the time taken to respond to the 
accuracy verification question, presented in milliseconds. 
Probe  Left  Right  Total 
Valency  Negative Positive Negative Positive  
Number Large 637.10 
(319.53) 
677.41 
(348.93) 
656.57 
(326.23) 
621.69 
(295.25) 
648.27 
(323.35) 
Small 649.57 
(316.20) 
670.66 
(334.01) 
658.37 
(342.19) 
646.01 
(316.36) 
656.22 
(327.22) 
Total  643.57 
(317.62) 
674.01 
(341.24) 
657.47 
(334.09) 
633.63 
(305.79) 
652.28 
(325.27) 
 
An inferential analysis revealed no significant main effects (probe 
location: Wilks’ λ = .897, f (1,24) = 2.752, p = .110, ηp2 = .103; magnitude: Wilks’ 
- 167 - 
 
λ = .982, f (1,24) = .432, p = .517, ηp2 = .018; valency: Wilks’ λ = .990, f (1,24) 
= .245, p = .625, ηp2 = .010), no two-way interactions (probe location and 
magnitude: Wilks’ λ = .984, f (1,24) = .388, p = .539, ηp2 = .016; probe location 
and valency: Wilks’ λ = .854, f (1,24) = 4.116, p = .054, ηp2 = .146; magnitude 
and valency: Wilks’ λ = .997, f (1,24) = .066, p = .800, ηp2 = .003), and no three-
way interaction (Wilks’ λ = .879, f (1,24) = 3.290, p = .082, ηp2 = .121). 
Discussion 
The present study investigated the interplay between words with varying 
valency maintained in working memory and concurrently apprehended numbers 
of varying numerical magnitude with regard to potentially shared spatial-
numerical mappings in horizontal space. In total, two interactions and two main 
effects were found. Of the interactions, there was one two-way (which warranted 
no further analysis) and a three-way. The main effects were found for probe 
response time and first fixation duration.  
For probe response time, words with a negative valency were found to be 
responded to faster than positive. The first fixation duration of a participant was 
found to be longer in duration when responding to a rightward probe than a 
leftward. An interaction was found for the total gaze duration of participants 
following their response to the parity judgement task. This was a three-way 
interaction, and driven by negative words and rightward probes: when 
participants heard a large number, the gaze duration was longer than after hearing 
a small number. 
To break down these findings, the result found in fixation durations acts 
as a strong indicator that the paradigm, and by extension the equipment used, 
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accurately recorded data. Previous studies have found longer first fixations to 
emerge after rightward over leftward saccades, especially when the processing 
involves linguistic content (McConkie & Rayner, 1976; Paterson, McGowan, 
White, Malik, Abedipour & Jordan, 2014). As the task on a whole can find 
support for physiological results, but not for well-established psychological 
findings such as mental number space (Hubbard, Piazza, Pinel & Dehaene, 2005) 
and SNARC effect (Fias, 1996), questions are raised. 
The interaction for total gaze duration provides weak support for the 
spatial-numerical mapping in rightward space, which resulted in longer total 
durations of gaze. However, interestingly, this occurred in combination with a 
word of negative valency as opposed to one with positive. Some previous 
research relates fixation durations to the relative memory load (e.g. Van Orden, 
Limbert, Makeig & Jung, 2001; Meghanathan, van Leeuwen & Nikolaev, 2014; 
Brouwer, Hogervorst, Oudejans, Ries & Touryan, 2017) and so one possibility 
here is that the longer durations in this study reflect similar process. If so, then it 
would be indicative of a task specificity effect in line with the proposal of 
conceptual interplay. However, others have linked gaze duration with increased 
attention (Unema, Pannasch, Joos, Velichkovsky, 2005; Podladchikova, Samarin, 
Shaposhnikov & Petrushan, 2017); if this is held to be the case, then support 
would be for number-space models of cognition instead. At either possibility, one 
comparison driving the interaction is not entirely convincing. Further research 
would be required to examine this in closer detail.  
In terms of the main effect found for valency in probe response time, the 
faster processing of negative words supports previous findings based on valency-
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arousal models of word recognition (e.g. Robinson, Storbeck, Meier & Kirkeby 
2004; Larsen, Mercer, Balota & Strube, 2008; Estes & Adelman, 2008). In an 
important paper, Kuperman, Estes, Brysbaert and Warriner (2014) disentangle 
valency from arousal and show further interactions to occur via word frequency: 
these manifested stronger in low-frequency words than high-frequency, with 
negativity predicting speed of response. The present study controlled for arousal 
and frequency, and so an avenue of future investigation could be found in the 
reanalysis of the data or rerunning of tasks with this taken into account. 
While the results here are not compelling, the bigger picture is made 
clearer. Having advanced into a domain of greater abstraction, processing is not 
involving the same level of simulation as other domains, e.g. affordances (Binder 
& Desai, 2011). As less sensorimotor simulation occurs, there is less capacity for 
conceptual interplay, and so less interaction between representation. Crucially, 
the lack of replication effects shows there is still something manifesting, but 
while the degree of interaction is enough to moot effects of number, it is not 
strong enough to make a comprehensible or obvious interaction. 
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Experiment 6 
Vertical Space 
Methodology 
Design 
As before, the task comprised a within-participants, 2x2x2 design. Here, 
the spatial semantics of a word bias (leftward/rightward), number (small/large) 
and probe (upward/downward) comprised the independent variables. Two parity 
rules (even-left; even-right) were used to balance for any effects of number line 
congruency and audible number presentation. In total, 128 trials were presented 
to participants. Recorded were several dependent variables. Non-eye-tracking 
metrics included simple reaction time and accuracy rates to the saccade and 
verification tasks. Eye tracking metrics were only recorded for the saccade task, 
and included saccade measures of onset and duration, as well as fixation 
measures of total gaze duration and the duration of the first fixation. All 
participants were required to give a response to every trial, which were grouped 
by parity rule and counterbalanced across presentation. Numbers were presented 
at random within blocks of testing. 
Participants 
The same participants involved in the completion of Experiment 5 took 
part in Experiment 6.  
Materials 
The same materials used in Experiment 5 were used again in Experiment 
6.  
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Procedure 
The experimental procedure that was used in Experiment 5 was, again, 
deployed here. However, in place of a horizontal saccade response to the parity 
task, participants had to saccade vertical targets (see Figure 35). 
  
Figure 35. An example trial sequence in which the verification question is a word congruent 
with the prime. Note that presentation is not to scale but is used to aid clarification. 
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Results 
The strategy discussed in the general methods section was utilised in 
filtering and analysing the data provided by participants. This involved, post 
filtering and transformation, a series of 2x2x2 ANOVAs to understand fixation, 
saccadic, and manual response parameters of the data. 
Responses to the parity and verification task were measured using 
reaction time and error rates for all participants. Eyetracking data was analysed 
only for the saccade task, which can be further divided into fixation and saccadic 
metrics. A standard criterion of α was used and set to .05. Data from one 
participant was excluded due to not completing the experimental paradigm, and 
all tests were conducted on the remaining 25 participants. For the raw data, see 
Appendix E. 
Saccade Task 
Error Rate Analysis 
The average rate of accuracy in the saccade task was 82.94%. Greater 
accuracy was observed for positive (83.81%) valency over negative (82.06). 
Small (83.13%) magnitudes were responded to with greater accuracy than large 
(82.75%). Finally, accuracy was higher in trials requiring downward (83.00%) 
over upward (82.88%) saccades. At a conditional level, accuracy rates can be 
seen in Table 41. 
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Table 41. Mean rates of accuracy (%) of participants in response to the saccade task. 
Probe  Down  Up  Total 
Valency  Negative Positive Negative Positive  
Number Large 82.25 82.75 81.25 84.75 82.75 
Small 83.25 83.75 81.50 84.00 83.13 
Total  82.75 83.25 81.38 84.38 82.94 
 
An inferential analysis revealed no significant results at main effect 
(probe location: Wilks’ λ = 1.000, f (1,24) = .004, p = .953, ηp2 < .001; magnitude: 
Wilks’ λ = .999, f (1,24) = .025, p = .876, ηp2 = .001; valency: Wilks’ λ = .870, f 
(1,24) = 3.573, p = .071, ηp2 = .130), two-way (probe location and magnitude: 
Wilks’ λ = .994, f (1,24) = .147, p = .705, ηp2 = .006; probe location and valency: 
Wilks’ λ = .942, f (1,24) = 1.488, p = .234, ηp2 = .058; magnitude and valency: 
Wilks’ λ = .998, f (1,24) = .043, p = .837, ηp2 = .002) or three-way (Wilks’ λ 
= .998, f (1,24) = .040, p = .843, ηp2 = .002) interaction levels of analysis. 
Response Time Analysis 
On average, a response was made by participants in 717.41ms. When 
maintaining in memory a word with positive (715.65) valency, the time taken to 
respond was faster than when maintaining a word with negative valency 
(719.21ms). Similarly, small (715.15ms) magnitude exposure resulted in faster 
responses than large (719.67ms) magnitude exposure. When the required 
response direction was upward (713.08ms), trials were responded to faster than 
responses downward (721.72ms). This can be seen at a conditional level in Table 
42. 
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Table 42. Mean and standard deviations values for the duration participants taken to 
respond to the saccade task conditions in milliseconds. 
Probe  Down  Up  Total 
Valency  Negative Positive Negative Positive  
Number Large 721.62 
(304.49) 
709.50 
(284.16) 
725.66 
(354.26) 
722.03 
(348.00) 
719.67 
(323.66) 
Small 745.32 
(321.07) 
710.24 
(298.54) 
683.48 
(293.86) 
720.55 
(328.42) 
715.15 
(311.40) 
Total  733.53 
(312.90) 
709.87 
(291.19) 
704.43 
(325.68) 
721.30 
(338.18) 
717.41 
(317.53) 
 
A closer analysis of the data revealed no significant main effects of probe 
location (Wilks’ λ = .976, f (1,24) = .585, p = .452, ηp2 = .024), magnitude (Wilks’ 
λ = .990, f (1,24) = .246, p = .624, ηp2 = .010), or valency (Wilks’ λ = .997, f 
(1,24) = .074, p = .788, ηp2 = .003). No two-way interactions were revealed 
between probe location and magnitude (Wilks’ λ = .989, f (1,24) = .260, p = .615, 
ηp2 = .011), probe location and valency (Wilks’ λ = .889, f (1,24) = 3.005, p 
= .096, ηp2 = .111), or magnitude and valency (Wilks’ λ = .998, f (1,24) = .057, 
p = .813, ηp2 = .002). Furthermore, no three-way interaction was revealed either 
(Wilks’ λ = .923, f (1,24) = 1.994, p = .171, ηp2 = .077). 
Eye Movement Analysis 
Fixation data. 
The duration of an average first fixation following a target-directed 
saccade was 362.32ms. Positive (364.16ms) word exposure lengthened this, and 
negative (360.44ms) word exposure shortened it. Similarly, small (358.93ms) 
magnitudes made for longer first fixation durations over large (365.70ms) 
magnitudes. Finally, after having performed a saccade upward (388.18ms) the 
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fixation duration was longer than after having performed a downward saccade 
(336.40ms). This is represented in Table 43 below, at a condition-level. 
Table 43. Mean (and standard deviation) values for the first fixations participants made 
in response to the saccade task, presented in milliseconds. 
Probe  Down  Up  Total 
Valency  Negative Positive Negative Positive  
Number Large 338.78 
(168.82) 
335.82 
(164.12) 
387.91 
(189.98) 
399.51 
(190.56) 
365.70 
(180.88) 
Small 331.94 
(166.97) 
339.04 
(178.23) 
384.17 
(188.58) 
380.77 
(185.17) 
358.93 
(181.22) 
Total  335.36 
(167.79) 
337.43 
(171.19) 
386.04 
(189.13) 
390.23 
(187.99) 
362.32 
(181.04) 
 
Analysis revealed a significant main effect of probe location (Wilks’ λ 
= .678, f (1,23) = 10.929, p = .003, ηp2 = .322), whereby first fixations in the 
upward (388.18ms) target area were maintained for longer than first fixations in 
the downward (336.40ms) target location. No other main effects were revealed 
by examination of magnitude (Wilks’ λ = .886, f (1,23) = 2.950, p = .099, ηp2 
= .114) or valency (Wilks’ λ = .988, f (1,23) = .276, p = .604, ηp2 = .012). At the 
level of two-way interaction, no significant findings were uncovered for probe 
location and magnitude (Wilks’ λ = .953, f (1,23) = 1.135, p = .298, ηp2 = .047), 
probe location and valency (Wilks’ λ = .989, f (1,23) = 1.135, p = .298, ηp2 
= .047), or magnitude and valency (Wilks’ λ = .995, f (1,23) = .106, p = .747, ηp2 
= .005), nor were any interactions found at the three-way level (Wilks’ λ = .902, 
f (1,23) = 2.504, p = .127, ηp2 = .098).  
The average total gaze duration participants made following a target-
directed saccade was 418.81ms. Following a word with positive (422.83ms) 
valency, the average was greater than a word with negative (414.71ms) valency. 
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Large (422.19ms) magnitudes had a similar effect over small (415.42ms) 
magnitudes, with the total duration being lengthened to the former. When the 
saccade that had been performed was downward (402.80ms), the total gaze 
duration was shorter than upward (434.77ms). At a conditional level, these results 
are reflected in Table 44. 
Table 44. Mean (and standard deviation) values for the total gaze duration of participants 
in response to the saccade task, presented in milliseconds. 
Probe  Down  Up  Total 
Valency  Negative Positive Negative Positive  
Number Large 399.34 
(187.81) 
402.12 
(193.07) 
436.55 
(217.58) 
450.03 
(232.15) 
422.19 
(209.50) 
Small 396.35 
(192.35) 
413.36 
(208.67) 
427.24 
(211.88) 
424.77 
(200.63) 
415.42 
(203.58) 
Total  397.85 
(189.93) 
407.75 
(200.95) 
431.90 
(214.61) 
437.53 
(217.31) 
418.81 
(206.56) 
 
Analysis of these results indicated a significant main effect of probe 
location (Wilks’ λ = .831, f (1,23) = 4.689, p = .041, ηp2 = .169), with the same 
pattern for first fixations repeating: longer total gaze durations were given to 
upward (434.77ms) than downward (402.80ms) targets. No further main effects 
were found for magnitude (Wilks’ λ = .985, f (1,23) = .347, p = .562, ηp2 = .015) 
or valency (Wilks’ λ = .989, f (1,23) = .246, p = .625, ηp2 = .011). At the 
interaction level, no two-way interactions were revealed for probe location and 
magnitude (Wilks’ λ = .944, f (1,23) = 1.377, p = .253, ηp2 = .056), probe location 
and valency (Wilks’ λ = .987, f (1,23) = .294, p = .593, ηp2 = .013), or magnitude 
and valency (Wilks’ λ = .968, f (1,23) = .752, p = .395, ηp2 = .032). No three-way 
interaction was found (Wilks’ λ = .891, f (1,23) = 2.817, p = .107, ηp2 = .109). 
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Saccade data. 
The onset a participant’s target directed saccade occurred, on average, at 
678.94ms. Words with a negative (677.69ms) valency caused saccades to onset 
faster than words with positive valency (680.16ms). The same was found to be 
true for small magnitudes (675.71ms) over large magnitudes (682.17ms), and for 
trials that required upward (674.35ms) over downward (683.51ms) saccades. 
These descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 45 below, at a condition-by-
condition level. 
Table 45. Mean (and standard deviation) values for the onset times of target-directed 
saccades during the saccade task, presented in milliseconds. 
Probe  Down  Up  Total 
Valency  Negative Positive Negative Positive  
Number Large 682.12 
(302.61) 
679.36 
(298.50) 
683.06 
(348.10) 
684.13 
(347.63) 
682.17 
(324.64) 
Small 701.92 
(310.64) 
670.45 
(295.65) 
642.83 
(293.33) 
686.41 
(336.41) 
675.71 
(310.11) 
Total  692.09 
(306.59) 
674.93 
(296.88) 
662.78 
(322.01) 
685.26 
(341.84) 
678.94 
(317.41) 
 
Through analysis, no significant main effect (probe location: Wilks’ λ 
= .967, f (1,24) = .808, p = .378, ηp2 = .033; magnitude: Wilks’ λ = .994, f (1,24) 
= .143, p = .709, ηp2 = .006; valency: Wilks’ λ = .1.000, f (1,24) = .001, p = .978, 
ηp2 < .001), two-way (probe location and magnitude: Wilks’ λ = .996, f (1,24) 
= .087, p = .770, ηp2 = .004; probe location and valency: Wilks’ λ = .889, f (1,24) 
= 2.994, p = .096, ηp2 = .111; magnitude and valency: Wilks’ λ = .998, f (1,24) 
= .044, p = .835, ηp2 = .002) or three-way (Wilks’ λ = .911, f (1,24) = .2.332, p 
= .140, ηp2 = .089) interaction was found. 
- 178 - 
 
On average, the duration of target-directed saccades was 44.53ms. Longer 
durations were found for negative (44.86ms) over positive (44.20ms) word 
valencies, for small (45.60ms) over large (43.46ms) magnitudes, and for 
downward (48.35ms) over upward (40.70ms) saccades. This is reflected at the 
conditional level in Table 46. 
Table 46. Mean (and standard deviation) values for the duration of a participant's target 
directed saccade during the saccade task, presented in milliseconds. 
Probe  Down  Up  Total 
Valency  Negative Positive Negative Positive  
Number Large 48.24 
(42.24) 
45.61 
(25.31) 
40.44 
(19.10) 
39.57 
(17.53) 
43.46 
(27.95) 
Small 48.16 
(35.70) 
51.44 
(47.10) 
42.53 
(29.65) 
40.30 
(20.83) 
45.60 
(34.88) 
Total  48.20 
(39.04) 
48.50 
(37.83) 
41.50 
(24.99) 
39.93 
(19.23) 
44.53 
(31.63) 
 
An examination of saccade durations reveals a significant main effect of 
probe location (Wilks’ λ = .646, f (1,24) = 13.128, p = .001, ηp2 = .354), with 
downward (48.35ms) saccades last, on average, longer than upward (40.70ms) 
saccades. A further main effect was identified for magnitude (Wilks’ λ = .841, f 
(1,24) = 4.535, p = .044, ηp2 = .159), whereby the duration of a saccade was 
longer if the magnitude experienced was small (45.60ms) instead of large 
(43.46ms). No main effect was found in the analysis of word valency (Wilks’ λ 
= .955, f (1,24) = 1.119, p = .301, ηp2 = .045). At the level of two-way interaction, 
no significant results emerged for probe location and magnitude (Wilks’ λ = .986, 
f (1,24) = .333, p = .569, ηp2 = .014), for probe location and valency (Wilks’ λ 
= .941, f (1,24) = 1.504, p = .232, ηp2 = .059) or for magnitude and valency 
(Wilks’ λ = 1.000, f (1,24) = .011, p = .916, ηp2 < .001). The same was true at the 
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level of three-way interaction, with no significant result being found (Wilks’ λ 
= .989, f (1,24) = .267, p = .610, ηp2 = .011). 
Verification Task 
Error Rate Analysis 
Participants were accurate in response to the verification task 95% of the 
time. This was higher following positive word exposure (95.31%) and lower 
following negative (94.69%). After hearing a large (95.31%) magnitude number, 
participants responses were more accurate than after hearing a small (94.69%) 
magnitude number. Finally, participants were more accurate after having 
performed downward (95.25%) over upward (94.75%) saccades. A breakdown 
by condition of accuracy rates can be seen in Table 47. 
Table 47. Mean rates of accuracy (%) in response to the verification question participants 
were tasked with answering. 
Probe  Down  Up  Total 
Valency  Negative Positive Negative Positive  
Number Large 95.00 95.50 94.75 96.00 95.31 
Small 95.50 95.00 93.50 94.75 94.69 
Total  95.25 95.25 94.13 95.38 95.00 
 
For the error rates observed during the verification question, no 
significant results were found at either main effect (probe location: Wilks’ λ 
= .975, f (1,24) = .606, p = .444, ηp2 = .025; magnitude: Wilks’ λ = .977, f (1,24) 
= .558, p = .462, ηp2 = .023; valency: Wilks’ λ = .941, f (1,24) = 1.500, p = .233, 
ηp2 = .059) two-way interaction (probe location and magnitude: Wilks’ λ = .980, 
f (1,24) = .480, p = .494, ηp2 = .020; probe location and valency: Wilks’ λ = .975, 
f (1,24) = .615, p = .440, ηp2 = .025; magnitude and valency: Wilks’ λ = .992, f 
- 180 - 
 
(1,24) = .194, p = .664, ηp2 = .008), or three-way interaction (Wilks’ λ = .994, f 
(1,24) = .133, p = .718, ηp2 = .006) levels of analysis. 
Response Time Analysis 
It took a participant, on average, 645.69ms to respond to the verification 
task. When the task asked about words with a positive (646.07ms) valency, a 
longer response time was observed in comparison to words with negative 
(645.30ms) valency. Small (647.55ms) magnitudes were also responded to 
slower than large magnitudes (643.84ms). Finally, after having performed a 
downward (637.50ms) saccade, participants were faster in responding to the 
verification task than after having performed an upward (653.91ms) saccade. 
This is seen at a condition-by-condition level in Table 48 below. 
Table 48. Mean (and standard deviation) values for the time taken to respond to the 
accuracy verification question, presented in milliseconds. 
Probe  Down  Up  Total 
Valency  Negative Positive Negative Positive  
Number Large 620.66 
(287.53) 
642.34 
(304.27_ 
669.45 
(319.57) 
643.05 
(323.17) 
643.84 
(309.14) 
Small 626.97 
(286.21) 
660.10 
(335.86) 
665.30 
(332.12) 
639.12 
(319.31) 
647.55 
(318.70) 
Total  623.85 
(286.65) 
651.19 
(320.26) 
667.41 
(325.53) 
641.08 
(320.99) 
645.69 
(313.89) 
 
Analysis of reaction times to the verification question revealed no 
significant main effect of probe location (Wilks’ λ = .926, f (1,24) = 1.907, p 
= .180, ηp2 = .074), of magnitude (Wilks’ λ = .967, f (1,24) = .817, p = .375, ηp2 
= .033), and no main effect of valency (Wilks’ λ = .999, f (1,24) = .032, p = .859, 
ηp2 = .001). At the two-way interaction level of analysis, a significant finding 
was revealed between probe location and valency (Wilks’ λ = .829, f (1,24) = 
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4.941, p = .036, ηp2 = .171). This interaction can be seen in Figure 36. This 
interaction was motivated by the difference between negative words and probe 
location (p = .017), with downward (623.85ms) probes provoking faster 
responses than upward (667.41ms) probes. The differences between positive 
words and probe location did not affect the interaction significantly (p = .512). 
No further interactions were found between probe location and magnitude (Wilks’ 
λ = .997, f (1,24) = .082, p = .777, ηp2 = .003) or magnitude and valency (Wilks’ 
λ = .998, f (1,24) = .058, p = .812, ηp2 = .002), nor was any interaction found at 
the three-way level of analysis (Wilks’ λ = 1.000, f (1,24) = .011, p = .918, ηp2 
< .001). 
 
 
Figure 36. Depicted is the two-way interaction for verification task response time. Here, 
word bias is displayed across probe location, where response time is displayed in 
milliseconds. 
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Discussion 
The present study investigated the interplay between words with varying 
valency maintained in working memory and the concurrently apprehended 
numbers of varying numerical magnitude with regard to the potentially shared 
spatial-numerical mappings in vertical space. Analysis revealed a single 
interaction and four main effects. The interaction was found in verification 
response times and indicated faster responses when the word was negative and 
the probe location downward than when the word was negative and the probe 
location upward; there were no differences in the processing of positive words. 
The main effects were found in fixation-related measures – first fixation 
durations and total gaze durations – as well as in the saccade durations. First 
fixation durations show longer first fixations when the target was upward over 
downward, which was echoed in the finding for dwell times. The analysis of 
saccade duration shows effects for probe location and magnitude: When the 
target participants responded to was downward, saccades lasted longer than when 
the target was upward. After hearing small magnitudes, saccades lasted longer 
than after hearing large magnitudes.  
The effects of first fixation duration and total gaze duration are 
complimentary, showing that following an upward target directed saccade 
participants maintained the first fixation, and the sum of subsequent fixations, in 
the target region longer than when the target directed saccade was downward. 
This finding is expected. The vertical asymmetry found in previous studies for 
saccade latencies shows upward responses to be initiated faster than downward 
responses (Abegg, Pianezzi & Barton, 2015; Tzelepi, Laskaris, Amditis & 
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Kapoula, 2010). So, following a saccade upward, participants will take longer to 
prepare a return saccade to centre as it is a downward movement. However, 
following downward saccades, participants are preparing a return saccade 
upward, which can be programmed and performed faster. Because of the added 
delay in upward space, longer fixations are observed than in downward space. 
This is, to a degree, reflected in saccade durations as participants are seen to make 
movements that are longer in duration when going downward as opposed to 
going upward.  
Interestingly, a main effect of number was also found in saccade durations, 
though here saccades initiated after hearing small magnitudes lasted longer than 
saccades initiated following large magnitudes. This is unexpected, and further 
research would be required in order to understand exactly why this result is found. 
Saccades have been shown to compress time, space and number (Burr, Ross, 
Binda & Morrone 2010), and so a delay in processing is an indicator of confusion. 
The question is, then, what is the cause of the confusion. The main effect 
observed does not fit with current models of mental number space, and any 
argument that could be made would be much more compelling if probe location 
and numerical magnitude interacted, which they did not.  
The present study failed to replicate some existing findings, with no 
support being found for the SNARC effect (Fischer, 2003). However, support can 
be seen for conceptual metaphor accounts of valency processing (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980), insofar as the interaction supports “bad is down” but not “good 
is up”. To a degree, this is a refutation of accounts of polarity (Lakens, 2012; see 
also: Lynott & Coventry, 2014) as according to this hypothesis stronger responses 
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should be in polar-positive domains. This interaction occurred in response to the 
verification question, which is once again a top-down measure of cognition as 
opposed to a bottom up.  
There is perhaps less support seen here than displayed for the horizontal 
domain in the previous study. Again, this is not necessarily a negative. Every 
result is informative, and often the lack of a finding is as important as an effect 
or interaction found. Here, previous research has been supported by the study, 
though ones pertinent to the hypothesis have not. There are a number of potential 
explanations for this, though the consistency of results here suggests it is a matter 
of complexity and not practicality. Abstraction appears to dilute conceptual 
interplay.  
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Chapter Summary 
The present study investigated the interplay between magnitude-related 
features of words with varying valency maintained in working memory and 
concurrently apprehended numbers of varying numerical magnitude with regard 
to potentially shared spatial-numerical mappings in horizontal and vertical space. 
Absence of the normal is presence of the abnormal, and this chapter acts 
as an exemplar. Here, support for conceptual interplay is of a different nature to 
the previous two experimental chapters. In total, three interactions, one of which 
was deemed to be unreliable, were found along with six main effects.  
Of the two studies conducted, the least support can be found in the vertical 
domain. This is not unexpected, as empirical and theoretical evidence suggest 
this should be the case. Vertical space has been argued as a less embodied and 
situated domain than horizontal space (Myachykov, Scheepers, Fischer & Kessler, 
2014). Being the most abstract of the examined topics, there is a case to be made 
for interplay in valency being weaker as processing doesn’t necessitate as rich 
and embodied simulations as spatial semantics and affordances do.  
All the main effects observed in vertical space act as replications of 
previous physiological findings, except for a main effect found for magnitude in 
saccade durations. This is an interesting finding, and not accountable by any 
theories discussed at present. Stranger still, however, is the lack of strong support 
for any number-related effect, and only weak support for conceptual metaphor 
effects. It is strange not to observe an interaction between magnitude and probe 
location, but perhaps this is due to effects of number being polluted by the 
presence of valency. 
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In terms of the horizontal domain, the main effect of valency for probe 
response time provides an interesting avenue for future research. While words 
were controlled for frequency and arousal, it is possible that an extraneous 
component had an effect upon participants. This is not a compelling argument 
however, as for these studies the same words were used in horizontal and vertical 
space. For this to be a substantial claim, it would be expected that the same effect 
would emerge for vertical parity response time, too. 
At the three-way level, the studies reported in this chapter provide some 
ground for interplay between concepts, but the overall pattern is not as consistent 
as could be expected. Here, large magnitudes were responded to faster than small 
magnitudes when the response required was rightward and the word maintained 
in memory was negative. Large magnitude and rightward space is a 
complimentary domain, and also the only domains important to the parity 
response task. The argument could be made that the interaction is primarily 
related to the number-space congruency, but this does not explain why it isn’t 
observed irrespective of wordbias. Additionally, some have argued that longer 
fixation durations (by extension, total gaze durations) reflect a greater load in 
working memory (Brouwer, Hogervorst, Oudejans, Ries & Touryan, 2017) and 
if this standpoint is adopted here then performance is actually hindered. One 
possibility is that the lack of compatibility between word bias and magnitude 
heard leads to the confusion and additional load on memory, which is perhaps the 
most convincing of arguments to be made. This would additionally support the 
suggestion of interplay between concepts that is presented in this thesis. 
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Importantly, both studies replicate previous research. In the vertical 
domain, the interaction seen between valency and probe location partially 
supports conceptual metaphor accounts of cognition (e.g. Lakoff & Johnson, 
1980). In addition to this, both horizontal and vertical domains find asymmetries 
in fixation durations (for example, McConkie & Rayner, 1976). Were the present 
tasks not to support anything, then the findings would be suspect. Instead, a 
strongly supported physiological measure, and a strongly supported 
psychological measure replicate, which only serves to strengthen the question of 
why other effects, such as the SNARC (Wood, Willmes, Nuerk & Fischer, 2008) 
and, more broadly, polarity (Lakens, 2012) and other aspects of conceptual 
metaphor theories (Amin, Jeppsson & Haglund, 2015) do not. One possible 
explanation is task demands. It may be that interplay occurs, but not to the extent 
that significant results emerge. 
Of course, a possible explanation for the lack of observed effects is the 
number of trials per participant. However, at this level it is primarily a limitation 
of the database used as opposed to an experimental issue. The hypothesis tested 
is novel, and these studies provide a reference point for later work. 
Here, then, there is certainly a muted response when compared to the 
findings from spatial semantics and affordance domains. The framework of the 
thesis is so that this is the most abstract of all the experiments. Indeed, it is this 
abstraction that is suggested as being the primary reason for the lack of interplay 
between concepts in manner as rich as was seen for the other experimental 
domains. 
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The following chapter begins the general conclusions of the thesis. It will 
start with a breakdown and comparison of effects observed across studies before 
leading into a more general discussion of the overarching implications of the 
thesis. Reference will be made to the concepts discussed in the introduction, 
findings in support and not in support of conceptual interplay, and suggestions 
for moving forward from here, including future research. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
General discussion 
The objective of this thesis was to offer a theoretical proposal showing 
how knowledge representations may interact during co-activation by means of a 
conceptual interplay. In support of this a set of six empirical studies was 
offered. These experiments covered concepts that belonged to the domains of 
number (all studies), manual affordances (1 and 2), spatial semantics (3 and 4), 
and valency (5 and 6). 
Experimental results cover a spectrum of abstraction, providing an 
overview as to how representations interact at differing levels of abstraction from 
the environment and body. For Manual Affordances, it was hypothesised that 
grasp size and object representations, stored in memory, lead to the establishment 
of attentional SNARC effects during auditory number processing. At the level of 
spatial semantics, the specific hypothesis was that words with explicitly 
associated spatial semantics, stored in memory, would lead to the establishment 
of an attentional SNARC effect during auditory number processing. Finally, the 
hypothesis for valency was that words with associated emotional biases, stored 
in memory, would lead to the establishment of attentional SNARC effects during 
auditory number processing. Strongest support for the conceptual interplay 
proposal came from the domain of spatial semantics and, to a lesser extent, 
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support was also seen in the domains of manipulation affordance and valency. 
Figure 37 revisits the abstraction pipeline to detail where, in relation to other 
areas studied, one domain sits. 
The following chapter begins the conclusions of the project and does so 
by recapitulating the results from each area before discussing the main findings 
in context of support for and limitations of conceptual interplay. Following this 
are future directions for research, and finally some closing remarks are presented 
for overall consideration. 
Summary of Results 
Here, reviewed briefly are the main findings from the thesis, as well as 
convenient displays that categorise them in terms of support for conceptual 
interplay and existing literature. In total, 32 main effects and interactions were 
found. Of these, seven interactions were deemed to provide nothing of further 
interest. Of the remaining results, three were three-way interactions, six were 
two-way interactions, ten were main effects of probe, three were main effects of 
Figure 37. The abstraction pipeline. A reference image used to indicate how concrete, 
in comparison to the other topics of the thesis, a given section is. Note number is not 
indicated, as it is used as a tool across all experiments. 
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magnitude, two were main effects of spatial semantics, and one was a main effect 
of valency. 
Volumetric Affordances and Numerical Magnitude 
Participants were required to maintain in memory the identities of objects 
of varying grasp volume, listen to numbers of varying magnitude, and then direct 
eye movement toward one of two targets located on a screen in horizontal 
(experiment 1) and vertical (experiment 2) space. From these experiments eight 
results emerged: three main effects (vertical), and three interactions of interest 
(two horizontal, one vertical). Two reactions were deemed to be of no further 
interest (horizontal). 
One interaction was three-way, found in horizontal space, and showed 
large magnitudes to evoke longer saccade durations than small – but only when 
participants maintained in memory a precision-grip object and performed a 
leftward saccade. The remaining interactions were two-way. One was observed 
in horizontal space the verification response latencies. When participants 
maintained in memory power-grip objects, and had just performed a rightward 
saccade, responses were slower than when the saccade performed was leftward. 
The final interaction was in vertical space for probe response and showed 
participants to be faster at responding when a large magnitude was presented and 
the response was upward over downward.  
For main effects, all three were observed in vertical space, and were for 
probe location. Both probe response time and saccade onset, upward targets were 
responded to faster than downward. In probe accuracy rates, upward targets were 
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responded to more correctly than downward targets. See Table 49 for a 
representation of findings. 
Table 49. Overview of interactions, main effects, and unreliable results found across 
experiments one and two. Non-significant results are omitted. 
Main Effect Interaction Unreliable 
Vertical –  
Probe Accuracy 
Horizontal –  
Saccade Duration (Three-
Way) 
Horizontal –  
Probe Reaction Time 
Vertical –  
Probe Response Time 
Horizontal –  
Verification Response 
Time (Two-Way) 
Horizontal –  
Saccade Onset 
Vertical –  
Saccade Onset 
Vertical –  
Probe Response Time 
(Two-Way) 
 
 
All the main effects listed support existing literature. Polarity processing 
accounts rely upon positive polar endpoints to elicit faster responses than 
negative polar endpoints (Lakens, 2012; also, Lynott & Coventry, 2014). This is 
useful, as it shows the equipment utilised works in the manner intended. Given 
the seriousness of replicability, and the so-called replicability crisis facing 
cognitive science, this is an important finding (Francis, 2017; Zwaan et al., 2017; 
Martin & Clarke, 2017). Were no interplay occurring between concepts, 
replication should be the default finding. After all, given the support for SNARC 
(Hesse & Bremmer, 2017; Fias, 2006; Fischer, 2003) and affordance (Oztop & 
Arbib, 2002; Borghi, 2005; Detry et al., 2011) effects, the emergence of similar 
findings is expected. In vertical space, this is partially true as faster responses 
were seen in upward space for large magnitudes. However, no bias was found for 
small magnitudes. This extends the polarity correspondence (Lakens, 2012) 
hypothesis to the processing of numerical magnitudes. 
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In horizontal space, the findings tell a different story. Here, an interaction 
was found in the verification task data that shows interference; that is, slower 
responses when participants are questioned about power-grasp objects after 
having just performed a rightward saccade. Another interaction for saccade 
duration supports this, but also incorporates the processing of number. Here, 
when participants maintain precision grasp objects and are required to saccade 
leftward, large magnitudes are faster than small. One possible explanation for the 
marked interference in response is top-down processing vs bottom-up processing. 
Previous research showed attention to function in radically different ways 
dependent on whether it is focussed by volition (e.g. Chapman & Myachykov, 
2015; Buschman & Miller, 2007; Connor, Egeth, Yantis, 2004). As both tasks 
require the conscious maintenance in memory of a parity rule (e.g. “look left if 
the number is odd; look right if the number is even”) and an object concept with 
a specific affordance profile (power vs precision), it could be argued that the 
bottlenecking of attention is due to top-down attentional control. This is only a 
convincing argument for the interaction observed in saccade durations, as all 
three manipulated factors contribute to the interference, whereas in verification 
response time it is only object affordance and probe location. As participants are 
only required to utilise the number during the parity task, one possibility is that 
it becomes divorced from attention before the verification task, and so only probe 
location and affordance remain at the bottleneck (see Figure 38). This is certainly 
the most reasonable of explanations, but research has reported on the flexibility 
of SNARC and magnitude effects (Alards-Tomalin, Earley, Leboe-McGowan & 
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Leboe-McGowan, 2013; Fischer, 2012), which means this result needs greater 
disentangling in order to be fully understood 
Both interactions show a slowdown in processing that is not mirrored in 
vertical space. Because of this, it can be suggested that the processes governing 
horizontal and vertical dimensions do not fully overlap. What is crucially missing 
from this domain are any effects or interactions involving affordance. This can 
be, at least partially, understood by means of domain’s nature. When utilising 
manipulation affordances to control tools, two axes are principally used. The first 
is horizontal, the second - egocentric. This is not removing entirely the vertical 
domain but acknowledging that its role is much lesser than that of the distance. 
Because of this, there may not be enough affordance content activated for 
bottlenecking to occur. Indeed, research has shown irrelevant features not to 
cause interference when the contents of visual attention and working memory 
interact (Olivers, Meijer & Theeuwes, 2006). 
TEST suggests a hierarchy of knowledge representations and 
distinguishes between knowledge that is situated (i.e. based in the context in 
which it was encoded and retrieved), embodied (i.e. body-based) and tropic (i.e. 
Figure 38. Shown are the components maintained in memory across various timepoints 
during a trial. The hashed areas for number and spatial response display potential 
timeperiods in which they may no longer be maintained in memory. Note that fixation dots 
are purposefully omitted 
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environment-based). According to this taxonomy, effects of magnitude are tropic 
in vertical space, which is to say learned from experience within the world. In 
horizontal space, magnitude is embodied and dependent upon bodily abilities. 
For affordances, however, if it is considered as a situated representation, then it 
is not something that will become significantly activated enough to clog up 
attention. 
Spatial Semantics and Numerical Magnitude 
Participants were required to maintain in memory the identities of words 
with varying spatial semantics, listen to numbers of varying magnitude, and then 
direct eye movement, following a parity rule, toward one of two targets located 
on a screen in horizontal (experiment 3) and vertical (experiment 4) space. From 
these experiments 15 results emerged: four interactions providing little upon 
further decomposition (two horizontal, two vertical), seven main effects (three 
horizontal, four vertical), and four interactions of note (three horizontal, one 
vertical). 
One of the interactions was three-way, found in vertical space, and 
motivated by two contrasts. Response accuracy in the verification question 
performance was greater in both cases when numbers with large magnitudes were 
manipulated over small. The first contrast found higher accuracy when the probe 
had required an upward response and the word being questioned about was 
downward biasing. The second contract found the opposite: when the probe had 
required a downward response, accuracy was significantly improved when the 
direction implied by the word was upward. The remaining three interactions were 
two-way and found in horizontal space. For the participant error rates during the 
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parity task, it was found that participants had greater accuracy when the response 
required was leftward and magnitude of the number experienced was small. For 
the onset time of saccades, rightward responses were faster than leftward when 
large magnitudes were maintained in memory. For the verification task error rates, 
participants responded more accurately when questioned about words with 
leftward biases after having heard small magnitudes over large. 
Main effects of probe occurred in the horizontal task (once) and the 
vertical task (twice). In horizontal space, rightward probe locations resulted in 
longer first fixation durations than leftward. In vertical space, for probe response 
and saccade onset times, upward targets were reacted to faster than downward. 
Two effects of magnitude were found, for both task verification error rates. Here, 
in horizontal space responses to small magnitudes were more accurate than to 
large magnitudes. In vertical space, responses to large magnitudes were more 
accurate than to small magnitudes. Finally, two main effects of word’s spatial 
semantics were found, both in verification task error rates. In horizontal space, 
when the word had a rightward bias, participants were more accurate. In vertical 
space, words with a downward bias were associated with more accurate 
responses. See Table 50 for a representation of findings. 
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Table 50. Overview of interactions, main effects, and unreliable results found across 
experiments three and four. Non-significant results are omitted. 
Main Effect Interaction Unreliable 
Horizontal – First 
Fixation Duration 
Vertical – Verification 
Accuracy (Three-Way) 
Horizontal – Probe 
Response Time 
Horizontal – Verification 
Accuracy 
Horizontal – Probe 
Accuracy (Two-Way) 
Horizontal – Saccade 
Duration 
Horizontal – Verification 
Accuracy 
Horizontal – Saccade 
Onset (Two-Way) 
Vertical – First Fixation 
Duration 
Vertical – Probe Response 
Time 
Horizontal – Verification 
Accuracy (Two-Way) 
Vertical – Saccade 
Duration 
Vertical – Saccade Onset   
Vertical – Verification 
Accuracy 
  
Vertical – Verification 
Accuracy 
  
 
All observed main effects of probe corroborated the polarity 
correspondence hypothesis (Lakens, 2012), which is to say the main effects for 
first fixation duration in horizontal space, and in vertical space saccade onset and 
parity task response time. Interestingly, for magnitude, there were contradictory 
effects in vertical and horizontal space for verification accuracy questions. It is 
important to stress that numerical magnitude did not affect performance in the 
verification task, which asked the participant a question about the word being 
maintained in memory. In vertical space, large magnitudes produced more 
accurate responses than small, the reverse being true for the horizontal task. In 
both vertical and horizontal tasks, an additional effect of word bias was observed, 
whereby rightward biasing words were more accurate than leftward, and 
downward biasing words more accurate than upward. Both effects indicate an 
opposite finding of those found for magnitude, and findings collectively reflect 
the existence of an interaction. These interactions encourage caution in the 
interpretation of main effects. 
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For horizontal space, the driving force behind the interaction was leftward 
word bias: when coupled with small magnitudes more accurate responses were 
found than when coupled with large, even though there was no role for magnitude 
in the verification task. This shows a facilitation effect, at least for small 
numerical magnitudes, in line with conceptual interplay hypothesis, though it is 
not expressed as it was predicted as it lacks a spatial component. One reason for 
this may be the task and the experimental design implemented in the study. At 
the level of experimental design, there is no need to maintain spatial response in 
memory, nor does the task require processing beyond the level of launching a 
saccade. And so, at the task level, there is little space for spatial information to 
affect responses. Unlike the parity task, which sees all three factors either 
maintained in memory or processed, the verification task focuses solely upon the 
word that was maintained in memory and, potentially, the mental trace of number 
that became activated and processed during the parity task. This provides an 
interesting avenue for future research, which will be explored further later in the 
chapter. While it’s possible that the number representation may have decayed 
somewhat before and during completion of the verification task, research shows 
effects of number to relatively long lived and robust to persist into verification 
task given the time-course (e.g. Fischer, Mills & Shaki, 2010; Kiesel & Vierck, 
2009; Yamamoto, Sasaki & Watanabe, 2016). 
However, the interaction in vertical verification error rates does involve 
probe location, which can be taken to echo the need for levels of representation 
(e.g. TEST; Myachykov, Scheepers, Fischer & Kessler, 2014). While horizontal 
space shows facilitation, vertical space shows interference. This is a novel and 
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very important finding. For verification error rate, the three-way interaction was 
shown to rely upon two contrasts. Firstly, when participants were maintaining in 
memory a downward biasing word, after having heard a large magnitude number 
and responded to an upward probe, their responses were more accurate than after 
having heard small magnitudes. Secondly, when maintaining in memory an 
upward biasing word, and after having heard a large magnitude number and 
responded to a downward probe, participants’ responses were more accurate than 
after having heard a small magnitude number. It is important to be mindful that 
the task requirement here is word recall, as participants are asked whether the 
word maintained in memory is the same as one presented onscreen. One 
possibility for this effect is that attention may become bottlenecked in wholly 
magnitude-congruent trials. This means that, by maintaining in memory a word 
with an upward bias, a large magnitude, and having performed an upward 
saccade the attentional capacities of a participant become overloaded. Common 
coding theory (Prinz, 1990) supports existence of such mechanism as similar 
codes would be queued or shared in attention during processing leading to 
memory traces that are not as strong (e.g. Navon & Miller, 2002; Marois & 
Ivanoff, 2005; Sigman & Dehaene, 2006). The interaction is even more 
interesting as word bias in the first contrast is opposite to the bias of number and 
probe location; the word in the second contrast is opposite only to probe location. 
So, the bottleneck, or lack thereof, appears to be non-specific, that the nature of 
the components in memory do not have to be relevant to the task, only that there 
are not too many instances of a given magnitude. 
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With this stated, another, simpler possibility is that experiencing a large 
magnitude increases awareness. However, other experiments fail to replicate a 
similar effect. There is, at the same time, literature supporting such a position 
(Jaśkowskí & Włodarczyk, 2005; 2006; Guoliang & Yan, 2007), and so it would 
be wrong not to entertain this stance. Response has been shown to be dependent 
upon the arousal level of participants, which can be modulated by magnitude (e.g. 
Vierck & Kiesel, 2010). In this instance, if large magnitudes are taken to increase 
levels of arousal, then greater levels of accuracy can be explained by participants 
being more vigilant. However, as the design of the current study was fully 
balanced, this argument does not explain why a general effect of large magnitude 
was not observed, nor why effects of small magnitudes being more accurate than 
large have been observed. As such, attentional bottlenecking by means of 
conceptual interplay is taken to be the most likely mediator of this interaction. 
Finally, two interactions at the two-way level show support for SNARC-
like effects in horizontal space. In parity task error rates, small number and 
leftward probes resulted in more accurate responses than small number and 
rightward probes. For saccade onset latencies, large magnitude and rightward 
probes were shown to be faster than large magnitude and leftward probes. This 
shows an accuracy advantage for small magnitude, but a speed advantage for 
large magnitude. The speed-accuracy trade-off is a well-documented effect in 
psychology in which accuracy can be sacrificed for the benefit of a faster 
response (e.g. Reed, 1973; Wickelgren, 1977; Thura, Huberman & Cisek, 2017). 
In the literature, studies have failed to find a speed-accuracy trade-off in the 
SNARC effect (e.g. Shaki & Petrusic, 2005; Bachot, Gevers, Fias & Roeyers, 
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2005; Patro & Shaki, 2016), which prompts questions as to why one is found in 
the current task. Traditionally, speed-accuracy trade-off refers to participants 
consciously sacrificing accuracy for faster responses. In the context of this task, 
however, it is more likely that this is an implicit biasing as a necessary side effect 
of processing magnitude. If it is accepted that there is little lag between 
processing the content of fixations and saccades, then due to the initial auditory 
processing of magnitude, and because of the novel nature of the response, 
participant eye movements reflect a unique case of attention-guided response. 
This interpretation is in line with the eye-mind hypothesis of Just and Carpenter 
(1980) and suggests the existence of a new type of speed-accuracy trade-off in 
horizontal space that is material-based as opposed to participant. One mechanism 
by which this may work is through subitizing small numerosities, which is 
viewed in the literature as being different to large numerosity processing (e.g. 
Ansari, Lyons, van Eimeren & Xu, 2007). 
Valency and Numerical Magnitude 
Participants in this block of studies were required to maintain in memory 
the identities of words with varying valency, listen to numbers of varying 
magnitude, and then direct eye movement toward one of two targets located on a 
screen in horizontal (experiment 5) and vertical (experiment 6) space. From these 
experiments nine results emerged: one interaction that provided little upon 
decomposition (vertical), six main effects (two horizontal, four vertical), and two 
interactions of note (one horizontal, one vertical). 
One of the interactions was three-way, found in horizontal space for 
participant’s total gaze durations. In this case, when participants maintained in 
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memory a negative word and had to perform a rightward saccade, large 
magnitudes resulted in longer total gaze durations than small. Another interaction 
found was two-way, located in the vertical task, and found for the verification 
task response times. When participants were questioned about a negative word 
that was maintained in memory, downward probes were faster than upward.  
Four of the main effects found for valency were related to probe location. 
Of these, three were in vertical space and one was in horizontal. Of the vertical 
results, for first fixation duration and total gaze durations, upward probes resulted 
in longer durations than downward. For saccade duration, however, downward 
probes had longer durations than upward. In horizontal space, for first fixation 
duration, rightward probes have longer fixation times than leftward. One of the 
main effects was found in vertical space for magnitude. Participants that had 
heard small numbers had longer saccade duration. Finally, a main effect was 
found for word bias in the horizontal task. Words with a negative bias had faster 
response times to the parity task than words with a positive bias. See Table 51 for 
a representation of findings. 
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Table 51. Overview of interactions, main effects, and unreliable results found across 
experiments five and six. Non-significant results are omitted. 
Main Effect Interaction Unreliable 
Horizontal – Probe 
Response Time 
Horizontal – Total Gaze 
Duration (Three-Way) 
Horizontal – Probe 
Accuracy 
Horizontal – First 
Fixation Duration 
Vertical – Verification 
Response Time (Two-
Way) 
 
Vertical – First Fixation 
Duration 
  
Vertical – Total Gaze 
Duration 
  
Vertical – Saccade 
Duration 
  
Vertical – Saccade 
Duration 
  
 
These results present an interesting contrast both within and between 
tasks. Like in previously described experiments, support was found for polarity 
correspondence (Lakens, 2012) insofar that first fixation durations and total gaze 
durations in the vertical task, and first fixation durations in the horizontal task, 
found times increased for polar-positive points (upward; rightward). However, 
for saccade durations in vertical space the opposite was true, with downward 
saccades lasting longer than upward saccades. This is interesting, as 
physiologically upward saccades have been documented as being of longer 
duration (Collewijn, Erkelens & Steinman, 1988). What makes this effect so 
difficult to interpret is that it is a main effect of probe. It is a purely-location based 
response, and so needs to be explored further to understand it fully. An additional 
main effect observed in vertical saccade duration was for magnitude, with small 
magnitudes leading to longer saccades than large. However, these did not interact, 
which would make for a much more understandable interpretation.  One follow-
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up analysis that could help would be the examination of saccade launch and land 
coordinates as this disentangles further the effects observed.  
In the horizontal domain a main effect for word meaning was found: 
maintaining in memory a negative valency word resulted in faster responses 
during the parity response task than words with positive valency. This appears to 
contradict recent work, which shows negative words to elicit slower responses. 
This is due to what the authors term, automatic vigilance (Estes & Adelman, 
2008; Adelman & Estes, 2013). In their task, a delay in processing for negative 
words was independent of factors such as arousal; though both positive and 
negative words were more accurately recalled than neutral words. Slower 
response to negative stimuli than to positive stimuli indicated presence of 
automatic vigilance (see also Pratto & John, 1991; Algom, Chajut & Lev, 2004; 
Wentura, Rothermund & Bak, 2000). The radical difference between their task 
and the current project is the orientation of attention: here, participants match a 
word displayed visually to the one that is already maintained in memory. When 
the word in memory is negative, and after having made a downward response, 
automatic vigilance and the associated spatially-congruent bias from downward 
space combines to facilitate processing. 
Interestingly, this interaction was not present in horizontal space, 
emphasising again a need for distinction between representations that are 
embodied (vertical) and situated (horizontal; Myachykov, Scheepers, Fischer & 
Kessler, 2014). Instead, observed here was a three-way interaction for total gaze 
duration. This interaction is like the observed three-way interactions in other 
experiments, insofar as it appears motivated by large magnitudes, and the 
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affected conditions avoid any bottlenecking of memory. In this instance, a 
negative word and rightward probe locations resulted in longer total fixation 
durations when the magnitude was large over small. This proves for an interesting 
contrast across studies. For spatial semantics and affordance processing tasks, 
there was an increase in verification task accuracy and a decrease in parity task 
saccade durations. These indicate faster processing, whereas longer total fixation 
durations have been suggested as both indicative of greater attention (Igarashi, 
Suzuki, Sugita, Kurisu & Kakikura, 2006) and greater confusion (Roy-Charland 
et al., 2012). If the former is accepted as an explanation, then the result is in line 
with those found already: that is to say a bottlenecking of attention is avoided by 
not having to queue representations or share resources (e.g. Navon & Miller, 
2002; Tombu & Jolicœur, 2002). However, if the latter is taken to be true then 
this result is unlike other tasks, as dissimilar magnitudes (negative word, large 
number) would be causing confusion in the mind of a participant. One possibility 
for this relies on the abstract nature of valency. As the most abstract of topics 
studied, there is little concrete about emotional states. In order to be able to 
understand valence states, it has been suggested that concrete domains, such as 
magnitude, are recruited to aid, or scaffold, learning (Barsalous 1999; 2008; 
2009; also Grady & Ascoli, 2017; Kövecses, 2016; Landau, Robinson & Meier, 
2014). In this instance, a concrete magnitude is presented that conflicts with the 
abstract magnitude of valency. Because valency relies upon the concreteness of 
a source domain in order to be understood (e.g. Shutova & Teufel, 2010), 
confusion arises when these conflict. Further research is required to disentangle 
these findings. 
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Conceptual Interplay, Conceptually 
The notion of conceptual interplay was born from necessity. Although 
cognitive science generally accepts a level of sensory and motor information as 
necessary in knowledge organization, there has been little agreement as to how 
the corresponding representations interact. The purpose of this thesis was to 
propose a case for conceptual interplay between the domains of affordance, 
spatial semantics, valency and numerical magnitude. This was suggested to be 
made possible through temporally and spatially co-activated mechanisms that act 
in line with embodied accounts of cognition (e.g. Barsalou, 1999), which allows 
for third-party general mechanism to mediate representations. 
To this end, across six experimental studies organized around three 
clusters, general support for this notion was found. Thus, as well as supporting 
existing literature, the thesis provides a novel contribution to knowledge through 
a role for conceptual interplay in simultaneously activated knowledge 
representations. For manipulation affordances, this was found in the horizontal 
domain via saccade duration. For spatial semantics, the interference presented 
itself in verification error rates across vertical and horizontal domains. In valency, 
saccade dwell times during the horizontal task demonstrated the interaction. 
The most common way this was presented was as an effect of interference. 
Interestingly, this stands in opposition to Walsh’s (2003) original predictions in 
ATOM. However, ATOM does not account for between-representation 
interaction, and instead focuses on within-representation effects. Given this, the 
original predictions made for facilitation are warranted, but the actual finding of 
interference is unsurprising. The only facilitation effect in support of conceptual 
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representation found was in spatial semantics; namely, in error rates for the 
verification task. The old adage two’s company, three’s a crowd may hold some 
ground here. The incorporation of a third domain that can bias response (i.e. 
probe location) may be the crucial factor creating an attentional bottleneck. 
Unique in spatial semantics is the clear direction of effect, as words present either 
a leftward or rightward bias, an upward or downward bias. In both affordance 
and valency domains, the effect is less clear, presenting either precision or power 
responses, or negative or positive. Perhaps the directional effects observed in 
spatial semantics override probe location, which results in the facilitation seen 
between this factor and number (in line with Richardson, Spivey, Barsalou & 
McRae, 2003; Gibbs, 2005). This will be discussed further below, as it has a 
potentially important impetus for future research. 
This research is exploratory, and from this can be derived two strong 
arguments moving forward. Firstly, and theoretically, the topic of study remains 
both original and in infancy, thus a lot of what would be comparatively effortless 
and clear were only one domain to be considered is much more muddied and 
difficult here. Work concerning itself with conceptual interplay going forward 
must bear this in mind, as the waters are not necessarily as clear as they may 
seem; the nature of how an interference effect or priming effect emerges requires 
further thought and divination. 
Secondly, and empirically, the existing wealth of literature that shows 
support for effects of number, affordance, spatial semantics, and valency, only 
partially replicates. In the context of the current task, were there no role for 
interplay between representations, it would be expected that, given how robust 
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and strongly supported SNARC effects are (Viarouge, Hubbard & McCandliss, 
2014; Myachykov, Ellis, Cangelosi & Fischer, 2016; Ninaus et al., 2017), and 
due to the experimental design encapsulating the parity task, then replication 
would be expected were no other effects occurring. Instead, there are mixed cases 
of partially replicating SNARCs, effects of the remembered concept (e.g. 
valency), and examples of conceptual interplay. Making this argument stronger, 
the SNARC has been found in other tasks that do not require processing of 
numerical magnitudes. For example, orientation detection (Fias, Lauwereyns & 
Lammertyn, 2001), monitoring of phonemes (Fias, Brysbaert, Geypens, & 
d’Ydewalle, 1996), pitch detection (Campbell & Scheepers, 2015), and identify 
judgements (Dehaene & Akhavein, 1995). Yet, it is not always the case that 
magnitude causes a SNARC. It has been demonstrated that the magnitudes must 
be related in some fashion (Di Luca, Granà, Semenza, Seron & Pesenti, 2006), 
of which the current thesis has already demonstrated overlapping neural circuitry 
(chapter 1) and task demands (chapters 3-5). In future research, it remains 
necessary to adopt very specific experimental paradigms so as to evoke 
established effects were conceptual interplay not occurring, as this provides a 
further case for interaction between concepts. 
When combined, the theoretical and empirical arguments provide a strong 
grounding for what has been found. Of course, as with all research there are ways 
to improve upon the adopted design. The limitations of the task will now be 
discussed, as well as how these may be addressed, and what form future research 
may take. 
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Limitations and Future Research 
When considering the limitations of a set of experimental studies, there 
are two types of issues that need to be addressed. These are limitations related to 
design (i.e. those pertaining to sample size, materials used, task structure, etc.) 
and limitations related to framework (i.e. theoretical and conceptual limitations). 
This section will review both types of issue separately, before suggesting future 
research to improve upon the current research. 
Design 
In terms of task design, at the core of psychology exists some relatively 
serious issues when considered from an embodied perspective (e.g. Barsalou, 
2008). These issues are that typically research utilises in testing white, middle 
class, university students from western populations (see Henrich, Heine & 
Norenzayan, 2010). This has been especially problematic for previous SNARC 
experiments after the findings that participants from countries that read right-to-
left have a reversed horizontal association of numerical codes, and the same down 
for participants from countries that read top-downward (e.g. Shaki & Fischer, 
2008). Unfortunately, this thesis is no different. Participants were predominantly 
white, middle class university students. However, early on in design this was 
acknowledged, and so attempts have been made to actually restrict the current 
sample to this group. By doing so, future research will be able to implement the 
same restrictions in sampling (as described in Chapter 2) and be able to readily 
compare findings to this project. 
At the level of utilised materials, there is an interesting dichotomy 
between the implicit effects of microaffordance and valency as is contrasted with 
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the explicit directionality of spatial semantics. While not an issue per se, this does 
create an unstable platform for contrast. Within the current thesis the different 
subject areas are compared and contrasted along an abstraction pipeline, though 
it has become clear that abstraction is not the only level by which these 
representations differ. Future research should remain wise to task framing and 
representational choice. For the current project, spatial semantics was the 
strongest contender for conceptual interplay, which means this issue is one that 
research should certainly pay attention to moving forward. 
A final issue to be raised at the level of design regards task. As one of the 
first investigations into the interplay between representations, it was decided that 
the playing field should remain level across tasks – in other words, that each task 
should be the same. However, this means that if there is an issue with task design 
in one study, it affects the task design for every study. Luckily, this worry has not 
came into fruition, however future research may want to consider limiting the 
number of factors examined. A great many effects of interference were observed 
across this project, and facilitation seen only in the strongly spatial domain of 
spatial semantics in the stronger still spatial axis of horizontality. 
Concept 
There is a conceptual issue regarding the spatial bias mentioned above. 
Though preliminary research exists to show valency and grasp aperture to work 
in a similar manner to explicit spatial bias (e.g. Göbel & Rushworth, 2004) and 
though this research is now supported somewhat by the current tasks, there is no 
firm evidence. For example, at the level of valency, it is certainly a possibility 
that arousal, not emotional content, is a candidate for magnitude bias. Indeed, 
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prior investigations demonstrate separate neural processes for valence and 
arousal, with effects of arousal occurring automatically while effects for valence 
rely on controlled encoding processes (Kensinger & Corkin, 2004; LeBar & 
Cabeza, 2006; Tambini, Rimmele, Phelps & Davachi, 2017). In the context of the 
current task, arousal was controlled for. In terms of research, it would be possible 
to examine arousal and emotion further and document the conceptual interplay 
between these representations. 
A pragmatic decision was made to avoid examining distance effects (i.e. 
near-far). However, by doing so some potentially interesting results may have 
been eschewed. At this level of investigation it is not an issue, but certainly one 
to be contended with by future research. Near-far effects are perhaps one of the 
strongest domains in the world around us, and certainly one of the most 
overlooked in cognitive science. In reality, it is hardly ever the case that the 
environment can be easily divided into cartesian axes, but at the same time this 
adds a level of complexity to research that is only just beginning to become 
addressed (e.g. Myachykov, Ellis, Cangelosi & Fischer, 2013; Thomas, 2017; 
Thomas & Sunny, 2017; Gronau, Izoutcheev, Nave & Henik, 2017). More 
abstract domains have yet to begin this line of research. Perhaps, here, this was 
most notable in the affordance domain of study. It is very rare for a tool to be 
used in vertical space, and so despite grasp size priming magnitude it is possible 
to make the argument that by not considering possible distance effects findings 
were lost. 
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Future Research 
One of the most pressing directions for future research is to address the 
directional nature of representations. In the context of the current thesis it was 
assumed that the findings reflected a change in levels of abstraction, though as 
discussed, another potential contender is the change in explicit and implicit 
directionality. More representational domains with explicit directionality need to 
be assessed in order to further examine this proposition. One such hypothesis 
could be that explicit directionality primes location of response instead of 
magnitude and can be investigated further by cross-examining rightward and 
upward responses, and leftward and downward responses as groups. For example, 
if location is primed over magnitude, a rightward bias should only prime a 
response in the rightward domain and not the upward. If magnitude were primed, 
then a leftward bias would also prime a downward response, as would an upward 
bias a rightward response.  
Naturally, the question of distance is one that, too, should be addressed. 
Pupillometry has traditionally proved to be difficult to implement in cognitive 
tasks (e.g. Hartmann & Fischer, 2016) and presently relies on significant pruning 
of data to remove eyeblinks and other artefacts. However, it is still the strongest 
candidate at the level of eyetracking for assessing near-far changes. In spatial 
semantics, near-far ratings already exist, which makes it a strong prospect for 
examination. Again, an issue of directionality arises in that there is an assumption 
in implicit spatial bias that power (affordances) and positive (valency) are upward 
and rightward-biasing – albeit somewhat supported – however this may not be 
the case for the z-axis. Thus, important and crucial norming studies are also 
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suggested for future research. A tentative hypothesis in this domain would be that 
objects with power grasp affordances would prime far-distance effects (i.e. large 
magnitudes) while precision grasp affordances would prime close-distance 
effects (i.e. small magnitudes). This could be replicated in the domain of valency 
and spatial semantics, whereby examining rightward and upward biasing words 
should prime far-distance effects. By doing this, the issue of directionality would 
further be clarified. 
Another possibility is reversing the order of processing. As it has now 
been established that observable effects occur in the current paradigm, a strategic 
choice would be to replicate the domains studied at present but swap the ordering 
of numerical and task-specific stimuli such that participants are first primed with 
a magnitude before asked a question about an item (in the case of valency, 
perhaps look left if the word is negative; look right if the word is positive) and 
then the verification question regards the numerical content. By conducting such 
a task, it would extend the literature on SNARC and conceptual interplay. Here 
the expectations are the same as are currently hypothesised, but in reverse: large 
numerical magnitudes prime positive word responses, small numerical 
magnitudes prime negative word responses – of course, similar predictions are to 
be made across affordance and spatially semantic domains. 
Naturally, the cultural question is one that needs to be addressed, but 
eventually. An idiom that comes to mind is do not try to run before being able to 
walk. While exciting opportunities exist in examining whether the reversed 
mental number line in other populations extends also to the domains studied here, 
it is not presently the most important of future directions. As such, this is offered 
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as a suggestion for future research, but only when other opportunities have been 
addressed. 
Conclusions 
This thesis offers a novel contribution to knowledge through the 
examination of how representations activated in close spatial or temporal 
proximity may interact with one another through a process termed conceptual 
interplay. The experiments conducted as a part of this project demonstrated a case 
for this interplay through demonstrating interference and facilitation effects 
between the related domains of microaffordance, spatial semantics, valency and 
numerical magnitude. Though pressing questions have been generated from the 
analysis of these tasks, support for the overarching hypothesis has been found. 
An important question in cognitive science regards how representations interact 
now has a fundamental platform from which a response can be developed, going 
forward.  
Additionally, the present studies have generated novel support for 
embodied models of cognitive processing, through the demonstration that 
representations, acquired through sensorimotor processing, play a role in 
understanding of more abstract domains (e.g. valency) and the understanding of 
the world. Future research suggestions have been presented which include 
replication, cultural, representational and pragmatic directions. From the 
perspective of the author, the most important of these are pragmatic, by which 
the other recommended tasks naturally follow. 
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representations stored within working memory. In the context of the current study, we aim to establish how offline 
representations establish a bias in processing.  
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Testing is to take place within laboratory space in the Northumberland Building at Northumbria University. Before the 
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computerised instructions. The duration of the study is not expected to last longer than 45 minutes. 
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5. Will my participation involve any psychological discomfort or embarrassment? 
No discomfort is anticipated, though minor psychological discomfort has been reported by participants undertaking 
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allocated throughout the study, though please notify the experimenter if this becomes overbearing. 
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7. How will confidentiality be assured? 
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research study will only be available to the research team identified in the information sheet. Should 
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4. Will my participation involve any physical discomfort? 
No. 
 
5. Will my participation involve any psychological discomfort or embarrassment? 
No discomfort is anticipated, though minor psychological discomfort has been reported by participants undertaking 
timed tasks in the past. Further, some physiological discomfort in the form of eyestrain is expected. Breaks are 
allocated throughout the study, though please notify the experimenter if this becomes overbearing. 
 
6. Will I have to provide any bodily samples (i.e. blood, saliva)? 
No. 
 
7. How will confidentiality be assured? 
You will be given a participant number that shall be kept separately from your consent form. Any information and 
data gathered during this research study will only be made available to the research team identified in the 
information sheet. Your results will not be identifiable and any data will only be used for the purposes of this research 
project, and potentially for publication in scientific journals or presented at conferences. 
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8. Will I receive any financial rewards / travel expenses for taking part? 
No. 
 
9. How can I withdraw from the project? 
If you wish to withdraw during the study, please inform a researcher. If you wish to withdraw your date after 
participating, please contact the principle researcher via the email listed at the start of this document and provide the 
unique identifier that was presented to you at the beginning of the study. Please note that this is only likely to be 
possible for one month after participation, after this time, the project will be complete. 
 
10. If I require further information who should I contact and how? 
Through contacting the researcher via the email listed at the start of this document, or the project supervisor 
(Andriy.Myachykov@northumbria.ac.uk). 
 
If you have any concerns or worries with regards to the way in which this research has been 
conducted, then please contact the Chair of Ethics (Postgraduate) Dr Nick Neave by Email: 
nick.neave@northumbria.ac.uk. 
 
The data collected in this study will be used as part of a PhD Thesis. It may also be published in 
scientific journals or presented at conferences. Any information and data gathered during this 
research study will only be available to the research team identified in the information sheet. 
Should the research be presented or published in any form, all data will be anonymous (i.e. your 
personal information or data will not be identifiable). 
 
All identifiable paper records will be stored in a locked filing cabinet, accessible only to the research 
team and all electronic information will be stored on a password-protected computer. All of the 
information you provide will be treated in accordance with the Data Protection Act. 
 
This information will be destroyed 6 months after completion of the project. If the research is 
published in a scientific journal it may be kept for up to 3 years before being destroyed.  During 
that time the data may be used by members of the research team only for purposes appropriate to 
the research question, but at no point will your personal information or data be revealed.  
 
This study and its protocol have received full ethical approval from the Department of Psychology 
Ethics Committee (Postgraduate) in accordance with the School of Life Sciences Ethics Committee. 
If you require confirmation of this please contact the Chair of this Committee, stating the title of 
the research project and the name of the researcher: 
 
Dr Nick Neave  
Chair of Department of Psychology Ethics Committee (Postgraduate) 
Northumberland Building, 
Northumbria University, 
Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 8ST 
UK 
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Participant Debrief 
 
PARTICIPANT DEBRIEF 
PARTICIPANT NUMBER 
 
NAME OF RESEARCHER Ashley Chapman 
 
PROJECT SUPERVISOR Dr Andriy Myachykov 
 
PROJECT TITLE Priming a SNARC via Spatial Semantics: The Attentional Interplay Between Numerical 
and Perceptual Information 
 
1. What was the purpose of the project? 
Previous research revealed similarities between word representations in memory and perceptual 
representations formed online during tasks suggesting that memory and perception are grounded in 
sensorimotor experience. This was also shown to be true for numbers: magnitude representations in memory 
show similar features to perceptual number representations, such as SNARC and distance effects. Other studies 
show sensorimotor simulations in memory are similar to other representations of magnitude, such as time and 
grasp affordances. The latter reports provide support to the ATOM theory of magnitude (time, space and 
quantity processed as part of the same mental system) suggesting an interplay between magnitude-related 
knowledge both in perception and memory. 
 
We expect to find that grasp size of the object representations stored in memory will lead to the establishment 
of attentional SNARC effects during auditory number processing revealed by eye movement and magnitude. 
 
2. How will I find out about the results? 
You can obtain a summary of the research through indicating your preference on the informed consent document. It 
must be noted that no interpretation of individual results will occur, and any document will be generalised to the wider 
sample as opposed to being individualised. 
 
3. Have I been deceived in any way during the project? 
No. 
 
4. If I change my mind and wish to withdraw the information I have provided, how do I do this? 
If you wish to withdraw during the study, please inform a researcher. If you wish to withdraw after participating, please 
contact the principle researcher via the email listed at the start of this document and provide the unique identifier that 
was presented to you at the beginning of the study. Please note that this is only likely to be possible for one month 
after participation, after this time, the project will be complete. 
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If you have any concerns or worries with regards to the way in which this research has been 
conducted, then please contact the Chair of Ethics (Postgraduate) Dr Nick Neave by Email: 
nick.neave@northumbria.ac.uk. 
 
The data collected in this study will be used as part of a PhD Thesis. It may also be published in 
scientific journals or presented at conferences. Any information and data gathered during this 
research study will only be available to the research team identified in the information sheet. Should 
the research be presented or published in any form, all data will be anonymous (i.e. your personal 
information or data will not be identifiable). 
 
All identifiable paper records will be stored in a locked filing cabinet, accessible only to the research 
team and all electronic information will be stored on a password-protected computer. All of the 
information you provide will be treated in accordance with the Data Protection Act. 
 
This information will be destroyed 6 months after completion of the project. If the research is 
published in a scientific journal it may be kept for up to 3 years before being destroyed.  During that 
time the data may be used by members of the research team only for purposes appropriate to the 
research question, but at no point will your personal information or data be revealed.  
 
This study and its protocol have received full ethical approval from the Department of Psychology 
Ethics Committee (Postgraduate) in accordance with the School of Life Sciences Ethics Committee. If 
you require confirmation of this please contact the Chair of this Committee, stating the title of the 
research project and the name of the researcher: 
 
Dr Nick Neave  
Chair of Department of Psychology Ethics Committee (Postgraduate) 
Northumberland Building, 
Northumbria University, 
Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 8ST 
UK 
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Valency and Numerical Magnitude 
Participant Information 
 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION 
 
NAME OF RESEARCHER Ashley Chapman 
 
PROJECT SUPERVISOR Andriy Myachykov 
 
PROJECT TITLE Priming a SNARC via Word Valency: The Attentional Interplay Between 
Numerical and Perceptual Information 
 
1. What is the purpose of the project? 
We aim to discover more about the processes that contribute to our general systems of memory and attention. 
Previous research has shown a bias in object and number processing dependent upon our perceptual senses and 
representations stored within working memory. In the context of the current study, we aim to establish how offline 
representations establish a bias in processing.  
 
2. Why have I been selected to take part and what are the exclusion criteria? 
You have been selected for the present study because you have given your consent to participate within the 
experiment and also met the inclusion criteria (over 18 years of age, speak English fluently, have normal or corrected-
to-normal vision). 
 
3. What will I have to do? 
Testing is to take place within laboratory space in the Northumberland Building at Northumbria University. Before the 
task commences, you will be asked to complete an informed consent document and provide demographic 
information. Once this has been completed you will be given information about the task you are to complete via 
computerised instructions. The duration of the study is not expected to last longer than 45 minutes. 
 
4. Will my participation involve any physical discomfort? 
No. 
 
5. Will my participation involve any psychological discomfort or embarrassment? 
No discomfort is anticipated, though minor psychological discomfort has been reported by participants undertaking 
timed tasks in the past. Further, some physiological discomfort in the form of eyestrain is expected. Breaks are 
allocated throughout the study, though please notify the experimenter if this becomes overbearing. 
 
6. Will I have to provide any bodily samples (i.e. blood, saliva)? 
No. 
 
7. How will confidentiality be assured? 
You will be given a participant number that shall be kept separately from your consent form. Any information and 
data gathered during this research study will only be made available to the research team identified in the 
information sheet. Your results will not be identifiable and any data will only be used for the purposes of this research 
project, and potentially for publication in scientific journals or presented at conferences. 
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8. Will I receive any financial rewards / travel expenses for taking part? 
No. 
 
9. How can I withdraw from the project? 
If you wish to withdraw during the study, please inform a researcher. If you wish to withdraw your date after 
participating, please contact the principle researcher via the email listed at the start of this document and provide the 
unique identifier that was presented to you at the beginning of the study. Please note that this is only likely to be 
possible for one month after participation, after this time, the project will be complete. 
 
10. If I require further information who should I contact and how? 
Through contacting the researcher via the email listed at the start of this document, or the project supervisor 
(Andriy.Myachykov@northumbria.ac.uk). 
 
If you have any concerns or worries with regards to the way in which this research has been 
conducted, then please contact the Chair of Ethics (Postgraduate) Dr Nick Neave by Email: 
nick.neave@northumbria.ac.uk. 
 
The data collected in this study will be used as part of a PhD Thesis. It may also be published in 
scientific journals or presented at conferences. Any information and data gathered during this 
research study will only be available to the research team identified in the information sheet. 
Should the research be presented or published in any form, all data will be anonymous (i.e. your 
personal information or data will not be identifiable). 
 
All identifiable paper records will be stored in a locked filing cabinet, accessible only to the research 
team and all electronic information will be stored on a password-protected computer. All of the 
information you provide will be treated in accordance with the Data Protection Act. 
 
This information will be destroyed 6 months after completion of the project. If the research is 
published in a scientific journal it may be kept for up to 3 years before being destroyed.  During 
that time the data may be used by members of the research team only for purposes appropriate to 
the research question, but at no point will your personal information or data be revealed.  
 
This study and its protocol have received full ethical approval from the Department of Psychology 
Ethics Committee (Postgraduate) in accordance with the School of Life Sciences Ethics Committee. 
If you require confirmation of this please contact the Chair of this Committee, stating the title of 
the research project and the name of the researcher: 
 
Dr Nick Neave  
Chair of Department of Psychology Ethics Committee (Postgraduate) 
Northumberland Building, 
Northumbria University, 
Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 8ST 
UK 
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Participant Debrief 
 
PARTICIPANT DEBRIEF 
PARTICIPANT NUMBER 
 
NAME OF RESEARCHER Ashley Chapman 
 
PROJECT SUPERVISOR Dr Andriy Myachykov 
 
PROJECT TITLE Priming a SNARC via Word Valency: The Attentional Interplay Between Numerical 
and Perceptual Information 
 
1. What was the purpose of the project? 
Previous research revealed similarities between word representations in memory and perceptual 
representations formed online during tasks suggesting that memory and perception are grounded in 
sensorimotor experience. This was also shown to be true for numbers: magnitude representations in memory 
show similar features to perceptual number representations, such as SNARC and distance effects. Other studies 
show sensorimotor simulations in memory are similar to other representations of magnitude, such as time and 
grasp affordances. The latter reports provide support to the ATOM theory of magnitude (time, space and 
quantity processed as part of the same mental system) suggesting an interplay between magnitude-related 
knowledge both in perception and memory. 
 
We expect to find that grasp size of the object representations stored in memory will lead to the establishment 
of attentional SNARC effects during auditory number processing revealed by eye movement and magnitude. 
 
2. How will I find out about the results? 
You can obtain a summary of the research through indicating your preference on the informed consent document. It 
must be noted that no interpretation of individual results will occur, and any document will be generalised to the wider 
sample as opposed to being individualised. 
 
3. Have I been deceived in any way during the project? 
No. 
 
4. If I change my mind and wish to withdraw the information I have provided, how do I do this? 
If you wish to withdraw during the study, please inform a researcher. If you wish to withdraw after participating, please 
contact the principle researcher via the email listed at the start of this document and provide the unique identifier that 
was presented to you at the beginning of the study. Please note that this is only likely to be possible for one month 
after participation, after this time, the project will be complete. 
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If you have any concerns or worries with regards to the way in which this research has been 
conducted, then please contact the Chair of Ethics (Postgraduate) Dr Nick Neave by Email: 
nick.neave@northumbria.ac.uk. 
 
The data collected in this study will be used as part of a PhD Thesis. It may also be published in 
scientific journals or presented at conferences. Any information and data gathered during this 
research study will only be available to the research team identified in the information sheet. Should 
the research be presented or published in any form, all data will be anonymous (i.e. your personal 
information or data will not be identifiable). 
 
All identifiable paper records will be stored in a locked filing cabinet, accessible only to the research 
team and all electronic information will be stored on a password-protected computer. All of the 
information you provide will be treated in accordance with the Data Protection Act. 
 
This information will be destroyed 6 months after completion of the project. If the research is 
published in a scientific journal it may be kept for up to 3 years before being destroyed.  During that 
time the data may be used by members of the research team only for purposes appropriate to the 
research question, but at no point will your personal information or data be revealed.  
 
This study and its protocol have received full ethical approval from the Department of Psychology 
Ethics Committee (Postgraduate) in accordance with the School of Life Sciences Ethics Committee. If 
you require confirmation of this please contact the Chair of this Committee, stating the title of the 
research project and the name of the researcher: 
 
Dr Nick Neave  
Chair of Department of Psychology Ethics Committee (Postgraduate) 
Northumberland Building, 
Northumbria University, 
Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 8ST 
UK 
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Informed Consent 
 
 
 
INFORMED CONSENT 
 
 
Project Title:  
Priming a SNARC via Word Valency:  
The Attentional Interplay Between Numerical and Perceptual Information 
Principal Investigator: Ashley Chapman 
 
Participant Number: 
               please tick  
  where applicable 
I have carefully read and understood the Participant Information Sheet.  
 
I have had an opportunity to ask questions and discuss this study and I have received satisfactory answers.  
 
I understand I am free to withdraw from the study at any time, without having to give a reason for withdrawing, 
and without prejudice. 
 
 
I agree to take part in this study.  
 
I would like to receive feedback on the overall results of the study at the email address given below.   
 
Email address…………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Signature of participant.......................................................    Date.....……………….. 
 
(NAME IN BLOCK LETTERS)....................................................………………………. 
 
 
Signature of researcher.......................................................    Date.....……………….. 
 
(NAME IN BLOCK LETTERS) ASHLEY CHAPMAN 
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APPENDIX B: Experimental Materials 
The materials that have been used in this study can be found in the respective 
sources, or in the case of materials created purely for the thesis, found online at  
https://github.com/howisstifflucky/chapmanPhDData  
This can be downloaded either directly, via the web, or by using a git client (see 
documentation here: https://book.git-scm.com/). 
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APPENDIX C: Demographics Questionnaire 
Demographics 
1) Your date of birth: -------/--------------/--------------  
                                       Day       Month          Year  
2) What sex were you assigned at birth? 
Male ☐    Female ☐  
3) Which of the following best describes your ethnic background? 
White ☐    Pakistani ☐ 
Black – Caribbean ☐   Bangladeshi ☐  
Black – African ☐   Chinese ☐ 
Black – Other ☐   Asian – Other   
Indian ☐   Other– please specify ☐___________________  
4) What is your country of birth? _________________________ 
5) What is your country of residence? _____________________ 
6) Are you a native English speaker? 
Yes ☐     No ☐ 
7) How would you describe your parents’ education and income? 
Upper class ☐    Upper-middle class ☐ 
Middle class ☐    Lower-middle class ☐  
Working class ☐   Decline to answer ☐ 
8) Do you have siblings? 
Yes ☐     No ☐ 
9) What is your birth order? 
__________ 
10) Which hand do you use to write? 
Left ☐     Right ☐ 
Ambidextrous ☐  
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11) How would you describe your vision? 
20/20 uncorrected vision ☐  Corrected with contact lenses ☐ 
Corrected with glasses ☐  Vision problems ☐ 
12) Do you have any problems with language? 
No ☐   Yes (please specify) ☐  ____________________ 
12) Are you currently: (please tick as many boxes as apply) 
In active paid work ☐   Unemployed and seeking work ☐  
Retired ☐    Unemployed due to illness or disability ☐  
Doing voluntary work ☐  At home doing housework ☐  
Full time student ☐   Other (please specify) ☐  ____________________ 
13) Please complete for present or last paid job (for retired or unemployed)  
Job title: ___________________________________________________  
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APPENDIX D: Short form Edinburgh Handedness Inventory 
Participants would be given a sheet with the following questions: 
 
 
Responses would then be scored with the following experimenter’s sheet: 
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APPENDIX E: Raw Data 
The raw data from experimental studies has been mirrored online at 
https://github.com/howisstifflucky/chapmanPhDData  
This can be downloaded either directly, via the web, or by using a git client (see 
documentation here: https://book.git-scm.com/). 
